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I. INTRODUCTION
[C]Iass is a cultural as much as an economic formation...'
There has been a recent resurgence of interest in class in legal
scholarship. 2 This development might have been predictable. Inequality in
I. E. P.THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 13 (1964).
2. For example, the University of Pennsylvania Law School recently hosted a conference on
"Law and the Disappearance of Class" (November 2001). Courses on class and the law are taught at
least at four law schools: U.C. Berkeley (Boalt Hall), the University of Miami, the University of
Michigan, and Santa Clara University. A recent book coauthored by a law professor emphasized the
continuing political importance of the white working class. See generally RuY TEIXEIRA & JOEL
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America has grown sharply over the past two decades. 3 Working people
face job tenure insecurity, massive shifts in work structures, and heavy
debt.4 Indigent families have begun experiencing the termination of

assistance from the state.5 Revelations of corporate wrongdoing highlight
the power of wealth. But the new interest in class is not rooted primarily in
concern with the conditions of low wage workers or the unemployed.
Rather, it is a new twist on the topic of race. Out of social discomfort and
legal challenges to affirmative action, judges and scholars are seeking a
6
way to confront inequality without confronting race.
ROGERS, AMERICA'S FORGOTTEN MAJORITY: WHY THE WHITE WORKING CLASS STILL MATTERS
(2000). There have been calls for more scholarship on class. See, e.g., Angela Harris, The
Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 777 (1994), and new work emphasizing the
importance and transformative potential of multiracial experience among workers, Cynthia L. Estlund,
Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. I, 67 (2000) (noting that
"[wie may aspire to make the workplace a realm of equality on the basis of race, sex, and ethnicity, but
the workplace remains a bastion of class inequality."). Many recent works discuss issues of affirmative
action based on economic disadvantage. See generally RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY:
CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 83-120 (1996); R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and
Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-based College Admissions, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1029 (2001); Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Econonic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1913 (1996);
Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 452 (1997)
[hereinafter Malamud, Assessing Affirmative Action]; Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative
Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1847 (1996) [hereinafter Malamud, Lessons and
Caveats]; Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC.
472 (1997).
3. See LAWRENCE MISHEL, JARED BERNSTEIN & JOHN SCHMITr, THE STATE OF WORKING
AMERICA, 2000/2001 37-49 (2001) (noting that the last few decades have witnessed a historically large
shift of economic resources from those at the bottom and middle of the income (or wage or wealth)
scale to those at the top). "The result has been an increase in inequality such that the gap between the
incomes of the well-off and those of everyone else is larger now than at any point in the postwar
period." Id. at 48. Angela Harris argues:
Inequality is not just an accidental byproduct of capitalism. It's capitalism's major product.
And in contemporary America, that inequality seems to be increasing. The richest Americans
keep getting an increasing share of the nation's wealth, while the rest of us are competing for
an ever smaller share of the pie.
Angela P. Harris, Beyond Equality: Power and the Possibility of Freedom in the Republic of Choice, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1190 (2000).
4.

See MISHEL, BERNSTEIN & SCHMITr, supra note 3, at 221-53 (discussing job instability and

the growth of the contingent workforce); id. at 257-58, 278-80 (discussing burden of debt).
5. See, e.g., Alexandra Marks, Spike in Welfare Rolls Reignites Debate over Safety Net,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 7, 2002, at 2 ("An analysis done by the National Campaign for Jobs
and Income Support, a grass-roots advocacy group in Washington, found that 150,000 people have
already had their Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) checks reduced or terminated
permanently as a result of the federal five-year time limit on benefits.").
6. Proposals that call for grounding redistributive programs in "class" are attempts to address
past injustice and present inequality without using racial categories to accomplish transformation.
These programs are really concerned with status, rather than class in any relational sense, and do not
usually address group relations of power at all. See infra text and accompanying notes Part D. 1.
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Class is important in its own right, but in the United States people
usually do not talk much about it. 7 The term is unfamiliar, packed with
many different meanings, 8 and uncomfortably radical. In law and popular
discourse, the figure of the white working class person has appeared in
recent years as the symbol for the need to end or change affirmative
action. 9 A searching examination of interest in white working people
requires a closer look at class and the social construction of race. The
concept of class seems tame only in comparison to the volatility of the
discourse on race. It only remains tame if it is understood through a
simplistic notion of individual status and divorced from conflict and from
consciousness of shared interest among oppressed people-in other words,
from groups and relationships of power.
This Article explores the relationship between class and race in the
cases that limit structural transformation in the areas of work (the
"affirmative action" cases) and political power (the "voting rights" cases).
These are anti-transformation cases; although they occur in different
contexts, taken together, they effectively protect both class and race
privilege and limit structural gains for African Americans and other people
of color.' 0 This Article makes a series of connected arguments about the
complex relationship between race and class in these cases. First, there are
many ways of understanding economic inequality, and all workers in the
field of law should begin to think about what we mean when we use the
term "class." Second, the concept of class that we choose as a framework
will affect our concepts of race and interest. Third, conservative concepts
of class, status, and interest have been incorporated into the reasoning of
7.
BENJAMIN DEMoTT, THE IMPERIAL MIDDLE: WHY AMERICANS CAN'T THINK STRAIGHT
ABOUT CLASS 17 (1990) (discussing the lack of real exploration of class issues). Within a "mythology
of classlessness," id. at 29, talk establishing class superiority cornes up all the time, but "[iln theory,
class is an unmentionable." Id. See also BELL HOOKS, WHERE WE STAND: CLASS MATrERS vii (2000)
("As a nation we are afraid to have a dialogue about class even though the ever-widening gap between
rich and poor has already set the stage for ongoing and sustained class warfare.").
8.
See, e.g., Ira Katznelson, Working Class Fornation: Constructing Cases and Comparisons,
in WORKING CLASS FORMATION: NINETEENTH-CENTURY PATTERNS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE
UNITED STATES 16 (Ira Katznelson & Aristide R. Zolberg eds., 1986) Ihereinafter Katznelson, Working
Class Formation] ("As a concept, class has soaked up so much meaning that it has become bulky to
use ... [it] has been used too often in a congested way, encompassing meanings and questions that
badly need to be distinguished from each other."). Id. at 13-14.
9.
See Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class, and the Future of Civil Rights
Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1005 (1989) (noting with irony the emergence of the white
worker in these arguments). See also KAHLENBERG, supra note 2, at 18 (arguing harm to whites and
damage to coalition opportunities from affirmative action programs).
10.
Most scholarly criticism has appropriately focused on defending minority interests. This
article is not a substitute for those arguments but a companion project, exploring the way the Rehnquist
Court treats interest in white working people.
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legal cases. Finally, the concepts adopted in law yield results in the fields
of work and politics that particularly harm people of color but that also
harm class interests of white workers-the very parties who provide the
excuse for the retreat from work toward racial transformation and social
justice.
Both class and race are moving targets, their meanings forged through
social processes and human relationships that change over time. Part II
briefly reviews important aspects of white positioned perception to answer
a famous riddle-why affirmative action programs seem threatening to
white people whether or not they result in much actual change. Affirmative
action disturbs settled norms even when whites have no conscious
attachment to privilege or intent to discriminate. Whiteness as a dominant
cultural norm explains both white discomfort with race-conscious programs
and the role of the term "merit" in debates about affirmative action.
Part III turns to concepts of class and their interaction with white
privilege. Two major aspects of class theory are important to issues of race
and transformation in law. The first is the conceptualization of structural
inequality. There are many possible ways of thinking about the economic,
social, and political relationships involved in the production, control, and
distribution of wealth. Among these, American law and popular discourse
tend to choose a simplistic concept of socioeconomic status disconnected
from group relations of power. The choice of theoretical framework has
important consequences for analysis of race, because different models of
structural inequality yield different concepts of the interest of whites in
maintaining white privilege. Simplistic concepts of status tend to make
white attachment to white privilege seem natural, inevitable, and
unchangeable. Class-based solidarity, in contrast, creates a basis for
identity that may diminish white working class attachment to race privilege
or at least create openings for change.
The second important aspect of class is the relationship between
structural frameworks of analysis and the way people understand collective
interests and work for social change. Class identity is constructed not only
from economic position or shared understanding but through shared action.
America is filled with multiple obstacles to class solidarity, including
residential segregation, employment discrimination, and racism as a
persistent and pervasive ideology. Middle-class notions of working-class
interest are particularly insidious: white working-class interest in protecting
privilege is generally perceived as economic in nature and fundamentally
selfish, while middle-class protection of privilege is characterized as moral
in nature and concerned with appropriate societal protection of all
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individuals. Because class is "a cultural as much as an economic
formation,"'1' legal claims about interest and legal rules affecting relations
between social groups both affect class formation in America.
Although law is part of the emphasis on race over class in America
today, I do not argue that courts and legal scholars should "do class"
instead of "doing race" in the jurisprudence of transformation. Using either
race or class as the sole analytical framework for the interests of white
working-class people results in a more conservative politics of
identification and action than when both class and antiracism are analyzed
together. If we only "do race," white workers hear only about the qualities
they share with whites from other classes and higher socioeconomic
status-not about interdependence, mutuality, or the many ways in which
people of color have brought militancy to the defense of labor. If we only
"do class," race will not correspondingly disappear from the experience of
white workers. Because white privilege remains unnoticed by white
people, struggles waged by people of color against oppression and
exclusion will be experienced as disruptive and unjustified.
Parts IV and V explore class interest in the cases on affirmative action
and voting rights. Recognizing class interest would have disrupted
doctrinal reasoning in the cases from Firefighters v. Stotts 12 to Adarand v.
Pefia,'3 transforming the ways in which cases on work can be said to be
like other cases. Class would have provided a richer framework for
analyzing the benefits and burdens of transformative programs for all those
affected, including white workers. 14 Attention to class issues would also
have disrupted the leap from the cases on work to the cases on voting and
political power. The political economy of the much-litigated Twelfth
District in North Carolina favored working class mobilization and
influence, 5 but class played no part in the Court's conception of the
interest of white people in this district in Shaw v. Reno 16 and its progeny.
II. THOMPSON, supra note 1,at 13.
12. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
13. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
14. For example, class interest is quite different for working people in the context of layoffs than
in the award of municipal contracts. See infra notes 274-80 and accompanying text.
15. The Twelfth District linked industrial locations along an interstate highway in a state that had
chosen to scatter industrial centers and urban areas. See PHILLIP WOOD, SOUTHERN CAPITALISM: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1880-1980 163 (1986) (discussing how North Carolina

promoted investment based on the rural and small-town base of its working class; state policy promoted
decentralized development and a pattern of small urban centers). See also infra notes 331-69 and
accompanying text. By bringing scattered industrial locations together, the district concentrated votes
of industrial workers.
16. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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The evolution of doctrine in both lines of anti-transformation cases
depends on the absence of class as a cognizable category in American law.
If working class interest were examined closely, the cases would have been
reasoned and decided differently. The description of the interest of white
workers in these cases consistently chooses race and status over solidaristic
concepts of class: the "reverse discrimination" cases effectively name the
economic interests of that group as white rather than as working class, and
the "voting rights" cases name their political interests as white rather than
as working class.
E.P. Thompson defined class not as a "structure" but as "something
which in fact happens."' 7 Arguments about interest are part of the
construction of social groups. The anti-transformation cases help to
construct a political theater in which "class"-in the sense of combined
mobilization and consciousness-is less likely to "happen" at all. As law
names interest and distributes power, it affects the ways individuals and
groups understand their self interest and work toward it. Cultural
perception and the direct exercise of power interact in law. These cases tell
judges, politicians, administrators, and especially those seeking change:
you may not integrate a work place this way, you may not shape an
electorate that way. When law ignores class while claiming to protect
white workers, it gives authority to the claim that whites are harmed by the
advent of people of color. Workers in law and social justice need a new
way to consider class and interest.
II. COLOR AND POWER EVASION AT WORK
During the 1990s, critical race theory described whiteness in ways that
have now become familiar: race is a social construction within which
whiteness is a distinctly constructed racial identity.1 8 Race is inherently
relational, necessarily involving more than one social group and the
17.

THOMPSON, supra note 1,at 9.

18. For an introduction to a literature that is still growing rapidly, see generally CRITICAL WHITE
STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic eds., 1997); BARBARA
JEAN FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT Now I SEE: WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW (1998); RUTH
FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1993);
IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996); WHITE REIGN:

IN AMERICA (Joe L. Kincheloe et al. eds., 1998); WHITENESS: THE
COMMUNICATION OF SOCIAL IDENTITY (Thomas K. Nakayama & Judith N. Martin eds., 1999);
DEPLOYING WHITENESS

STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, MARGALYNNE ARMSTRONG, ADRIENNE DAVIS & TRINE GRILLO, PRIVILEGE
REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996).
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relations between groups' 9 as they evolve over time. "Racial theory is
shaped by actually existing race relations in any given historical period,"
and always subject to contest and change.20 Whiteness, according to Ruth
Frankenberg, consists of several linked phenomena: a "location of
structural advantage" and "race privilege"; a "'standpoint,' a place from
which white people look at [themselves], at others, and at society"; and "a
set of cultural practices." 2' The interaction between the material world and
the ways we explain and understand it generate experience-and whiteness
is continuously reconstructed through lived experience.2 2 This section
describes the way positioned white perception and its interaction with
structural privilege affect race-consciousness in the workplace.
A. INDIVIDUALISM, COLOR EVASION, AND POWER EVASION

As many scholars have noted, whites tend not to notice race when
23
only whites are present-race becomes salient in relation to others.
Whiteness facilitates achievement, diminishes conflict, and grants access,
while simultaneously diminishing awareness of one's own race. One of the
19. The concept of race acquires meaning only in the context of historical development and
existing race relations, and its meanings continue to change over time. See, e.g., Michael Banton, The
Idioot of Race: A Critique of Presentism, in 2 RESEARCH IN RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 21-22 (Cora

Bagley Marret & Cheryl Leggon eds., 1980) (describing changing concepts of race); MICHAEL OMI &
HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990s 4 (2d
ed. 1994) (same).
20. OMI & WINANT, supra note 19, at 1I.Omi & Winant identify a transition in the 1920s and
1930s from biologistic and social Darwinian views of race toan ethnicity-based paradigm which was in
turn challenged in the 1960s by class- and nation-based paradigms of race. Id. at 14-16.
21.
FRANKENBERG, supra note 18, at I. Frankenberg defines "whiteness" as the cumulative way
that race shapes the lives of white people. See id. Exploring whiteness has been difficult for whites in
part because the concept was discussed openly throughout most of American history, primarily by
advocates of white supremacy. Stephanie Wildman explores the ways in which the system of white
privilege interacts with systems of privilege based on other identity categories to affirm its invisibility
and power. See WILDMAN, stepra note 18, at 7-24. See also Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and
Women,in Practice atd Theory: A Reply to Catharine MacKitnot, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217, 238-

44 (1993) (analyzing the subordination of women in the context of housework and caring for children,
so that both race privilege and racial subordination can be made visible within the overall subordination
of women).
22. See FRANKENBERG, supra note 18, at 2:
Discursive repertoires may reinforce, contradict, conceal, explain, or "explain away" the
materiality or the history of a given situation. Their interconnection, rather than material life
alone, is infact what generates "experience," and, given this, the "experience" of living as a
white woman in the United States is continually being transformed.
23. See id. at 196 (observing that young white women described feeling "cultureless" and
described whiteness as "'formless' especially when comparing themselves to others whose identities
are seemingly "marked by race, ethnicity, region, and class").

2003]

CLASS AND STATUS IN AMERICAN LAW

24
Therefore,
privileges of whiteness is a freedom not to notice privilege.
will to
the
conscious
without
majorities
white
reproduce
can
people
white
job
and
exclude-for example, by finding desirable friends, acquaintances,
25
candidates to be others like themselves -without noticing the collective
28
26
and comfort 27 in ordinary life.
privilege that facilitates mobility
However, whites sometimes do perceive racism in the expression of
resentment against white privilege and sometimes even in the discomfort
created by being forced to feel conscious of whiteness. Self consciousness
and hostility both intervene in the apparently natural dominant norm. In
the logic of white privilege, making whites notice their own race seems

racist.
Ruth Frankenberg identified three ways in which whites "think
through race": essentialist racism, color and power evasion, and race
Essentialist racism is the old, familiar enemy: "race
cognizance. 29

difference

understood in hierarchical terms of essential, biological

24. See WILDMAN, supra note 18 at 2-5; FLAGG, supra note 18 at 1-2 (describing whiteness as
transparent norm). The manifestations of privilege seem elusive and subtle to whites who seek to
identify them. In an influential essay, Peggy McIntosh identified forty-six ways she experienced white
privilege in daily life, including things that happen because she is white and things that do not happenfor example, the ability to shop alone, well assured she will not be followed or harassed. See Peggy
McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences
Through Work in Women's Studies, in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 22, 25

(Leslie Bender & Dan Braveman eds., 1995). Cf Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves": Securing
Black People's Right to Shop and to Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH. L. REV. 147, 150-53, 156-63
(discussing the impact of treating African Americans as potential thieves); Kimberle Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the hitersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theor, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 151 (explaining that in

discrimination cases, race and sex are significant only as they disadvantage victims; privilege is implicit
and not perceived).
25. See, e.g., Cheryl 1.Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1731-37
(1993); Rodney Thaxton, Racism & Its Use of Myths, MIAMI HERALD, May 17, 1992, at Cl.
26. Since white neighborhoods minimize direct interaction by whites with people of color, the
social construction of race becomes critical: life in segregated space shapes racial identification. The
values implicit in contemporary housing segregation-values in which white neighborhoods and
"good" neighborhoods often come together-are part of the construction of the meanings of race in
America.

See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,

AMERICAN APARTHEID:

(1992); John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and
the Culture of Segregation: "Heving a Stone of Hope fromn a Mountain of Despair," 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 1233 (1995); John 0. Calmore, Spatial Equalit' and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-tothe-Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487 (1993); Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS

Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659 (1995).

27. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 21, at 234 (describing ways in which white privilege can be
reproduced without intent or effort by participants in commercial transactions.)
28. See McIntosh, supra note 24, at 4 (describing how author was raised to see herself as an
individual, not as part of a culture). See generally FLAGG, supra note 18 (exploring transparency of
whiteness and difficulty for whites of noticing white privilege in daily life).
29.

FRANKENBERG, supra note 18, at 14-15.
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inequality." 30 Law recognizes and rejects essentialist racism, but that is a
very limited achievement, because most public discourse in America today
is not characterized by essentialist racism. Race cognizance is the
recognition of difference on the basis of cultural autonomy and
empowerment for people of color. 3 1 Race cognizance has been under
attack in law, as the Rehnquist court has effectively equated the use of
32
terms that classify by race with essentialist racism.
Color and power evasion are pervasive in public discourse in the
United States. When whites are color evasive, they fail to notice their own
color, the color of others, and any difference between them.3 3 Color
34
evasion treats noticing color or race as a manifestation of prejudice.
Although color evasion seems to many white Americans like courtesy, the
idea that noticing race is itselfprejudiced rests on a fundamental sense that
race involves the inferiority of the "Other." 35 White privilege is the
product of a social history of racial power and subordination. 36 Adopted in
30. Id. at 14.
31. See id.
at 14-15.
32. When racial classifications are described as inherently "odious," the Court has treated the use
of race as a category in law as the same as the social harm of racism. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
643 (1993); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 214, 215, 224 (1995); infra notes 252255 & 307-317 and accompanying text. "The Court now largely finds racism wherever decision
makers explicitly take account of race. But it is also increasingly true that the Court spies racism only
where state actors consciously consider race." Ian Haney-Lopez, histitutional Racism: Judicial
Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1836 (2000).
33. Color evasion is similar to the phenomenon Neil Gotanda calls the myth of"nonrecognition."
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1,16-23 (1991).
34. See FRANKENBERG, supra note 18, at 145-46 (describing ways in which white women
equated noticing race with being prejudiced and showed "selective consciousness of difference," in
which they both admitted and denied noticing race difference). Whites are often color evasive when
discussing or characterizing people of color and when discussing white self-consciousness, the
awareness of a white self in relation to people of color. See id. at 142-49.
35. Noticing race is not polite for whites, therefore, because "race" itself is not polite-because
to whites "race" historically meant "Other," inferior, stigmatized. Id. 142-43, 15 1-52. Frankenberg
observes that, in this framework, "People of color are 'good' only insofar as their 'coloredness' can be
bracketed and ignored, and this bracketing is contingent on ...the virtue of a 'noncolored'--or whiteself." Id. at 147.
36. The meaning of whiteness cannot be separated from racism. See id. at 1-2. Recently, many
historians have described a process in which some immigrants from other countries "became white."
See generally THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE (1995); NOEL IGNATIEV,
HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995); DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND
THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991). Eric Arnesen has recently criticized this

historical literature for, among other things, failing to demonstrate that European immigrants were not
"white." Eric Arnesen, Whiteness and the Historian's hnagination, 60 INT'L LAB. AND WORKING
CLASS HIST. 3 (2001). Certainly European immigrants became consolidated into a system of privilege
in which structures of American racism worked to their advantage, and they became part of the
continuation of those structures.
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an effort to avoid being racist, color evasion implicitly preserves values
drawn from essentialist racism. Power evasion is color evasion with a
different edge: whites notice those differences which do not threaten white
37
comfort or privilege but deny the connection between race and power.
Most whites understand racism as something that a second party does
to or believes about a third party. 38 The second party is the bad racist actor,
and the third party the subordinated person of a minority race-both are
distinguished from the way whites understand themselves. Since the
dominant norm of whiteness and the mechanisms of its reproduction are
transparent to white people, whites perceive the problem of racism as
intentional, individual prejudice. For more privileged white Americans,
racism often appears to be something that working class whites
(particularly Southerners) do to African Americans and other people of
color. Blaming working class whites also tends to exonerate wealthier
whites. In the absence of any more radical concept of class interest, the
middle class may understand working class whites only as racists. 39 This
dynamic permits middle class white people to sincerely regret the
continued existence of racial hostility without feeling responsible for
changing it.
In law, color and power evasion are manifested in the preference for
color-blind or race-neutral policies. The call to do away with race in
decisionmaking resonates for whites when combined with the assertion that
immigrants have no historic guilt for black subordination. This argument
simultaneously opposes racism and protects privilege. The call to "just
stop talking about race" seems consistent with rejecting racism and
attractive because positioned white perception continually misses the
ongoing reproduction of race. Because whites tend to think of race as
meaning "Other," the call to stop making racial classifications can have
moral authority. It seems to protect against racial injustice in general as
well as protecting against the danger that affirmative action will create
discrimination against themselves for being white. 40 Therefore, this
37. See FRANKENBERG, supra note 18, at 156 (asserting that whites evade recognizing
differences that make whites uncomfortable through euphemism, self-contradiction, or other forms of
denial).
38. See Martha R. Mahoney, Constructing Solidarity: Interest and White Workers, 2 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 747, 750 (2000).

39. See Bob Zellner, Labor and Civil Rights, Address before the Law and Society Association in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (May 1992).
40. For example, in the early 1990s a poll of young people between the ages of fifteen and
twenty-four (called the "post civil-rights" generation) showed that sixty-eight percent of blacks felt that
blacks were discriminated against on the basis of race; fifty-two percent of Hispanics felt Hispanics
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argument may appeal to whites who oppose racism and believe they are not
racist.
B. WORK AND INSECURITY: UNSETTLING EVASION

I don't think there are 500 people in Louisiana that have either been
adversely affected or benefited from affirmative action. But everyone
who doesn't have a job or whose son cannot get into law school believes
it's because of affirmative action." If affirmative action is so limited
in
41
its scope, why are so many white people so worked up about it?

Affirmative action programs challenge the privilege to avoid seeing
whiteness.
Affirmative action changes the transparent quality of

whiteness-even without significantly altering the racial makeup of a
workplace-because it makes white people identify as white rather than as
individuals with no race. Whiteness also suffers as a dominant norm,
losing the crucial capacity to define expectation without notice or
negotiation. No matter how voluntary a program or how modest its
methods, affirmative action embodies an aspiration toward change. The
conscious aspiration to integrate the workplace defeats color evasion,
whether or not whites consciously seek to prevent access for people of
color. Even before the population of a workplace changes, affirmative
action identifies and counts whiteness, and-even worse-treats it as a
problem. Whiteness, which had not been self-conscious, becomes less
comfortable.
The process of counting the race and gender of workers also defeats
color evasion. Although the counting process begins by counting
minorities for "underinclusion, 4 2 it immediately threatens to reveal
were discriminated against on the basis of race, and forty-nine percent of white people felt that whites
were being discriminated against on the basis of race. See George E. Curry, Young Find Race Relations
Troubling, CHI. TRI., Mar. 17, 1992, at 2 (describing poll conducted by People for the American
Way). A lesser number felt they had themselves been the objects of discriminatory actions. See id.
41.

MICHAEL GOLDFIELD,

THE COLOR OF POLITICS:

RACE AND THE MAINSPRINGS

OF

AMERICAN POLITICs 7 (1997) (quoting former Louisiana governor Edwin Edwards in his 1991
campaign against David Duke). On the limited effect of affirmative action on opportunity, see Eleanor
Holmes Norton, Affirmative Action in the Workplace, in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 44
(George E. Curry ed., 1996) (observing that the proportion of white men in the full-time civilian
worklorce declined 4.4% between 1979 and 1992, but African-American and Hispanic men declined
more: Afiican Americans declined by 5.5%, while Hispanics declined by 6.9%).
42. For example, in 1974 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") identified
factors described as the "essence" of affirmative action programs. They included the following:
establishing company policy and commitment; assigning responsibility to a top official; analyzing the
work force to identify areas where minorities and females are underutilized; goal setting; ensuring that
job descriptions and hiring criteria reflect actual job needs; finding minorities and females who qualify
or can become qualified to fill goals; ensuring that procedures do not have a discriminatory effect;
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overinclusion of whites. Whites then appear as a social group and
whiteness loses the appearance of a natural phenomenon. This is a
threatening process for whites who had not perceived the presence of a
social group of privileged whites but only a set of individuals and their
achievements.
Affirmative action does not stop at requiring whiteness to be noticed.
Whiteness must also be justified. By counting, affirmative action programs
strip legitimacy from the assumption that the current distribution of access,
wealth, and work is a natural phenomenon.43 The predominance of white
people in a medical school class, secretarial pool, lunchroom, or office
party loses that natural status which required no justification. This loss is
disconcerting because part of being white is a sense of race-less comfort
that is equated with human value and dignity. The lack of identification
with a privileged group helps establish that any individual white person
acquired her job through her own meritorious work. An emphasis on
privilege threatens the concept of merit in whites and poses it against the
merit of the "Other." Reaffirming merit becomes an urgent need, so it
should be no surprise that merit has become a rhetorical focus of debates
over affirmative action.
In the absence of affirmative action programs, color evasion permits
some diversity in the workplace to be unnoticed, accepted, or rationalized.
After all, color evasion will avoid consciously noticing difference-the
culture within which whites live and work is not really supposed to be
If minority coworkers are not brought in through
white anyway.
affirmative action, color and power evasion can be reestablished. The
dominant norm operates with the following irony. In the absence of any
official program, white norms permit the inclusion of some people of color,
since the dominant character of whiteness-its most important trait as a
transparent positioned norm-does not require that the environment be
exclusively white. But, in the absence of affirmative action programs, the
dominant norm still works actively to limit change. Because a whitedominant environment feels inclusive to whites, whites are poorly equipped
getting minorities and females into "upward mobility and relevant training pipelines" to improve
access; developing systems to monitor and measure progress. See I U. S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR
EMPLOYERS 3 (1974). Finally, the EEOC noted, "[ijf results are not satisfactory to meet goals, find out

why, and make necessary changes." Id.
43. See Harris, supra note 25, at 1777-81. See also Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10, 54-58 (1987) (criticizing assumptions that the status quo is "natural, uncoerced, and
good").
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to gauge whether an environment is effectively inclusive and may
overestimate diversity in the absence of a program of systematic inclusion.
Counting and other systematic mechanisms of transformation threaten
the dominant norm both by enforcing change and by stripping whiteness of
its capacity to define dominance without notice. In a tidy coincidence, the
same resistance that protects whiteness as a dominant norm also protects it
as a numerical majority. Because the norm requires not-noticing race,
white people who oppose affirmative action may not see themselves as
denying access to people of color (a goal too close to the old enemy of
essentialist racism) but as ending unfair preferences, a discourse that
incorporates the "merit" defense while reestablishing the dominance of
white norms.
In contrast to the difficulty of perceiving white privilege, white people
do notice phenomena that threaten value and dignity, such as insults by the
boss, or fear of loss of job. The existence of affirmative action as an
employment policy destabilizes the state-of-nature, self-justifying condition
of whiteness. The challenge to whiteness therefore feels like a challenge to
value and dignity." This is one of the most puzzling phenomena of our
time. Why should identification with a privileged group pose a challenge
to dignity and self respect? The problem is that race privilege includes
unearned" assets or power 45 -thus the idea that one's current assets are
"unearned" is threatening.46
White Americans responded to the challenge posed by affirmative
action in several ways, including compliance,4 7 transformation, resistance,
and shifts in political and social discourse. One widespread response was a
discursive strategy that invoked the concept of merit and defended the
dominant norm with a circular argument: to the extent whiteness is
dominant in a workplace or throughout society, it is the product of merit;
44.
For whites who consciously resist loss of race privilege, whiteness functions as it did under
de jure segregation, as an identity that specifically reflects human value and dignity while denying that
the excluded Other also has dignity and full humanity.
45.
See McIntosh, supra note 24, at 23-27 (describing unearned assets the author gains from

white privilege).
46.
See, e.g., Stephanie Wildman, Teaching and Learning toward Transformation: The Role of
the Classroom in Noticing Privilege, in WILDMAN, ARMSTRONG, DAVIS & GRILLO, supra note 18, at
165 (discussing white male professor who insists that he works hard to earn the respect of his class and
resists seeing privilege that is in operation frorn the moment he enters the classroom).
47.
See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger & John Lande, Internal Dispute
Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 497, 511-19

(1993) (reviewing actions by complaint handlers who were management personnel of large employers).
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merit, not unearned privilege, created the present allocation of work.4 8 Old
beliefs about white superiority are deployed on a new battlefield.4 9
Positioned white perception is crucial to understanding the success of the
right-wing attack on affirmative action.
The rhetoric that poses
"preferences" against "merit" helps to affirm merit as an attribute of
50
whiteness.
When arguments about affirmative action focus on past injustice,
rather than the present reproduction of power, they encounter a welldeveloped set of defenses. 5' Retrospective arguments fit relatively well
with the idea that racism is something a second party does to a third party.
A moral dilemma can now be asserted. The second party-the bad racist
actor-is someone who operated in the past, perhaps fifty years ago (before
48. Good things accrued by whites (such as homeownership) are best understood by whites as
accrued through their own merit. See John E. Morrison, Colorblindness,Idividuality, and Merit: An
Analysis of the Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313, 330-34 (1994) (reviewing
various perspectives regarding the concept of merit). Success affirms merit: I got this nice home
through hard work and thrift; it proves that I am meritorious if I also get other good things; I work hard,
and I know it, so my sense of desert and of my own merit are repeatedly confirmed. An opposite
rhetoric implies that people with merit are disadvantaged by those who advance through affirmative
action, which is understood to mean advancing without merit. The second argument is also circular:
anything gained by a person of color is suspect, potentially non-meritorious-because a person of color
gained it.
49. See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comnnient on the Affirmative Action
Debate, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1327, 1330 (1986) (assessing claim that affirmative action harms blacks).
50. Because the background norm of whiteness is invisible, whites looking at affirmative action
tend to see blacks as profiting by trading in blackness. Cheryl Harris specifically responds to this
concern by noting several reasons that blackness is not the mirror image of whiteness: the reification of
whiteness reflects centuries of privilege that are not present in the reification of blackness; whiteness
still exists as an artifact that confers advantages over blackness; affirmative action does not carry with it
an ideology of subordination-it can therefore remove the divisions that have historically perpetuated
the subordination of working class whites; nor does it naturalize privilege or create expectations of
future benefits for blacks since it cannot be implemented without conscious intervention, planning, and
monitoring. See Harris, supra note 25, at 1784-86. For those defined outside the circle of whiteness,
affirmative action is manifestly not trading in blackness but reallocating some of the privileges of
whiteness-redistributing a few sticks from the "bundle of rights" in whiteness, or creating a property
interest in equal opportunity. On the property right in whiteness, see id. at 1777-91; Derrick Bell,
Property Rights in Whiteness-Their Legal Legacy, Their Economic Costs, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE CUTTING EDGE 71, 75 (Richard Delgado and Jean Stephanic eds., 1995); Derrick Bell, Xerces and
the Affirmative Action Mystique, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1595, 1602-11 (1989) [hereinafter, Bell,
Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystiquel.
51. 1 do not mean here to dispute the strengths of these arguments, to suggest an end to them, or
to criticize the movement for reparations. Obviously, arguments that focus on present injustice also
encounter defenses. My concern is with the ways in which white discursive strategies and positioned
perception respond to reinforce white attachment to white privilege. See generally WHEN SORRY ISN'T
ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE (Roy L.
Brooks ed., 1999) (providing assessment of reparations movement and presenting arguments submitted
by whites). Reparations arguments need not be understood as focusing only on the past-they may also
link past injustice to the present reproduction of power and privilege.
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Brown v. Board of Education) or even more than one hundred fifty years
ago (during slavery). The third party-the "actual victim" of racism-also
existed in the past, cannot really be made whole now, and may in fact be
dead. As Cheryl Harris has shown, emphasizing the question of guilt leads
to a focus on "innocent" whites, to the detriment of black aspirants.52 The
claim of innocence 53 directly relates to the concept of merit: It is an
assertion that a person has not gained position through unearned advantage.
Many whites who do not wish to be racist, believe they are not racist,
and wish to avoid being perceived as racist, choose to focus on the harms
of the past. The admission of past harm combined with the denial of
redress in the present recognizes inequality while protecting wealth and
self-respect.
This white response includes many sub-narratives of
innocence: "I wasn't guilty because my family wasn't here" (the immigrant
story),54 or "I suffered discrimination too and am not really as 'white' as
you think" (the story of outsider ethnic and religious groups), and "my
family has not been privileged and I am not privileged today" (the white
working class story). Each of these stories has persuasive power because it
turns some aspect of truth previously understood to contradict the story of
participation in race privilege. Focusing on the past allows whites to avoid
55
noticing the problem of the present reproduction of privilege.
The dynamics of privilege are important to legal reasoning about race.
Law constructs the background rules of material existence and permits
society to treat those rules as given-selectively releasing them from
52. Harris notes:
If affirmative action is cast as a bipolar corrective justice claim between a Black aspirant and
a white applicant or incumbent, then denying relief to the Black aspirant logically follows.
Although the claim for compensation for unjust loss may be valid, the white applicant or
incumbent is innocent of the historical wrong for which the Black aspirant seeks relief and
therefore should not be forced to yield position.
Harris, supra note 25, at 1782 n.3 10.
53. For a partial review of the Supreme Court's concern for "innocent" nonminorities in
affirmative action cases, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: List Term 's Affirmative
Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78, 84 (1986) (examining paradigm of sin and innocence in Supreme
Court decisions).
54. See Antonin Scalia, Commentaorv: The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH U. L. Q. 147, 152.
Kenneth Karst responds directly to this argument by arguing that immigrants joined the "firm of
privilege." KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION
92-104 (1989).
55. Of course, many justifications for affirmative action do focus on the reproduction of power in
the present.

See. e.g., GERTRUDE EZORSKY, RACISM AND JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE

ACTION 9-27 (1991) (emphasizing continuing discrimination in the present as well as continuing
effects of past racism, and describing the importance of contemporary social networks to access to
work). See generally CHARLES R. LAWRENCE Ill & MARt J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK:
MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997) (remarking that both the past and the present

provide reasons to defend affirmative action).
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consciousness-while reckoning with problems and conflicts that are
56
brought to the foreground through the selection of new legal conflicts.
Law is therefore part of the construction of whiteness directly, by defining
race, and indirectly, as it makes arguments about racial injustice, and as
legal arguments confer and protect privilege. 57 The focus on the past in
narratives of contemporary "innocence" is power evasive, allowing the
Court to avoid dealing with contemporary power and the continuing
process of racial formation.5 8 Only by evading power could the meaning of
"race" in the 1860s be held to define its meaning for civil rights today. 59
Color and power evasion affect law as they affect the rest of society, but
their application particularly influences the terms of social debate.
An example of power evasion in law occurred in the cases in which
white plaintiffs challenged employer decisions as racially discriminatory
under Title VII. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,60 the Supreme
Court created a burden-shifting formula requiring the plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. The presumptions in the McDonnell
Douglas test effectively recognized that race-based exclusion for people of
color and race-based privilege for whites shaped access to work in the
United States. 6 1 If a minority applicant was qualified for a job, did not get
56. See, e.g., Karl Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358,
1358 (1982) ("The peculiarity of legal discourse is that it tends to constrain the political imagination
and to induce belief that our evolving social arrangements and institutions are just and rational, or at
least inevitable, and therefore legitimate.").
57. See generally HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 18 (examining legal construction of white racial
identity).
58. Power evasion marked the cases dealing with whether Arabs and Jews were protected by the
Reconstruction-era civil rights acts. St. Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 608-13 (1987);
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987) (discussing whether Arabs and Jews
were "distinct races" and thus "within the protection of' civil rights statutes). In St. Francis College.
the court string-cited eight books and a number of articles on race without serious analysis of their
content. 481 U.S. at 610 n.4. The Court recognized that "race" is a troublesome and contingent
category that changed over time, not a natural or fixed category. See id. at 610-13. It held, however,
that interpretation of the statutes turned on the understanding of race at the time Congress enacted the
bill. See id. Since Arabs and Jews were conceived as distinct races at that time, they could sue under
civil rights statutes today. See id. at 613.
59. The term "race" has been used in law to stand for several different concepts. See generally
Gotanda, supra note 33; Lawrence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-BasedConstitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L. J. 1063, 1074 (1980).

60. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
61. Id. at 802. The court recognized that direct evidence of discriminatory treatment can be
difficult to produce. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination and shift the burden to the
defendant to justify its actions, the plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainants qualifications.
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it, and a white person got it instead, a court could presume that "these acts,
if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors." 62 Reverse discrimination cases
posed the sharp question of whether failure to hire a white person could
have the same meaning as failure to hire a person of color. Some circuits
applied the McDonnell Douglas test without comment or modification in
the reverse discrimination context.63 Because the test was based on
inferences drawn from discrimination prevalent in American society, other
circuits have found it impossible to draw the same inferences from a white
plaintiff's race and situation, holding instead that a white plaintiff must
additionally show "background circumstances [to] support the suspicion
that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the
majority.

64

Courts are power evasive when they make the same assumptions
about discrimination for whites as for people of color. Inferences about the
meaning of a racial difference between job-applicant and job-occupant
surely depend on the meaning and context of race. Belief in their own
merit and discomfort with the loss of a dominant norm may make whites
believe that affirmative action is responsible for the success of any person
of color. 65 Because subordination and stereotypes are race-specific,
formalism in these cases effectively protects white privilege.
Id.
62. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
63. See, e.g., Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301, 304 (11th Cir. 1991); Young v. City of Houston,
906 F.2d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 1990). See generally Angela Onwauchi-Willig, When Different Means The
Same: Applying a Different Standard of Proof to White Plaintffs Under the McDonnell Douglas Prima
Facie Case Test, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 53 (1999) (supporting argument in favor of different tests
for white and minority plaintiffs with extensive evidence about discrimination in employment).
64. Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (requiring
showing of "background circumstances"). See also Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d
63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); Bennett v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 670 F. Supp. 196, 198-99
(E.D. Tex. 1987); Jones v. Slater Steels Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1570, 1575 (N.D. Ind. 1987). Cf
Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 1986) (disparate impact case).
The Tenth Circuit created an alternative route to establishing a prima facie case to avoid disfavoring
white plaintiffs. See Notari v. Denver Water Dept., 971 F.2d 585, 589-90 (10th Cir. 1992).
65. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Affirnative Action Rhetoric, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring
1991, at 130, 139-40. Radin writes:
The dominant group will be able simultaneously to make women and people of color meet
higher standards than those applicable to white males, and yet convince everyone, often
including the beneficiaries of affirmative action themselves, that they are inferior...
... if a black gets the job, it will be said to be rnerely the result of affirmative action'; yet
blacks will have to be spectacularly good to get the job, in the face of the stubborn
conceptualizalion of them as not good at this sort of thing.
Id. at 139-40 (emphasis omitted).
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III. CLASS, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND WHITENESS
"What is the meaning of 'race'?" is an intellectually liberating
question. The curtain is thrown back: an apparently natural category is
revealed to be socially constructed, problematic in all aspects, and packed
with many meanings. The question has proven productive in law as in
many areas of social theory, opening a rich body of recent literature
including examination of the role of law in defining "race" itself and in the
construction, transformation, and protection of racial power.
In contrast, asking "What is the meaning of 'class'?" feels more like
falling off a cliff. Vast bodies of social and political theory have explored
this question. The debates go back more than a hundred years and have
lively current iterations. But the question is important in law even if it is
difficult. The absence of explicit recognition of class in current legal
discourse, and the implicit concepts of interest and inequality, shape legal
decisions ideologically and doctrinally.
There are many modes of analyzing inequality. Concepts of class and
status are related to concepts of the self-interest of white working people.
A status-only approach to inequality yields a more conservative view of
interest in which working class white people appear to be naturally attached
to preserving white privilege-perhaps even more than wealthier whites.
In concepts of class interest that are based on group relations of economic
power, antiracist solidarity is an actual or potential interest of white
workers, and class awareness and activism are vital to the transformation of
white attachment to privilege
In law, conservative decisions and ideology have led to reasoning that
is status-based rather than class-based. Even proposals for "class-based
affirmative action" are concerned more with status than with class in any
relational sense. These proposals shift the focus of law and policy to
compensation for individual disadvantage rather than social justice and
transformation.
This Part of the Article explores the difficulty of
addressing class in law.
A. CONCEPTS OF INEQUALITY AND SELF-INTEREST:
CLASS AND "VULGAR STATUS"

The existence or non-existence of classes is one of the major stakes in
66
the political struggle.

66.

Pierre Bourdieu, What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of

Groups, 32 BERKELEY J. SOC. 1, 9 (1987).
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Historically, two major concepts of class and status divided social and
political theory. One, associated with Max Weber, analyzes economic
participation through a focus on distribution and the market and
emphasizes status as an important aspect of structural inequality. The
other, associated with Karl Marx, emphasizes class relations in a system of
production and the exploitation of labor by capital.67 My goal here is not to
urge a choice between Marx and Weber in analyzing structure and agency
and their interaction with law, but to contrast the gap between popular
concepts of status in America and the ideas of class that appear in
Marxism, left Weberian thought, and the labor movement. Many scholars
agree that the two classic schools have over time converged to some
extent 68 or at least moved toward each other. 69
67.

Neo-Marxists 70 began

See, e.g., STEPHEN EDGELL, CLASS (1995); Norbert Wiley, hitroduction, in THE MARX-

WEBER DEBATE 7-11, 19-25 (Norbert Wiley ed., 1987); Vic Duke & Stephen Edgell, The
Operationalisation of Class in British Sociology: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations, 38 BRIT. J.
Soc. 445, 446-50 (1987); Mike Savage, Class Analy'sis and its Futures, 32 SOC. REV. 531, 535-41
(1994).
68. See, e.g., Loic J. D. Wacquant, Making Class: The Middle Class(es) il Social Theory and
Social Structure, il BRINGING CLASS BACK IN: CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 39,
50 (Scott G. McNall et al eds., 1991):
[There arel widening areas of overlap and convergence between Marxist and Weberian
approaches Ito the middle classesl....
Marxist sociologists.., have produced less
deterministic and more differentiated pictures of the middle class, and Weberian theorists...
have developed more structural models emphasizing property and power. In any case, this
emerging synthesis between 'production-centered' and 'market-centered' approaches seems
far more convincing than any of these views taken alone. The ritual opposition of these two
traditions of class theory is no longer meaningful and profitable.
/ed.(citations omitted).
See also John R. Hall, The Reworking of Class Analysis, in REWORKING CLASS 1, 31 (John R. Hall ed.,
1997) ("Once it is acknowledged that market capacities, class interests, and organizational exploitation
become structured in diverse ways within capitalism, the theoretical gaps between Marxian and
Weberian approaches are largely erased, and the Weberian analysis of structurations within capitalism
becomes ever more salient."); Wiley, supra note 67, at 23, 25 (noting that "what exists now is a kind of
Marx-Weber truce, tending toward cautious interaction").
For additional exploration of the
convergence of Marxist and Weberian thought, see Val Burris, The Neo-Marxist Synthesis of Marx and
Weber on Class, in THE MARX-WEBER DEBATE, sttpra note 67; ROSEMARY CROMPTON, CLASS AND
STRATIFICATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO CURRENT DEBATES 50-52 (2d ed. 1998); Franco Ferrarotti,
Weber, Marx. and the Spirit of Capitalism: Toward a Unitary Science of Man, in A WEBER-MARX

DIALOGUE 262, 270-71 (Robert J. Antonio & Ronald M. Glassman eds., 1985); McNall, et al.,
Ittroduction, in BRINGING CLASS BACK IN, supra, at 3; Erik Olin Wright, Rethinking, Once Again, the
Concept of Class Structure, in REWORKING CLASS 41-71 (John R. Hall ed., 1997); Duke & Edgell,

supra note 67, at 445-501.
69. Scholars do not agree, however, on the consequences of change. Is the convergence toward
shared theoretical understandings? Or do the two systems of analysis still stand apart and lead in quite
different directions despite their increased need to reckon with the insights of the other system? See
generally Duke & Edgell, supra note 67 (comparing Marxist and Weberian approaches); Savage, supra
note 67 (same).
70. Nor is the distinction between "neo-Weberian" and "neo-Marxist" always clear; scholars
sometimes disagree as to how they would classify each other. For example, Duke and Edgell classify
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emphasizing forms of exploitation beyond those tied to the relations of
production 71 and recognizing differences within and between classes that
are more like occupational strata than earlier Marxist analyses.7 2 NeoWeberians recognized difficulty in analyzing stratification, particularly
when faced with contested issues involved in classification of the status of
women.

73

In Marxist analysis, class remains primary-workers of all races share
the experience of exploitation and depend upon each other for liberation.
But Marxism is not the only concept of class that invokes solidarity as the
shared interest of working people. Solidarity also fits within Weberian
74
thought in which economic class is important to relationships of power.
If class is organized entirely or even partly by power relationships among
groups involved in systems of production, 75 working people have very deep
interests in building mutuality and overcoming divisions among
themselves. Even without resolving debates about whether capitalism is
itself the source of racial divisions and racist oppression, 76 the left and the
labor movement have long argued that the interests of white workers are
John Goldthorpe as neo-Weberian, in part because he works with occupational schema that look very
status based. See Duke & Edgell, supra note 67, at 445-50. Robert Erikson and Goldthorpe claim this
characterization is not accurate or useful. ROBERT ERIKSON & JOHN H. GOLDTHORPE, THE CONSTANT
FLUX: A STUDY OF CLASS MOBILITY IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 37 n.10 (1993) (explaining that they
draw on both Marx and Weber in making employment relations crucial to delineating the structure of
class positions and noting that they believe "the opposition between Marxian and Weberian conceptions
of class that is by now enshrined in sociology textbooks is in many respects exaggerated ... to repeat, it
is consequences, not antecedents, that matter"). See also Savage, supra note 67, at 536-37 (noting that
the categorizations by Erikson and Goldthorpe depend in some ways on relation to employment
relationships, not only on status).
71.

See generalv JOHN E. ROEMER, A GENERAL THEORY OF EXPLOITATION AND CLASS (1982)

(analyzing exploitation of labor in capitalist countries and status exploitation in socialist countries).
72. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 68 (comparing class relationships).
73. EDGELL, supra note 67, at 32-33; Duke & Edgell, supra note 67, at 451-52.
74. This holds true even though economic class may be conceived differently than in Marxism
and be analyzed more as a matter of stratification. See, e.g., CROMPTON, supra note 68, at 32-35. See
also Wiley, htroduction, in THE MARX-WEBER DEBATE, supra note 67, at 18-21.
75. For example: "[Classes] are determined by their place in a historically specific ensemble of
production relations and by their self-activity, which constitutes and reconstitutes these relations and
their place within them." McNall et al., supra note 68, at 3-4 (quoting MAURICE ZEITLIN, ON CLASSES,
CLASS CONFLICT, AND THE STATE: AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE 3 (Maurice Zeitlin ed.)). Under the given
analysis, working toward developing and defending shared class interests has historically been part of
what constructs the working class itself. See id.
76. See GOLDFIELD, stpra note 41, at 15 (describing the "divide and conquer" framework
common to some Marxists and some labor unionists as one in which "racism is instilled by employers
who attempt to forestall solidaristic, class-based organization on the part of their own employees and
workers in general").
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disserved in important ways by racial division in general and by its impact
on specific struggles.7 7
Clearly, not all accounts of "class" are right and of "status" wrong.
There are good reasons for the convergences in Marxist and Weberian
thought. Obviously, status concepts have been crucial to the analysis of
racial constructions and white privilege. Rather, this Article criticizes
frameworks that recognize only status, especially simplistic or naturalized
concepts of status, because this approach has important consequences in
law.
1. Exploitation, Oppositional Groups, and Solidarity
Erik Olin Wright defined approaches to class as "relational" (focused
on group relationships of power and exploitation) or "gradational" (focused
on stratification and line-drawing based on occupation and market
position). Both relational concepts and concepts that are at least in part
related to production emphasize the need of working people for solidarity.
For Marxists, class interest in white men and women as workers outweighs
any advantage that exists in holding onto white privilege. Marxists do not
always submerge race questions into class questions. 78 They have
sometimes advanced theories that are closer to "national" concepts of
race 79 and sometimes treated racism as a consciously developed capitalist
ploy. 80 As to the self-interest of white workers, Marxist theories emphasize
interest in a mobilized, conscious, self-activating working class. In this
vision, whites are harmed as are all workers to the extent that they are
divided from other workers. Racism is part of working class division;
rejecting racism and white privilege, therefore, is part of working class
interest.
If the relationship of social groups in a system of production is a factor
of any significance in social analysis-a position many scholars associate
with Weberian as well as Marxist traditions-then white workers have
interests in opposing racism and building class-based solidaristic
consciousness and action. Those interests are either actual (objective,
77. See infra text accompanying notes 132-157. See also Martha R. Mahoney, What's Left of
Solidarity? Whiteness, Labor Histor,, and Law (2003) (unpublished manuscript in possession of
Southern California Law Review) (discussing class consciousness and white privilege).
78. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 19, at 29-35 (examining Marxist influence on both "class"
and "national" paradigms of race); GOLDFIELD, supra note 41, at 15 (describing the "class reductionist"

idea that employers created race discrimination as a divide-and-conquer tactic as common to some
Marxists and some non-Marxists in the labor movement).
79.
80.

See OMI & WINANT, supra note 19, at 29, 42-44.
See GOLDFIELD, supra note 41, at 15.
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inevitable) or potential (contingent, capable of being mobilized). If control
of capital and economic relationships of exploitation are even somewhat
important in any theory, then solidarity is at least a potential interest of
workers.
Pierre Bourdieu argues that classes are not predetermined or natural
but instead the political product of struggles for group self-definition within
"the social space."'" Social groups may form around many different axes,
engaging in class competition for control of political, cultural, symbolic,
and economic capital on unequal terms. 82 The representational battle to
name interests is part of forming those interests-groups form and are
recognized in part through the process of trying to define themselves. 83 In
Bourdieu's thought, therefore, there are no preexisting class relationships
of power and exploitation. Yet even when the nature of classes is itself the
subject of social contest, the possibility for economic solidarity-and for
contests of power against those who possess capital-is one of the ways in
which social groups may form. Therefore, there is at least a potential
tension between some of the ways in which white working people
experience "class" and the ways in which they gain from white privilege.
When defining interests is part of a process of creating them, attachment to
white privilege has the potential to defeat other forms of mobilization and
group construction that could be advantageous for white workers. In other
words, even in a postmodern analysis in which Marx's concept of natural
class interest is absent, the possibility of solidaristic group formation and
action based on shared economic interest is sufficient to make attachment
to white privilege problematic.
81. See Bourdieu, supra note 66, at 6. In Bourdieu's analysis:
IC]onstructed classes can be characterized in a certain way as sets of agents who, by virtue of
the fact that they occupy similar positions in social space (that is, in the distribution of

powers), are subject to similar conditions of existence and conditioning factors and, as a
result, are endowed with similar dispositions which prompt them to develop similar

practices....
. [T]he movement from probability to reality, from theoretical class to practical class, is
never given ... the principles of vision and division of the social world at work in the
construction of theoretical classes have to compete, in reality, with other principles, ethnic,
racial or national, and ... with... ordinary experience of occupational, communal and local
divisions and rivalries.

Id. at 6-7.
82.

See Bourdieu, supra note 66, at 11. See also PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A CRITIQUE

OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE 438-39 (1984) (asserting that groups are both unequally endowed with
capital and unequally equipped to fight over it).
83. Bourdieu, supra note 66, at 9. Bourdieu emphasizes control of capital in several forms
(cultural, symbolic, economic) and also the political nature of claims about class: "the existence or nonexistence of classes is one of the major stakes in the political struggle." Id.
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White attachment to privilege is destructive to many aspects of classbased action and organization.8 4 In a practical sense, white workers who
seek to hold onto white privilege and whose identity is strongly defined by
their whiteness are less likely to forge strong ties with workers of color.
The ideology that supports white privilege will impede their ability to work
with non-whites and will also make whites less trustworthy colleagues for
people of color.
Some scholars emphasize the segmentation of the labor market and
the extent to which white workers profit from access to better jobs. 85 In
recent years, many historians have also emphasized the agency of white
workers in the subordination of workers of color. 86 My argument does not
depend, however, on the ways in which race privilege and the ideology that
defends it have been part of the history of the white working class, nor on a
choice between class-conscious solidarity or attachment to privilege as a
natural defining interest of white workers. Because of the workings of
white privilege, all whites profit to some extent from participation in a
racist society; unless shared economic interest is understood to trump all
race privilege, therefore, some combination of racism, privilege, and
structural disadvantage within capitalism is the complex ground on which
working people in the United States form social groups.
Rather, I am concerned with the way that law incorporates arguments
about interest and affects the possibility and the strength of solidaristic
class-based organization. If shared roles in a system of production are even
part of the analysis, white privilege has destructive effects on the potential
for transformative work among workers. The negative impact of white
attachment to privilege is more obvious in left analyses which perceive the
working class as having naturally solidaristic interests opposed to those of
capital. However, to the extent that social groups can and sometimes do
form around shared interests in economic relationships of power, racism
and white privilege are destructive to that mobilization-whether group
84.
See, e.g., Goldfield, supra note 4 1, at 31 (stating that the system of white supremacy and the
ideology of white chauvinism have been detrimental for white workers in two ways: as an impediment
to development of a "sustained, solidaristic, class-based labor movement," and also it has often harmed
the immediate economic interests of white workers"). The view that racism is costly to workers is

consistent with E.P. Thompson's emphasis on class as a "happening," not a "thing." THOMPSON, supra
note I, at 10.
85.
See, e.g., Edna Bonacich, The Past, Present, & Future oJ Split Labor Market Theory, in I
RESEARCH IN RACE & ETHNIC RELATIONS 17 (1979) (analyzing split labor market in which racial
division is based on differential in price of labor-a "'class' theory of race and ethnicity").
86.
See, e.g. BRUCE NELSON, DIVIDED WE STAND: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR BLACK EQUALITY (2001) (emphasizing agency of white workers and extent to which they profited
from racism).
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formation is perceived through Bourdieu's approach or through neoMarxist or traditional labor analyses. In contrast, status-only analyses
create a different vision of white interest, and, as later Parts of this article
will explain, these concepts have important consequences in law.
2. Contemporary Concepts of Status
When people in America refer to "class," they usually mean status
rather than economic relations of power. They may refer to socioeconomic
status in general or to the sort of status required through consumption. 87 A
theoretical concept of status divorced from group relationships of power
and exploitation also appears in the work of economist Robert Frank. 88
Drawing on evidence that dominant animals have higher levels of
serotonin, Frank argues that the drive for status is inherent in human nature.
He asserts that in humans the quest for status is measured against a local
reference group, rather than against all people in society. 89
Frank recognizes inequality in bargaining power, and he is not
opposed to all protection for workers or to governmental regulation in
general. 90 In several ways, however, he rejects left concepts of class.
Frank treats exploitation of workers as a problem arising from the lack of a
functioning market. While employers might wish to exploit employees, he
believes they are unable to do so because of competition for workers.
Exploitation existed in the past in company towns, in which employers had
too great a grip on labor, and could still exist in a modern town with only
one major employer, such as a mining town. 9 1 However, Frank assumes
that any such mine would operate close to the margin of economic survival
and could not be exploiting workers because it would have little economic
87. See generally PAUL FUSSELL, CLASS: A GUIDE THROUGH THE AMERICAN STATUS SYSTEM
(1983) (analyzing "class" in the context of consumption and social status). See also DEMOTT, supra
note 7, at 31-33 (criticizing Fussell's emphasis on consumption and taste, and Fussell's treatment of
himself and some social groups as classless or outside the system of class).
88.

ROBERT FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR

STATUS 23-38 (1985). Legal scholars who apply Frank's theories include Richard McAdams and Cass
Sunstein. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position,

68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 327-28, 337, 364-67 (2001); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation And
Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production And Race Discrimination, 108 Harv. L. Rev.
1003, 1012-13 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Huoman Behavior And The Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205,

239, 267-68 (2001).
89. FRANK, supra note 88 at 22-38 (describing local reference groups against which status is
measured).
90. Frank does not dispute the reasonableness of the minimum wage, id. at 144-46, and argues
that status causes many competitions that the state can regulate for the good of society and its members.
Id. at 244-69.
91. Id. at44.
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surplus to share with them. 92 For Frank, profit from investment is as
natural as status-if an investor could not make a profit, she would invest
elsewhere 9 3-but it does not give rise to oppositional class interest or to
exploitation. Frank sees employers as individual entities in competition for
workers; if they tried to keep wages down, they would have to form an
unstable cartel. 94 His analysis does not account for deskilling low-wage
work, globalization, or other developments of the modern economy. And it
95
is explicitly opposed to left explanations of class interest.
The concept of status as a natural drive, and the analysis of status
without group relationships of power and exploitation, ultimately lead to
conceiving of attachment to white privilege as natural. Even if individual
whites do not seek the advantage of race privilege, because race is a social
construction, they are more likely than people of color to be perceived by
other whites as good prospective employees 96 and neighbors, 97 or to be
perceived by banks and insurers as good credit risks.98 I am not arguing
that this concept of status is the same as essentialist racism. Open
92. Id.
93. For example, Frank suggests that the owner of capital might invest in some non-exploitive
activity such as tree-growing in which she could sell lumber at the end of the year for money. FRANK,
supra note 88, at 43. He does not explain, however, why tree-growing for profit is non-exploitive.
Who plants, cultivates, and cuts the trees? Who turns trees to lumber? Unless Frank envisions trees
without labor, why are trees free of exploitation? Frank's casual approach to non-exploitive profit
allows him to avoid analyzing or explaining exploitation.
94. Id. at 42-43.
95. Frank concludes by stating that the problems with markets-including the failure of private
firms to pay workers the marginal value of their products, and the fact that "the terms of the unregulated
competitive labor market [are not] socially optimal"-does not have anything to do with "the power
imbalances and other imperfections stressed by critics." Id. at 268.
Instead, market outcomes fall short in the ways they do because individual goals and
collective goals are in fundamental tension from the outset. Evolutionary forces saw to it that
people come into the world with a drive mechanism that makes them seek to outrank others
with whom they compete for important resources. But this drive mechanism, so useful in the
individuals' struggle to survive, could hardly have been designed to yield greater disruption
for society as a whole. The specific behavioral consequences of this drive mechanism, not the
consequences of excessive market power, are what we regulate in the modern welfare state.
Id.
96. See, e.g., Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them,
But... ": The Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 203-04 (Christopher
Jencks & Paul C. Peterson eds., 1990) (indicating that employers bluntly expressed overtly racial
notions concerning the worthiness of prospective employees and preferred suburban to inner-city
applicants).
97. See supra note 26.
98. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351 (6th Cir. 1995) (lawsuit
alleging discrimination by mortgage insurance company); NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978
F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 508 U.S. 907 (1993) (same).
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99
expressions of race prejudice might lower, not raise, the status of whites.
White privilege, however, is status-enhancing as long as it includes
enhanced chances of being perceived as honest, intelligent, or meritorious,
or includes other practical advantages in obtaining access to employment,
education, or other sources of wealth and privilege. If the human drive for
status is a natural force, whites would remain attached to privilege as long
as any racism persists. Whites of lower status might be more attached to
white privilege than whites of more elite status, because they would have
fewer advantages over others around them, and therefore fewer ways to
generate serotonin. °°

Law is limited by concepts that treat status as natural and fail to
recognize exploitation. Uncontested legal rules have the effect of making
the distribution of power look natural. The emphasis on status can reveal
the need for rules that protect against racial subordination but conceal the
need for rules that facilitate solidarity. 1 The failure of judges to perceive
either class interest or the ongoing construction of white privilege is part of
the reasoning that helps to defeat programs of racial transformation.
Status tends to be a zero-sum game. 10 2 A gain in status for one group
means a loss for other groups. In status-only frameworks, therefore,
99.
But cf THE BELL CURVE DEBATE (Russell Jacoby & Naomi Glauberman eds., 1995)
(bringing together documents and criticism of RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE

BELL CURVE (1984) and summarizing debates about ethnic differences in intelligence.)
100. FRANK, supra note 88, at 23-25, 59.
101.
The consequences of looking only at status are apparent in Richard McAdams' application
of Frank's theory to antidiscrimination law. Criticizing economic arguments that antidiscrimination law
is unnecessary because the "taste for discrimination" is costly, McAdams argues that whites as a social
group have a shared interest in protecting white status. This is a sophisticated application of status
concepts to the collective advantages of white privilege. However, McAdams misses the process by
which whites have been consolidated to the defense of race privilege rather than class mobilization in
American history. McAdams quotes a speech in which Henry Grady appealed to white southerners,
arguing that white racial domination must be "compromised in no [material] necessity." McAdams,
supra note 88, at 1006-08. The tension between Grady's view and class-based activism of the late
nineteenth century is not considered in McAdams' account, which therefore understates the contingent,
contested nature of social group mobilization (Bourdieu's version of class). While I agree with
McAdams about the continued importance of antidiscrimination law, his approach to status makes it
difficult to recognize other ways in which law works to defeat transformative work. Cf Mahoney,
supra note 38, at 754-57 (criticizing failure to recognize the tensions between Populist organizing and
appeals to white supremacy in the South).
102. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2328-29 (1997)
[S]tatus competition is intense because status is a relative good. One has more of it because
others have correspondingly less. Status competition tends to be zero-sum, at least in the
short run.... One cannot increase the status of one group without decreasing the status of
another. High prestige is prestige over others and in distinction to others. Increased respect
for lower status groups means a corresponding loss of respect for higher status groups because
their identity has been constructed around their greater prestige and the greater propriety of
their ways of living.
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protecting white privilege appears to be a natural economic and social
interest for white people, regardless of their wealth or class position. When
shared class interest is not recognized, white working people have no
redistributive interest in solidarity, and therefore any white privilege they
relinquish is a loss rather than a shift which may lead to further gains.
"Vulgar Marxism" refers to a relatively crude economic determinism
or reductionism with which virtually no legal theorists are willing to
identify.10 3 When concepts of status and stratification have been stripped
of relation to power, capital, and economic exploitation, they capture the
thought of Weber and his followers no better than economic reductionism
captures Marx. The dominance of status concepts in American social
thought explains the lack of a cognate term. We need a new term, perhaps
"vulgar status," or "status-only," or "vulgar Weberian," to describe
simplistic concepts of socioeconomic status divorced from relations of
capital, production, and power. It would be great progress if American
04
theoreticians feared status vulgarity as much as vulgar Marxism.1
Status alone also implies an understanding of the state and political
power different than concepts of class that are related to the production of
wealth. Vulgar status is consistent with a conservative notion of the state.
The "empty state" ' 5 is a hollow shell containing gradations of status
Id. at 2328. Balkin applies this analysis to race relations in America:
Illn a system of white supremacy, whites gain positive associations of honesty, reliability,
industry, intelligence, and morality in comparison to blacks. To increase the status of blacks
in society means that these positive associations must be weakened or eliminated. Whites can
no longer expect a certain set of positive assumptions to be made about them simply because
they are white. The social meanings of whiteness and blackness are subtly altered, and the
social identities of individuals are thereby changed.
i. at 2329.
103. But (f Eben Moglen, The Tran.formation of Morton Honvitz, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1042,
1044 (1993) (reviewing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992)) (noting that "the once self-proclaimed 'vulgar Marxist' has
gone post-nodern").
104. Of course, what we should really fear is losing sight of the production of wealth and power
entirely, rather than fearing intellectual "vulgarity."
105. The "empty state" is a metaphor for the political economy of the Rehnquist Court, deployed
to deny state responsibility and blame the market-the shell is arranged around the private sector and
not understood to define it. In the "empty state," the line defining the public good is not merely
arbitrarily drawn to insulate power but is defined as the sum of all the different private goods. See
Kenneth Casebeer, Running on Empty: Justice Brennan's Plea, the Emptyv State, the City of Richmond,
and the Profession, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 989, 1002-19 (1989) [hereinafter Casebeer, Runniing on
Emipty'j; Kenneth M. Casebeer, 7hie Eniptv State and Nobody's Market: 77he Political Ecollony of NonResponsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of the Civil Rights Movement, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 247,
253-70 (1999) [hereinafter Casebeer, The Empt Statel.
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stacked like layers in a cake.' 0 6 The "haves" get larger, sweeter, more
highly placed layers than the "have-nots." The state has no more to do with
interaction between layers than the cake pan does with the cake.' 0 7 Robert
Frank does acknowledge the importance of legal rules to the construction
of economic interest and the distribution of rights and privileges; he states
that legal rules originally based on concepts of exploitation are often
justified as a way of regulating the quest for status. However, since Frank
believes that exploitation does not exist, he does not recognize the role of
the state in creating and protecting exploitation.
In contrast, economic and relational concepts of class based even in
part on the organization of production necessarily involve some idea of the
role of the state in maintaining constellations of economic power. 0 8 When
social groups exist in contested relation to each other, the rules that allocate
power between them are part of their relationship. The structures that
govern relationships are important and cognizable, including the exercise
of state power through judicial decisions. To reckon with class, race, and
social change, legal theory and doctrine need to recognize concepts of class
that go beyond status and serotonin.
The following sections explore the interaction between concepts of
economic inequality and concepts of racial interest; subsequent Parts of this
article explore the ways in which law adopts a conservative concept of
economic inequality that has regressive effects for racial equality. I will
use the term "status" to refer to economic and social inequality that does
not consider relations of group power and exploitation and the term "class"
to refer to economic inequality constructed through relationships of power
and exploitation between social groups.
106.

See, e.g., Sylvia Walby, Gender, Class and Politics, in GENDER AND STRATIFICATION 31

(Rosemary Crompton & Michael Mann eds., 1986) (describing "a tradition, more common in America
than Britain, of studying social stratification by ranking individuals on a scale. This tradition is quite
different from the more European tradition of defining classes in relation to each other, as one group of
people who benefit at the expense of others").
107. Perhaps the "empty state" has even less to do with shaping society, because, in the cake pan
metaphor, the pan inevitably shapes the cake to some extent.
108.

See Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further Reflections on the Distinctive Character of

American Libor Laws, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1, 26 ("IW]e may assume that whatever the particular terms
of compromise achieved by workers and capitalists, they are to some important degree--even in the
most voluntarist system-institutionalized and enforced by the state.").
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B. "MAKING CLASS": AGENCY, WHITENESS, AND THE MAKING OF CLASS
AND CONSCIOUSNESS

[Plolitical and symbolic factors necessarily play a crucial role in the
construction of ... [class]: Class identities, practices, and "lived
experience" are not "afterthoughts" tacked on preexisting classes; they
enter into the very making of these classes. 109

Two roles of law, naming interest and distributing power, are
important in a dynamic view of class, race, and struggle. This section
describes their interaction. Sociologists and historians have long worked to
articulate' 10 the relationship between economic and social structures,'' 1 on
the one hand, and consciousness, 112 ideology, and struggle, on the other.' 3
However structural relations are described, they are experienced in the lives
of people, individually and socially.
The capacity for collective
109. Wacquant, supra note 68, at 51 ("Class lies neither in structures nor in agency alone but in
their relationship as it is historically produced, reproduced, and transformed.").
110. See Savage, supro note 67, at 540 (citing generally CROMPTON, supra note 68) ("The
relationship between structure and agency is one that has not been 'resolved' in any branch of
sociological inquiry and ... it is therefore wrong to 'gang up' on class analysis as if it is particularly at
fault here.").
11. See, e.g., MICHAEL BURAWOY, THE POLITICS OF PRODUCTION: FACTORY REGIMES UNDER
CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM 39 (1985). In fact, Marxism does not require defining economic structure
as the basis of all analysis. Id. ("Any work context involves an economic dimension (production of
things), a political dimension (production of social relations), and an ideological dimension (production
of an experience of those relations). These three dimensions are inseparable.").
112. See, e.g., Katznelson, Working-Class Formation, supra note 8, at 8:
Class formations ... arise at the intersection of determination and self-activity: the working
class "made itself as much as it was made." We cannot put "class" here and "class
consciousness" there, as two separate entities, the one sequential upon the other, since both
must be taken together-the experience of determination, and the "handling" of this in
conscious ways. Nor can we deduce class from a static "section" (since it is a becoming over
time), nor as a function of a mode of production, since class formations and class
consciousness (while subject to determinate pressures) eventuate in an open-ended process of
relationship--of struggle with other classes-over time.
(quoting E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory, in E.P. THOMPSON, THE POVERTY OF THEORY AND
OTHER ESSAYS 106 (1978)
113. Nor do Weberians think status is everything:
'ICllasses' have often been treated-in some traditions of social theory-as though they were
groups or collectivities: most commonly, in those traditions claiming a lineage from Marx.
On the other hand, there are contrasting approaches-most notably associated with Max
Weber and those who have followed him-in which the term "class" is used to refer to a
category of aggregate qualities (chances in the market, or traits of occupations). Neither of
these types of conceptualization seems satisfactory .... I therefore propose abandoning both
of these approaches, suggesting that a theory of class can only be satisfactorily elucidated as
involving the influence of an institutional order of "class society" upon the formation of
collectivities. Such an understanding of class structuration implies connecting ... a theory of
class society, as an institutional form, with an account of how class relations are expressed in
concrete types of group formation and consciousness.
ANTHONY

GIDDENS,

CENTRAL

PROBLEMS

IN

SOCIAL

CONTRADICTION INSOCIAL ANALYSIS 109-10 (1979).

THEORY:

ACTION,

STRUCTURE,

AND
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understanding, the sorting of possibility and decision, and the actions taken
also happen through experience of real people. As E.P. Thompson said,
"[H]istorical change eventuates, not because a given 'basis' must give rise
to a correspondent 'superstructure,' but because changes in productive
relationships are experienced in social and cultural life, refracted in men's
ideas and their values, and argued through in their actions, their choices,
1
and their beliefs." 14
1. "Making Class" or Racialized Status Groups
The process of "making class" involves agency and cultural and
economic relationships. In "making class," therefore, white privilege is
crucially important. If class is "a happening," not "a thing," then the very
"happening" of class is shaped by both conscious and unconscious white
choices. Since whiteness is also an interaction between the material world
and our experience of it, class interest is one of the most important ways in
which shared identity can affect the experience of self, identity, and interest
for white working people. In other words, strong working class identity
can help whites be less defined by their positioned perspective or by
attachment to privilege.
Conversely, attachment to privilege diminishes solidaristic
identification. Both privilege and positioned perception shape "men's
ideas and values ... actions, choices, and beliefs" by distributing benefits

and by justifying them. Whiteness can therefore facilitate the sense of
"middle class" status expressed by many American workers. 115 Race is
part of the construction of class-as-status in America, and statusconsciousness is part of what defeats the development of solidaristic
consciousness. ' 16
The lack of a language of class, the status/stratification concept of
inequality, and the dynamics of racial privilege and subordination are all
important to the ways Americans understand themselves and each other. In
America today only two social "classes" (actually status groups) are
usually discussed in the media and popular politics-a "middle class," and
an "underclass."
Each has a presumptive race. "Middle class" is
presumptively white or non-African-American, a notion easily identified by
distinguishing the frequency with which "black" qualifies "middle class" in
E.P. THOMPSON, MAKING HISTORY: WRITINGS ON HISTORY AND CULTURE 222 (1994).
115.
See infra
text accompanying notes 118-125.
116. In this dynamic sense, class experience "happens" in ways that include race experience as
part of the formation of classes. This point can be overlooked when "race and class" are taken to mean
"non-whiteness and lower-class status."
114.
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ways that "white" or "Asian" do not. In contrast, the category "underclass"
is presumptively non-white, and the term is particularly likely to be used to
refer to African Americans. 117 No "upper class" is ever discussed. There
exists a status called "wealthy", however, all but the very wealthiest of that
group describe themselves as having "middle-class" values and lifestyles.
And even the middle class is not very self-aware as a class:
[Alithough they may sometimes speak of themselves as men or women
of the 'middle class,' only with an effort of will-only by contrivancecan they imagine themselves to be members of a class. Normally they
feel themselves to be solid individual achievers in an essentially classless
society composed of human beings engaged in bettering themselves. 118
"Class" consciousness is therefore both raced and a misnomer for
most of America. It describes status rather than class categories. "Middle
class" status becomes, effectively, a distinction between status above
poverty level and below it.
A particular problem for consciousness of shared class interest in the
United States today is the raced construction that links "underclass" and
"unemployed and unemployable." The same period in which a "black
middle class" identity has been strengthened has seen the construction of
the concept of a gendered and raced underclass, portrayed as dependent and
criminal, not part of the working class but oppositional (trying to live off
the working class or steal from it).'' 9 The stereotypical link between race
and unemployment is part of the division that makes the category "working
class" seem disconnected from shared interest with racially subordinated
communities.1 2 ° Effectively, the focus on socioeconomic status and the
racialization of perceptions of employability interact with the idea that two
status categories ("middle class" and "underclass") define the universe of
"class" in America. 12 1 "Middle class" status consciousness interacts with
117.
See HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND ANTIPOVERTY
POLICY 29-33 (1995).
118.
DEMOTr, supra note 7, at 43.
119.
1 arn not arguing that the "underclass" is actually unrelated to the working class, but that it is
stercotypically constructed as unrelated and sometimes opposed to the working class. Thoughtful
critiques of the use of the term "underclass" can be found throughout Gans' study of attacks on the
poor, see GANS, supra note 117, and THE "UNDERCLASS" DEBATE: VIEWS FROM HISTORY (Michael B.
Katz ed., 1993) (presenting a critique of the use of the term "underclass").
120.
"Working class" is also a racialized concept in America; a concept of "working class" as
presumptively white developed after Reconstruction and continued to affect class development until the
present. See Michael Omi & Howard Winant, Racial Fortmatiots, inuRACE, CLASS & GENDER IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN INTEGRATED STUDY 13, 18 (Paula Rothenberg ed., 4th ed. 1998).
121.
Robert Reich tried to popularize the idea of an "overclass" as part of a vision of three classes
in America: an overciass, an underclass, and an "anxious class." GANS, supra note 117, at 52, 167
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race

unconsciousness

because

both

involve

unselfconscious

participation in an invisible norm that defines social expectation.
Of course, if everyone said "status" when status was what they meant,
it would help clarify the debates about race and class. 122 The use of the
term "class" disguises the concepts of status that permeate American
society, politics, and law. "Middle class" in common American parlance is
really a status term popularly understood through consumer choices and
124
capacities. 123 Many Americans identify with "middle class" status.
In addition, the American "mythology of classlessness" interacts with
white privilege to discourage class awareness and class formation. Status
is generally understood in law as an individual attribute 25 rather than as a
social process. This approach allows white privilege to appear as an
incidental feature of an individual life-a happenstance of skin color for
which a privileged individual cannot be held responsible.
Status-based views of whiteness also disguise shared interest in
working class solidarity. Whites of lower status are thought to have the
greatest attachment to racism of any group, both in their objective needs
(they need the help of white privilege most) and in their subjective
n.109 (1995). The "anxious class" is clearly a political appeal to people positioned in the center
(therefore, fundamentally "middle class" in American parlance). It was not widely adopted.
122.
Both terms-status and class-are used extensively in law; neither is used in law the way it
is used in sociological theory.
123.
See generaly FUSSELL, supra note 87, at 97-127 (claiming middle-class status can
simultaneously be a claim of self-respect; that is, if the only other choice popularly discussed is
'underclass," perceiving oneself as middle class is an indicator of both respectability and stability).
124.
See DEMOTT, supra note 7, at 41-54. Some of this identification, however, may be a
function of how studies are framed. See also MICHAEL ZWEIG, THE WORKING CLASS MAJORITY:
AMERICA'S BEST-KEPT SECRET 57-59 ("As recently as 1996, a majority of Americans responding to a
New York Times poll identified themselves as members of the working class rather than the middle
class."). In another recent survey, when offered two choices (working or middle class) fifty-three
percent chose working class and forty-three percent middle class. Id. at 58.
125.
See Rosemary Crompton & Michael Mann, Introduction, in GENDER AND STRATIFICATION
6-8 (Rosemary Crompton & Michael Mann, eds. 1986). Gender critiques of class theory also reveal
inherent flaws in assessing "class" as an individual matter, while pressing theorists on the limits of both
Marxist and Weberian theory in explaining women's experiences. Rosemary Crompton and Michael
Mann identify two major problems in analyzing gender and class. The first is the question of whether
the individual or the household is the proper unit of social analysis. The second notes that the "lifechances associated with the same occupation may be very different depending upon whether it is carried
out by a man or a woman." Id. at 6. The first issue was more problematic for neo-Marxists, and the
second for neo-Weberians. Id. For example, critiques of occupational stratification studies have been
part of work on class and gender. In the past, sociological studies of stratification and mobility often
grouped women in the occupational strata of their husbands. See also ERIKSON & GOLDTHORPE, supra
note 70, at 232-39; Duke & Edgell, supra note 67, at 450-53 (discussing whether the appropriate unit
of class analysis is the respondent/individual or the household/family); Walby, supra note 106, at 3 1-33
(noting the issue of whether a woman takes the same position in the ranking order as her husband).
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attachment (they seek extra status most desperately). Focusing solely on
status therefore reifies attachment to white privilege.
2. Agency and Consciousness-Class Lived Within Communities
Class is not just about structure or position but something dynamic
that includes the ways people understand themselves and their lives.
Therefore, there is a relationship between how people understand their
situations and how they act which moves in both directions: action affects
consciousness, and consciousness affects action. E.P. Thompson described
class as a "happening," not a thing. In the United States, the "happening"
of class has always been affected and shaped, inside the workplace and
beyond it, by the phenomena of subordination and privilege that constitute
race.
The widespread American attachment to status-identification as
"middle class" discourages the mobilization of class consciousness. "The
middle class does not exist prior to its symbolic and political
organization-it results from it." '2 6 Rejecting analyses which do not
recognize that social groups are contingent and forged in struggle,
Bourdieu emphasizes how important this contest over the nature of class
really is: "Knowledge of the social world and, more precisely, the
categories that make it possible, are the stakes, par excellence, of political
struggle, the inextricably theoretical and practical struggle for the power to
conserve or transform the social world by conserving or transforming the
categories through which it is perceived."' 27
Ira Katznelson emphasizes the importance of the separation of home
and work to the development of class in America.' 28 He divides "class"
into four aspects: structure, ways of life, dispositions, and collective
action. 129 These aspects are helpful for thinking about the development of
126. Wacquant, supra note 68, at 52.
127.
Pierre Bourdieu, The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups, 14 THEORY AND SOC'Y 723,
729 (1985). Bourdieu elaborates: "[Olne cannot group just anyone with anyone while ignoring the
fundamental differences, particularly economic and cultural ones. But this never entirely excludes the
possibility of organizing agents in accordance with other principles of division..." Id. at 726.
128. For a recent study applying Katznelson's framework to a working-class community, see
generally ROBERT BRUNO, STEELWORKER ALLEY: How CLASS WORKS IN YOUNGSTOWN (1999).
129. See Katznelson, Working-Class Fornation, supra note 8, at 14. Katznelson distinguishes
structural analysis of capitalist development (abstract analysis of structure, which he calls "experiencedistant") from the organization of society "lived by actual people in real social formations" (which he
calls "experience-near"). Id. at 15-16. Class means "formed groups, sharing dispositions," id. at 17,
and it also refers to the collective actions that are taken by those groups. Katznelson draws these
theoretical frameworks in order to avoid treating class actions as inauthentic because they do not follow
a theoretical hierarchy of authenticity.
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class and race in America. Part of the status-focus in America derives from
"ways of life." Residential segregation has become part of the story of
class and consciousness. Access to homeownership for white working
people1 30 enhances the sense of "middle class" status; the consumer role
"homeowner" helps define identity. Residential segregation cabins the
experience of community for people of different races and affects access to
work.
Katznelson's concepts of class are also helpful in thinking about the
role of law. Law is part of the "structure" of state and the relations of
production.
Law structures homeownership and the possibility of
achieving it in a variety of ways; it shapes development of residential
segregation, disputes over governance of public schools, the provision of
municipal services, and responses to segregation. It protects or creates
background rules governing "dispositions," and it regulates or discourages
collective action such as labor organizing, voting, demonstrating, and
handing out leaflets at shopping malls. Distinguishing structure from lived
experience also helps refine analysis of the different contexts in which class
consciousness is forged and class actions happen. Of course, I do not mean
to distinguish work as "structure" and home as "experience," but instead to
take Katznelson's point that economic and political structure and the lived
experience of life, work, and struggle for change vary widely for working
class Americans. Activism may function differently at the workplace than
in community struggles outside the workplace. Collective identities and
common systems of meaning at work do not always produce collective
action toward class interests. Significantly, in our segregated nation, the
impact of white privilege on "class consciousness" may be experienced
differently in the two locations, yet each context (home and work) may
3
affect responses in the other.' '
3. Solidarity Stories-White Privilege Contested
The idea of solidarity 3 2 is in some trouble these days. Diversity, not
133
solidarity, is the dominant framework for inclusive thinking about race.
130.

Homeownership has been less available to minorities than to whites. See generally CHARLES

ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS (1955) (providing study detailing how homeownership is unavailable

to minorities); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 26 (criticizing federal
homeownership to minorities and explaining their impact on urban segregation).
131.

programs denying

See generally IRA KATZNELSON, CITY TRENCHES: URBAN POLITICS AND THE PATTERNING

OF CLASS INTHE UNITED STATES (1981) (discussing patterns of working class Americans).
132. Adolph Reed explains, "Building solidarity [in the context of the labor movement] is about
constructing and maintaining a we to fight in concert for common objectives." Adolph Reed, Jr.,
Building Solidarity, PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1, 1996, at 20, reprinted in ADOLPH REED, JR., CLASS NOTES
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A searching examination of the relationship between class-based activism
and race is beyond the scope of this Article. But the possibility of
solidaristic class-conscious activism is fundamental to my argument that
the anti-transformation cases tend to conceal class-based interests of white
workers.
There are several reasons for the lack of awareness about solidarity
and faith in its transformative potential. The structural weakness of the
labor movement has made labor militancy less socially visible; therefore,
when class does "happen" in some region or struggle so that solidarity is
strong, it does not get much time on the evening news. The geographic
divide between residence and work combines with residential segregation
to obstruct the development of solidaristic political action. 13 4 Fear of
undertaking multiracial solidaristic work may arise either from stereotypes
of white workers or from actual experience of the effects of racism. Most
important, white privilege and racist ideology among white workers and
within organized labor also threaten solidarity.' 35 Class-based solidarity as
a unifying, galvanizing force among36workers of different races may seem
dated, unlikely, or even impossible.'
207 (2000). Reed emphasized that trade unions are "the most racially integrated voluntary associations
in American life" and necessitate mutual accommodation that can "break down racist, sexist, nativist, or
homophobic tendencies." Id. at 208 (noting that the labor movement has not always lived up to this
potential).
See RICK FANTASIA, CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY: CONSCIOUSNESS, ACTION, AND
133.
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN WORKERS 3-4 (1988) (describing widely held belief that American
workers lack class consciousness and do not have a tradition of solidarity, and noting strong
consciousness of solidarity in the United States during the 1930s). See also Charles R. Lawrence Ill,
Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense qf Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REv.
928, 941, 951-55 (2001) (stating that "It he case for diversity is a case for the integration of a
privileged class," and criticizing the failure of the diversity paradigm to address issues of historic and
continuing racial discrimination).
134. See, e.g., WILLIAM FORM, SEGMENTED LABOR, FRACTURED POLITICS: LABOR POLITICS IN
AMERICAN LIFE 6 (1995).
135. See Eric Arnesen, Up from Exclusion: Black and White Workers, Race, and the State of
labor History, 26 REV. INAM. HIST. 146, 147 (1998) (reviewing literature on race and labor and noting
"(tIlhat organized labor often functioned to uphold whites' access to employment and exclude non white
workers has been a commonplace in the literature for much of this century"). See generall
GOLDFIELD, supra note 41 (analyzing racism in the labor movement).
136. See, e.g., Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks," Privilege and the United
Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542. 1543-44 (1999) (arguing that the "united front" mentality
of Emporium Capwell is out of date, and that enforced collectivity within unions burdens women and
people of color; advocating separate organizing based on race, national origin, and gender); Sherry
Linkon & John Russo, Can Class Still Unite: Lessons from the American Experience, in CAN CLASS
STILL UNITE?: THE DIFFERENTIATED WORK FORCE, CLASS SOLIDARITY, AND TRADE UNIONS 311,
312-17 (Guy van Gyes et al. eds., 2001) (describing demographic shifts in work force, changes in work
structures, and debates about racism among workers and the role of identity politics). See also Marion
Crain, Colorblind Unionism, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1313, 1336-39 (2000) (defending proposal for identity-
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The concept that working class whites are more prejudiced than
whites from other classes 137 is attractive to the middle class and has proven
very durable. 138 Because of the structures of racial subordination, during
most of American history, middle-class white Americans had relatively few
opportunities to treat African Americans as their peers. In the context of
home ownership, the elites that controlled access to loans, insurance, and
development schemes created structures of segregation in urban and
suburban life. 139 Another stereotype identifies white workers with white
based bargaining units). But cf Linkon & Russo, supra, at 318-21 (describing success of 1997 strike
against United Parcel Service by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, which carried out internal
education, reached out through gender- and race-based networks, and successfully framed the issue as a
social justice struggle around economic restructuring; concluding class must not be framed in narrow
economic terms, but labor organizing must encompass class and racial issues simultaneously);
Mahoney, supra note 38, at 762 (criticizing separate bargaining units, given the increasing strength of
minorities within the labor movement, and arguing that identity-based organizing may leave white
workers organized around the most conservative aspects of identity).
137. Joel Williamson called this historical myth the "grit thesis" of racism and segregation in
Southern history and emphasized that racism existed across classes. JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE
OF RACE 294 (1984). "The whole idea of a specially vicious attitude toward blacks prevalent among
lower-class whites is an upper-class myth" that served the interest of the elite. Id. at 295. Cf. WILLIAM
WINPISINGER, RECLAIMING OUR FUTURE: AN AGENDA FOR AMERICAN LABOR 251 (1989) ("Television
programming systematically glorifies white collar jobs no matter now menial, while blue collar workers
are depicted as prejudiced buffoons. (This last is a vicious calumny; you'll find far more racial and
ethnic prejudice in the country club and the corporate boardroom than on the factory floor.)").
138. Barbara Ehrenreich addresses this issue repeatedly in her study of middle class anxiety. For
example,
IT]he myth of working-class intolerance and authoritarianism is one of the most cherished
beliefs of American sociologists. Even when confronted with directly contradictory evidence,
they will simply assert their class-based prejudices. For example, a 1966 study on
occupational mobility and racial tolerance cited evidence that "the higher one's class of origin
or class of destination the more likely that one prefers to exclude Negroes from one's
neighborhood." But the authors refused "to contemplate seriously" that such an unflattering
finding could be true.
BARBARA EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLING: THE INNER LIFE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 113 (1989)
(quoting RICHARD F. HAMILTON, CLASS AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES (1972)).
139. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 26 (discussing housing discrimination). See
also Mahoney, supra note 26, at 1672 (explaining that redlining created economic disincentives to
desegregation). Legal rhetoric has generally claimed to protect the interest of disadvantaged whites
rather than treating them as scapegoats for racism. The idea of lower-status attachment to privilege
appears only indirectly in the cases. For example, cases on school desegregation may treat white
aversion to people of color as a "natural" phenomenon. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, Ill
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that "natural, if unfortunate, demographic forces" or
desegregation may have caused white departure to suburbs and race concentration in the Kansas City
school district, despite factual findings in the district court that segregation had caused this pattern).
White flight arguments are not explicitly based on class, but, because wealthy and upper middle-class
students are often understood to "flee" to private schools, the naturalization of urban segregation
implicitly supports the idea of working class attachment to privilege. The naturalized image of white
flight is misleading. See generally JOHN HARTIGAN JR., RACIAL SITUATIONS: CLASS PREDICAMENTS

OF WHITENESS IN DETROIT (1999) (discussing a variety of white attitudes in an urban environment and
different responses by whites to racial change).
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supremacist hate groups. Historical studies of the Ku Klux Klan 0have
shown that it was not disproportionately composed of white workers.14
While stereotypes account for some of the popular disinterest in
solidarity, the continuing force of inequality and racism are more important
obstacles.' 4 1 Scholars have analyzed the segmentation of the working class
in the United States. 142 Recent works in labor history have described the
simultaneous construction of whiteness and class in America, emphasizing
143
the role of white workers in establishing and defending white privilege.
Bruce Nelson and David Roediger, among others, emphasized the agency
of white workers in claiming white superiority and discriminating against
workers of color. 144
Unsurprisingly, left-led unions did better on
140.

See WILLIAM

D.

JENKINS,

STEEL VALLEY KLAN: THE Ku

KLUX

KLAN IN

OHIO'S

MAHONING VALLEY 77-79 (1990) (noting that lack of statistical data may taint findings); SHAWN LAY,
HOODED KNIGHTS ON THE NIAGARA: THE Ku KLUX KLAN IN BUFFALO, NEW YORK I I (1995). Since

so many people hold working class jobs, a majority of working class members would not necessarily
comprise a disproportionate presence within the group. Jenkins, supra, used membership lists that
included occupation and local directories to compute the percentage of all Klan members at six levels of
manual and nonmanual job skills, and then compared these figures with the percentages of native-born
white men and of all males in the local population. Id. at 82-84. Jenkins found that the white middle
class had joined the Klan in greater numbers than their proportion of the area population, and that the
lower skilled blue-collar workers were a lower percentage of Klan members than any other sector of the
local population. Id. at 78-94. See also W.J. CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH 344 (1941) (describing
elite control of KKK); LEONARD L. RICHARDS, GENTLEMEN OF PROPERTY AND STANDING: ANTIABOLITION MOBS IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA 82 (1970) (describing mobs before the Civil War).

141.
For example, after the enactment of civil rights laws, as minority workers fought for access
to work, some unions continued to resist change. See, e.g., infra Part IV.A (discussing role of
firefighters' unions).
142.

See, e.g., DAVID M. GORDON, RICHARD EDWARDS & MICHAEL REICH, SEGMENTED WORK,

206-10
(1982). But see KIM MOODY, WORKERS IN A LEAN WORLD: UNIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY 143-79 (1999) (describing segmentation, racism, and changes in the organization of industry
and society as divisive factors within the working class, but identifying the period of rapid transition
within which unions and workers now operate as one which continues to push working people toward
the need to defend their interests). Moody also argues for the continuing importance of solidarity:
A class or union 'identity' speaks to a real material need that draws people together. If the
institutional bases of racism and sexism are not addressed this unity can collapse far more
readily than it took shape. But the opportunity to forge unity is there in the reality and
organizations of the class.
Id. at 178.
143. See generally Arnesen, supra note 135 (reviewing studies by many scholars). Cf Arnesen,
supra note 36, at 13-23 (questioning psychological focus of historical literature on whiteness). See also
Mahoney, supra note 77 (exploring issues for legal theory in recent literature on labor and race).
144. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 86, at 89-142 (describing resistance to integration and
attachment to white privilege on docks and in steel mills); ROEDIGER, supra note 36, at 28-36, 170-73.
DIVIDED WORKERS: THE HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES
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antiracism than most American trade unions; in general, outside the left,
145
antiracist leadership was often inconsistent or nonexistent.
Rather than insist on the primacy of solidarity as a narrative in the
history of working class organizing in the United States, it is important to
recognize racism and simultaneously look at instances in which class-based
mobilization directly and creatively confronted white privilege and racist
ideology. One example comes from a project in rural Mississippi, where
white civil rights organizers worked on building Working-class solidarity
based on racial equality during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Activists
with years of experience in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee ("SNCC") created the Grass Roots Organizing Work
("GROW") Project to reach white workers in the heart of the Deep South
with a message of biracial unity and shared labor struggles. 146 Underlying
the project was the belief that the achievements of the civil rights
movement made it possible to approach white workers about interracial
unity based on equality.
The GROW organizers sought to prove the possibility of classconscious antiracist work. If, in Mississippi in the late 1960s, whites were
willing to believe they could gain from the experience and militancy of
black coworkers and willing to work together as equals, this would
establish the possibility of antiracist class-conscious work at other times
and places.' 47 The changed conditions won through the achievements of
the African-American civil rights struggle were crucial to building
awareness among whites of shared needs. The organizers told white
workers that they could maintain any attitudes they chose about black
inferiority and white superiority, but, regardless of their beliefs, they had to
completely change their behavior. If they wanted to make any progress
with their union, they had to work on a basis of genuine equality with black
workers. The organizers expected that shared interests would create
changed behavior, although rhetoric would probably be the last vestige of
white racism to change. The result was not only organizational growth for
145.
See, e.g., GOLDFIELD, supra note 41, at 190-98; Arnesen, supra note 135, at 151; Michael
Honey, Anti-Racism, Black Workers, and Southern Labor Organizing: Historical Notes on a
Continuing Struggle, 25 LAB. STUD. J. 10, 15-16 (2000).
146.
Only a few years after SNCC workers were murdered in Mississippi, the GROW project

helped organize pulpwood cutters and, later, woodworkers at a Masonite plant in Laurel, Mississippi.
On the Masonite strike, see JERRY LEMBCKE & WILLIAM M. TATrAM, ONE UNION IN WOOD 47 (1984).

On the GROW project, see generally Zellner, supra note 39 (describing organizing challenges and
successes).
147. The head of the Mississippi AFL-CIO warned the GROW
involvement in the woodcutters. See Zellner, supra note 39.

organizers about Klan
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the union but also surprisingly rapid and dramatic change in racial beliefs.
After a few years of work in a union, one former Klansman commented
148
that he had now "joined the civil rights."'
Empowering minorities and building unity within labor are
interrelated projects.149 A recent example involved an organizing drive at a
Kmart Distribution Center in North Carolina. 50 Black workers led the
drive to organize the Greensboro Distribution Center, the only Kmart
distribution center with a mostly-black work force, in which workers were
paid an average of $5. 10 per hour less than workers in identical jobs in
other areas. When Kmart obdurately resisted after the union won an
election, union members planned a sit-in protesting company policy. Black
ministers who had been supporting the drive decided to be arrested in their
place, kneeling in prayer in the parking lot and helping to turn public
opinion in Greensboro toward support for the workers. When the union
won a contract, it was the first time any Kmart distribution center had been
organized.
About a third of the workers at the distribution center were white, and
they joined the unionizing effort. When the company sued black workers
and black ministers, white workers held a press conference, demanding to
know why they had not been sued too. 15' Reverend Nelson Johnson and
the other black ministers carefully described their campaign as one for
"authentic community" or "sustainable community." When the struggle
was described as one for racial justice, white workers did not see it as their
own; when racial justice was ignored, blacks felt the campaign was
148.
Id. See also JASON BERRY, AMAZING GRACE: WITH CHARLES EVERS IN MIssIsSIPPI 112-48
(1973) (discussing effects of previous organizing projects on Charles Evers' first mayoral campaign).
Cf. OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, THE BEST OF ENEMIES: RACE AND REDEMPTION IN THE NEW SOUTH

(1996) (former Klansnan rejects white supremacy, sees that it has harmed white working class interest,
and works with African Americans for equality and reform in Durham).
149.
See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the
hitersection of Title VII and the NLRA. NOT!, 28 HARV. C.L.-C.R. L. REV. 395, 478-84, 497-99
(1993) (criticizing concepts of solidarity that permit subordination of' minorities, and considering
structural proposals to empower minority workers within labor unions, including cumulative voting and
separate representation).
150.
See LANI GUINIER, LiFr EVERY VOICE: TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS SETBACK INTO A NEW
VISION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 239-43 (1998); PENDA HAIR, LOUDER THAN WORDS: LAWYERS,
COMMUNITIES, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 102-19 (2001); Penda Hair, Prayer and Protest:
Bringing a Community Vision ofJustice to a Libor Dispute, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 657, 670-73
(2000), Reverend Nelson Johnson, Reflections on an Attempt to Build "Authentic Coinnunity" in the

Greensboro Kinart L bor Struggle, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 675 (2000).
151.
The press conference was the product of strategic consultation between Reverend Nelson
Johnson and other black ministers, and white ministers and workers. Rather than describe the suit as an
issue of discrimination, even though only blacks had been sued, Reverend Johnson described it as an
opportunity. See GUINIER, supra note 150, at 241.
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unresponsive to their concerns. Black leadership sustained the drive
throughout, but eventually white ministers, college professors, students,
152
and businessmen joined in support work.
Fear of racism can itself be an obstacle. In one union drive in a
community with a history of racial oppression and tension, labor organizers
feared the effects of white racism and therefore chose not to feature black
leadership in campaign literature. This strategy failed to overcome white
reluctance to organize, and it left black workers with no sense that the
union spoke for them; the union lost the election. In a subsequent drive at
the same plant a few years later, organizers carefully brought both black
and white workers into leadership, and they accepted leadership from each
153
other. The second campaign became a significant victory for the union.
Mostly-white unions have sometimes voted to integrate leadership or
to protect integration against the impact of layoffs-only to be held back
by law. 154 In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,155 a union
collectively agreed to structure layoffs to retain later-hired minority
teachers. In Donovan v. Illinois Education Assoc., 156 a teacher's union
created an appointment procedure to supplement its elected governing body
to ensure the presence of at least eight percent minorities in the
association's representative assembly. In both cases, the courts, not unions,
blocked racial transformation programs. Once courts had blocked such
programs, unions no longer attempted them-but only the unions' failure
remained noticeable. The conditions for antiracist solidaristic work need
57
protection in law.'
152.
This solidaristic approach to the interest of white workers is dramatically different from the
way that the interest of whites appear in the anti-transformation cases. In Shaw v. Reno and its progeny,
the Supreme Court implicitly treated white workers in this area of North Carolina as if their interest
were defined by their race; the court held that the "message" sent to their representatives by the creation
of this heavily industrial highway district was one of inattention to their needs. See discussion infra
notes 312-69.
153.
Interview with Monica Russo, District Manager for Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union, in Miami, Florida (Oct. 10, 1994).
154.
See Arnesen, supra note 135, at 156 (calling for examination of the role of the state in
shaping working-class race relations). The effect of law is both ideological and practical, making
structural rules more or less obvious, and making alternative paths more or less possible.
155.
476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986) (holding race-based layoffs unconstitutional).
156.
667 F.2d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding seats for minorities unauthorized under the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act). The structure would have avoided a zero-sum conflict
with current leadership, and permitted minorities to run for any of the previously existing seats while
guaranteeing at least some minority representation in leadership. See Iglesias, supra note 149, at 45964 (discussing Donovan).
157.
See Rogers, supra note 108, at 3 & n.6. (emphasizing the importance of legal rules to the
construction of labor coalition and collective action).
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This Article argues that submerging class interests in law allows a
conservative vision of white working class interest to triumph. It does not
argue for submerging race interest into class. Rather, it calls for a
searching, contextual evaluation of class interest, bringing class back in to
create a richer dialogue and to emphasize that the needs of
workers-including white workers-remain unprotected in recent cases.
4. Class Accounts-Economic Interest, Morality, and the Claim of Harm
to Whites
The rationales for limits on institutional programs of racial
transformation include a "defense of others" attitude toward the newly
discovered white working class. White middle class people may perceive
the interest of working class whites in race privilege as economic, yet
simultaneously perceive their own opposition to transformative programs
as moral.' 58 Morality is equated with individual interest and treated as
distinctfrom and even opposed to group interest. When law adopts this
vision of interest, it simultaneously supports the claim of harm to whites
and diminishes class consciousness.
In much contemporary discourse, including debates in law, a general
societal interest in racial equality is posed against the self-interest of white
working people. This false dichotomy treats advancement within the
working class as a zero-sum game in which redistribution is only possible
among working class people, not between them and other classes. This
view is a status-based account of white interest because, like Robert
Franke's economic vision, it excludes solidaristic transformation. The
interest of white workers is asserted as one that trumps the moral ground of
reparations or compensation for past harm for oppressed minorities. Using
"racial preferences" then seems an immoral or inauthentic reason to decide
59
between individuals. 1
Claims about morality and justice are part of the construction of class
and identity, not merely secondary to them. Transformative work in law
and in labor and community organizing depends on moral claims, not
merely on economic claims. As E.P. Thompson explained, "[e]conomic
158. People of "middle-class" status sometimes assume that higher status includes higher levels of
awareness; enlightened altruism and opposition to racism are assumed to be more common in those
classes. The middle class rarely describes itself as afflicted with conflicts between moral claims and
racial self-interest. Rather, the conflict between economics and social justice is ascribed to the working
class.
159. This reasoning appeals to positioned white perception because of the ways in which
challenges to whiteness make white people feel uncomfortable.
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relationships are at the same time moral relationships; relations of
production are at the same time relations between people, of oppression or
of co-operation: and there is a moral logic, as well as an economic logic,
which derives from these relationships."1' 60 Thompson concluded that "the
history of the class struggle is at the same time the history of human
16 1
morality."'
Consciousness and action for white working class people are a
contested process: how much more difficult will attachment to privilege or
the process of identification as white make it for whites to work in
solidarity with people of color, and when will they see class interest in
ways that lead to solidaristic behaviors and beliefs? Solidarity may include
simply behavior-being willing to work together with people of color at all
("we are all in this together, we must work together, a rising tide lifts all
boats"); 162 commitment to egalitarianism ("we all deserve good
treatment"); or the rejection of white supremacy as destructive and
inauthentic-in other words, an antiracist position.
Consciousness is interrelated with action. 163 The social and political
fight to name interests is therefore part of the construction of class. Law is
a powerful way in which society names interests, validating political claims
about harm and right. Law must simultaneously begin recognizing class
interest and resisting the formalism that equates naming race with racism.
Therefore, this Article is not arguing simply against certain ways of naming
interests in law. Rather, it argues against deploying the institutional power
of law in ways built on the premise of white working-class investment in
white privilege and instead for directly confronting class issues. Law sets
conditions under which shared work happens (or does not happen) as well
160. THOMPSON, supra note 114, at 75 (explaining that he has reconsidered his original view in
which William Morris' moral critique was dependent upon Karl Marx's economic and historical
analysis; "I see the two as inextricably bound together in the same context of social life").
161.
Id.
162. The GROW organizers believed that behavior would be the first thing to change for white
working-class people in Mississippi, and that "rhetoric" (use of racist terminology) would be the last.
See Zellner, supra note 39.
163.
For a thoughtful discussion of the relationship between action and consciousness, see
FANTASIA, supra note 133, at 8-16. Rick Fantasia argues against the many scholars who understand
Marx to have described a dichotomy between a class "in itself'-formed in economic relation to
capital-from a class "for itself"-acting on its own behalf. See id. at 8. Fantasia describes class as "a
dynamic phenomenon in which particular classes have no independent being, but are functions of their
relationships to other classes .... [Cilass consciousness essentially represents the cultural expression of
the lived experience of class, an experience shaped by the process of interaction of these collectivities in
opposition to one another." id. at 14.
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as validating moral claims about the interests of justice and the nature of
harm.
The anti-transformation cases are the fruit of a sustained political
campaign to shift the civil rights paradigm in ways that take an identifiably
white perspective. During the Reagan administration, politicians and the
Justice Department sought to shift the paradigm for civil-rights cases away
from remedying the subordination of people of color by the dominant white
racial group-the focus of the civil rights movement-to individual rights
and particularly to the protection of whites against "reverse
discrimination."' 64
When the Justice Department brought reverse
discrimination suits and switched sides in civil rights lawsuits, the result
was twofold: to name harm to white people as a primary concern as a
matter of justice, and to diminish desegregation of workplaces and access
for minorities to business dealings with local governments. Ultimately, this
logic led in recent voting rights cases to legal doctrines that treat whiteness
as uniquely endangered and that effectively diminish political power for
people of color, particularly African Americans. All white people, as a
matter of morality and justice, should feel deeply concerned with these
results.
These decisions also create problems in terms of class
consciousness and mobilization particular to working class people. Part IV
of this Article will examine the ways class and whiteness interact in the
cases on race, work, and power decided in the two decades after that shift
in Justice Department strategy.
C. MAKING STATUS: THE DIFFICULTY OF DISCUSSING CLASS IN LAW
What is striking is the national facility at generating substitutes for the
language of class; it approaches the incredible and is properly thought of
65
as the sea on which the mythology of classlessness floats. 1
"Class" is generally invisible in American legal discourse. The term
is used constantly ("class action," "classification") in reference to issues
164.
During the Reagan administration, the Justice Department initiated and supported reverse
discrimination suits in a systematic campaign against affirmative action. See THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL
& MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN

POLITICS (1991) 172-97. Drew Days argued at the time that a casualty of the Reagan-era "about-faces
on civil rights" could be "the good will of millions of Americans." Drew S.Days, Turning Back the
Clock: The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 347 (1984)
(arguing that a "substantial number of citizens" had accepted the need to solve discrimination and
exclusion, but that voluntary compliance by the public was threatened by Reagan administration
policies). See also J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND
THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 456-67 (1997).
165.
DEMOT', supra note 7, at 109.
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other than social and economic inequality and power.' 66 When used in law
with regard to economic inequality, the term usually refers to gradational
rather than relational concepts. Legal discussions of structural inequality
seldom use the term "class," instead discussing "race," "poverty,"
"employee," or "labor," none of which adequately replaces the concept of
class. In different ways, each of these terms addresses some questions of
power, but none directly addresses the relationships of power between
social groups. Since law more easily recognizes race and gender rather
than class issues, the need to shape legally cognizable claims has also
tended to diminish consciousness of and arguments about class. Recent
proposals to use "class" instead of race as the basis for affirmative action
sense and in reality
have not explored the meaning of class in any relational
67
concern more or less elaborated status-based criteria.'
1. Inadequate Categories-"Race," "Poverty," "Labor," and "Employee"
In a supposedly classless society, class is hard to address directly. In
law and society, it is easier to recognize the existence of "poverty" than to
recognize the processes that produce and protect wealth. Poverty is not a
good substitute for the concept of class. It is a status category that implies
deviance below a norm' 68 and therefore reinforces the myth of
classlessness (or at least middle class status) as the defining social norm. It
draws arbitrary 169 lines between working people who may be similarly
166. 1 am indebted to Jeanne Adleman, my mother, for pointing out the many uses in law of the
term "class" usually not related to each other. As Stephanie Wildman points out, a similar phenomenon
is true of the term "privilege"; we have executive privilege, evidentiary privilege, and so on, yet
ordinarily the term is not used to describe the dominance and the freedom from subordination which
remain as invisible as whiteness. Interview with Stephanie Wildman, Mar. 27, 2001.
The best arguments on this point are by Deborah Malamud, who pointed out that it is
167.
difficult for law to deal with structural economic inequality. Malamud, Lessons and Caveats, supra
note 2, at 1860. See also Deborah C. Malamud, Race, Culture, and the Law: Values, Symbols, and
Facts in the Affirmative Action Debate, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1668 (1997) (reviewing four recent books on
race and affirmative action).
168. Poor people are often constructed as deviant. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 101-25

(1995) (observing that single mothers are labeled "deviant" and viewed as threatening by society); Wes
Daniels, Judicial Inages of Homeless Litigants and linplicationsfor Legal Advocates, 45 BUFF. L. REV.
687, 687-88 (1997) (reasoning that deviance is one of the shifting judicial images of homeless people
as "derelicts, victims of misfortune, or as people burdened by structural forces beyond their control");
Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites And Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse hiforms Welfare
Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1159, 1160-61 (1995) (noting that welfare mothers are
treated as deviant). My emphasis in this section is on the ways in which "poverty" implies a non-poor
norm, rather than the ways in which it treats the poor as departures from that norm.
169. Poverty calculations have not been readjusted since 1950s and are not based on current
proportional costs of housing and food, among other problems. See DOUG HENWOOD, THE STATE OF
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situated except for income (similar in low wages, experience of
unemployment or underemployment, and in their relations to employers or
communities). Also, poverty as a category implies nothing about classes
and the relations between them: it focuses on distribution rather than
production of wealth with no implication about the control of capital except
for the identification of a group that controls none.
In part, finding language for class in law is difficult because of the
way legal doctrine involved in the late twentieth century. Poverty as a
legal category does not find much constitutional protection, although
occasionally indigency does. Once the Supreme Court determined that
wealth was not a suspect classification triggering heightened constitutional
review, lawyers for low-income people and scholars writing in the area
were encouraged to focus on the categories of race and gender, which do
receive heightened review. 170 The failure to establish any successful legal
theories under which workers have rights to prevent deindustrialization and
employer relocation discouraged focus on class as part of a system of
production. 171
In contemporary American usage, a confused interaction
between the
concepts of "race," "poverty," and "class" often affects legal and social
discourse. Since whiteness as a dominant norm is transparent for whites,
"race" is generally understood as non-whiteness. Race (as non-whiteness)
in turn becomes a marker for class, which is in turn understood to mean
poverty. "Race" and "poverty" thereby come to define the ways we
THE USA ATLAS 48, 111-12 (1994) (cited in WHITE TRASH, RACE AND CLASS IN AMERICA 191 (Matt

Wray & Annalce Newitz eds., 1997)).
170. Legal advocates focus on race because poverty is so hard to deal with directly in law. John
Calmore observes that:
[Alithough class status plays a larger role than ever before in the life style and opportunities
of blacks, due to ubiquitous racism and the law's reluctance to confront the issues arising
frorn broad economic inequality, it is imperative that legal advocates treat the black poor as
special, unique victims of racism.
John 0. Calmore, Exploring the Significance of Race an(d Class in Representing the Black Poor, 61 OR.
L. REV. 201, 204 (1982).
171.
During the 1980s and into the 1990s, activists and communities sought legal and political
tools to keep plants from closing, but victories were scarce. One of the most famous cases was Local
1330 v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980), discussed in Jules Lobel, Losers,
Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1331, 1338 (1995). See generally Joseph
William Singer, The Reliance htterest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988) (discussing problems
of plant closings); Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: lIOw, Povert'%, and America's
Eroding hdustrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757 (1993) (same) thereinafter Ansley, Standing Rustyj. See
generally Fran Ansley, htclsive Boundaries And Other (hn)possible Paths Toward Comnunity
Development in a Global World, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 353 (2001) (discussing transition between the
plant closing movement and the response to globalization involved in activism against free trade and the
World Trade Organization).
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understand "class," perpetuating stereotypes that equate poverty with nonwhiteness. The racialization of the concept of poverty disserves lowincome people of color, who come under attack because of racism as well
as their impoverished status. It also disserves higher-income people of
color, who are then treated with stereotypical expectations attached to lowincome people as one manifestation of racism. Low-income whites also
suffer from the racialization of the concept of poverty when social
programs are attacked based on racism.
Labor, probably the legal category closest to class, is also an
ineffective and misleading substitute for class or class interest. Labor law
covers people in different employment categories and economic positions
(for example, schoolteachers as well as mechanics). American labor law
weakened over the past fifty years and membership in unions declined as
organizing grew more difficult. 172 The American legal system therefore
addresses interests of working people far more frequently through
"employment law" than "labor law." The term "employee" describes a
status, a legal relationship, and some recognition of relative power.
However, managers, waitresses, executives, secretaries, bank vice
presidents, doctors, nurses, truck drivers, and textile workers are all
employees.
Therefore, the term fails to capture either class or
socioeconomic status effectively.
Solidaristic class interests are also disguised by certain structural
qualities of employment discrimination litigation. Litigation tends to strip
issues for courtroom presentation-partial shared interests vanish.
Antidiscrimination law seldom challenges the ways in which economic and
political systems of production and their legal protection are involved in the
reproduction of racial power.' 73 Classification by wealth or class does not
trigger close scrutiny in constitutional law, and class is not a cognizable
172.

Over time, it also became more difficult for workers to maintain organized status.

See

generally THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?: TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR WHEN IT'S
FLAT ON ITS BACK (1991) (describing overwhelming difficulties and obstacles in union organizing).
Union membership in the United States fell from 35.5% of the work force in 1945 to 15.8% in 1993; in
the private sector, union membership had fallen to 10.8% of the work force by 1994. See RICHARD
SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF WORK IN THE NEW
CAPITALISM 152, 157 (1998). In 2001, 13.5% of wage and salary workers were union members.
"Nearly 4 in 10 government workers were union members in 2001, compared with less than I in 10
private wage and salary workers." BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNION
MEMBERS IN 2001 (2003), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.

173.

But see Marley S. Weiss, Risky, Business: Age and Race Discrimination in Capital

Redeployment Decisions, 48 MD. L. REV. 901, 902-03 (1989) (arguing that age and race discrimination
are implicated in decisions about reallocating corporate capital investment).
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category under Title VI1.174 Therefore, legal arguments in these areas are
constructed as if all "employment" is about the same class, as if all classes
have the same sorts of employment interests, and as if the same standards
should in fact govern diverse employment contexts including hiring,
promotion, layoffs or firings, and contracting.
2. The Rehnquist Court Turns Class into Status in Labor Law
American labor law places direct and indirect limits on class
mobilization' 7 5 by refusing to recognize the exercise of class power 176 and
by choosing status over class. In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 177 for example,
the Court held that union organizers could not gain access to employees of
a retail store on the grounds of the shopping center where it was located,
although seven months of sustained union effort had only succeeded in
reaching twenty percent of the employees in the Hartford metropolitan
area.' 78 The workers' right to learn about organizing opportunities was
therefore diminished in order to protect the employer's property
Lechmere describes the
rights-distribution trumps production.
employer's power as power over property, not over workers, but the
holding reinforces the class power of employers. 179 The opinion essentially
treats the collective interest of workers as attached to the separate property
rights they hold in their residences. As Cynthia Estlund has explained, "the
only employer interest that seems to have been threatened by the union's
174. As Fran Ansley points out, if "class" were a protected category, disparate impact analysis
would be impossible-the disparate impact of dollars is called "the market" and most American law is
organized around it. Interview with Fran Ansley, May 19, 1994.
175.
Examples include the structure in which contracts are negotiated with individual employers,
and restrictions on secondary boycotts. See JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AN[) ASSUMPTIONS IN
AMERICAN LABOR LAW 69-77 (1983). Also, work is not protected as investment. See Int'l Bd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1979) (stating that pension plan ftinded by employer is not
a "security" under Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act). In Daniel, although the employee
argued that the employer's payments into a pension fund on his behalf were deferred compensation and
even though substantial amounts of the income for pension funds were earned by investment rather than
employer contribution; the court reasoned that the "purported investment is a relatively insignificant
part of an employee's total ... compensation package." Id. at 560.
176. See Richard Michael Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualisin ad Protected Protest
Activities Under the National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 800-11 (1989) (noting
differences between NLRB and courts in their analyses of this issue). See also id. at 811-13 (noting
situations, such as fear or narrow economic self-interest, in which courts reject the worker's position as
too sell-interested to constitute mutuality; noting narrow definitions of "mutual aid or protection"
among workers as protected only when capable of being construed also a defense of oneself).
177. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
178. See id. at 530, 540-41.
179. Cf NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, Inc., 351 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1956) (excluding
non-employee organizers from access to workplaces that were characterized by the court as being near
"small well-settled communities where a large percentage of the employees live").
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conduct was Lechmere's interest in preventing employees from receiving
information about unionization.""18 The Court also weakened working
class interest within labor law by restricting the ability of unions to use
18
membership dues for political speech about shared interests. '
In NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.,182 the majority opinion
doctrinally detached the category "labor" from both class and power in
American labor law. In a nursing home, licensed practical nurses directed
nurses' aides as part of the performance of both in their work. 183 The
Supreme Court held that the nurses were "supervisors" excluded from the
union bargaining unit. 84 The statutory question depended on whether the
nurses directed the labor of other workers "in the interest of the employer":
Congress defined a supervisor as: "any individual having authority, in
the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise
of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires
85
the use of independent judgment."']

The case therefore turns upon the interpretation of "the interest of the

employer." The crucial question not addressed directly in the Court's
interpretation is which core concepts-class or status, production or
distribution-will be implied in brackets into the employer's "interest."
180. Cynthia L. Estlund, Libor, Property', and Sovereignrv After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV.
305, 334 (1994).
The law now allows employers to interfere with employees' protected conduct by excluding it
from private property, with no better justification than a bare desire to inhibit that conduct.
By allowing an employer's desire to inhibit union organizing to outweigh employees'
federally protected right to organize, the Lechmere Court 'accommodated' employer interests
that are simply incompatible with the basic policies of the Act.
Id. at 335.
181.
See, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 528 (1991) (limiting ability of
teacher's union to speak to issues of public education using dues of nonmembers despite shared interest
as employees, not only as citizens of the community and professionals). See also Communications
Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988) (limiting ability of union to represent nonmembers on areas
of class concern). Cf Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. I, 11-17 (1990) (treating bar association's
use of members' dues to fund speech as analogous to restrictions placed on workers in labor unions).
182. 511 U.S. 571,576-80 (1994).
183. The case concerned a charge of unfair labor practice after the employer disciplined four
licensed practical nurses. The nursing home had a Nursing Director and Assistant Director, nine to
eleven nurses (both registered nurses and practical nurses), and fifty to fifty-five nurses' aides. See id.
at 574-75.
184. On the importance of contests over bargaining units to the difficulty of union organizing, see
generally GEOGHEGAN, supra note 172.
185. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. at 573 (citing 61 Stat. 138, codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(11)).
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The Supreme Court implies that nurses-like all employees-work "in the
[commercial] interest" or "the [market] interest" of the employer. The
Court emphasized that it is always in the interest of the employer when
employees perform their work. The direction by nurses of tasks performed
by other workers therefore is part of a classless concept in which the
"interest" of the employer is defined by successfully competing with other
providers for clients, rather than by the extraction of profits from the labor
86
of employees.'
In contrast, a focus on "the [class] interest of the employer" leads
directly to analysis of the end toward which power is exercised. "Managers
and supervisors do not exercise authority simply to coordinate production
but do so within a context in which the goal of production is profit and the
means to that goal is the extraction of surplus labor."' 87 A relational classbased analysis completely avoids confusion: "Managerial tasks that involve
giving direction in order to integrate and coordinate the labor process and
to provide specialized knowledge are usefully distinguished from the
authority exercised to discipline and control. But coordination tasks in
themselves cannot be a base for exploitation, for the extraction of surplus
188
labor."'
Power over workers as workers was the point Justice Ginsburg made
in dissent:
It is a defining task of management to formulate and execute labor
policies for the shop; correspondingly, the persons charged with
superintending management policy regarding labor are the "supervisors"
who, in the Board's view, act "in the interest of the employer."
Maintaining professional standards of course serves the interest of an
enterprise .... But "the interest of the employer" may well tug against
186. See George Feldman, Workplace Power and Collective Activit": The Supervisory and
Managerial Exclusions in Libor law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 525, 537-45 (1995) (discussing managers and
supervisors in Health Care & Retirement Corp.).
187. Johanna Brenner, Work Relations and the Fornation of Class Consciousness, in THE
DEBATE ON CLASSES 184, 186 (Erik Olin Wright et al. eds., 1989). "Managerial direction of other
workers therefore has a two-sided character: on the one side, in coordinating production managers and
supervisors may be performing tasks that are socially necessary labor; on the other side, since
production is being coordinated within constraints set by the need to make an average rate of profit,
managers also have to control and discipline the workforce." Id. Class analysis explains more than one
sort of exercise of authority: "Managers may exercise authority in order to coordinate the labor process
or they may exercise authority in order to control workers-and often they do both at once. But these
are two distinct kinds of authority." Id. Brenner goes on to argue that "a failure to distinguish between
Ithe different exercises of managerial authority] underlies Weberian claims about the inevitable
connection between a complex division of labor and bureaucratic hierarchy." id.
188. /d. at 187.
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that of employees, on matters such as "hiring, firing, discharging, and
fixing pay"; "in the interest of the employer," persons with authority
89
regarding "things of that sort" are properly ranked "supervisor."1

The crucial issue is the exercise of power. When class is read out of
the National Labor Relations Act, the result, predictably, weakens the
position of workers.
D. WHY "CLASS-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION" Is NOT ABOUT CLASS
Proposals to end race-based affirmative action frequently suggest that

affirmative action programs based on "class" can and should replace raceconscious programs.' 90 There are a few major strands to arguments for
these proposals.
justifications.

They

involve

moral,

political,

and

pragmatic

Although moral arguments take different forms, they are frequently

argued together. The first moral argument treats any remedial action based
on race as immoral since the use of race as a category is inherently
destructive.' 9'

The second argument weighs comparative disadvantage

among individuals or groups, using the interest of low-income whites as a
framework. 92 This is often posed rhetorically as a question: why should
the child of a relatively wealthy or influential African American be favored

over a coal miner's daughter? 193 In the context of educational admissions
189. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. at 594-95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
190. See generally KAHLENBERG, supra note 2 (suggesting reform of the affirmative action
system). For criticisms and analysis of "class" based affirmative action proposals, see generally
Malamud, Lessons and Caveats, supra note 2; Malamud, supra note 167; Tung Yin, A Carbolic Smoke
Ball for the Nineties: Class-Based Affirmative Action, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 213 (1997). For defenses
of "class"-based affirmative action that do not treat the concept of class as opposed to race, see Banks,
supra note 2; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1913 (1996). In the late 1980s, William Julius Wilson had made proposals which could be seen as
forerunners of this current position; he advocated avoiding race-targeted reform proposals and
emphasizing job development that will aid whites as well as minorities, in order to avoid the resistance
to potential class unity that is created by race-targeted assistance. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 114-18 (1987).
191.
This is the position taken by Justice Scalia, both in an essay before he became a judge, see
Scalia, supra note 54, at 153-54 and in judicial opinions, see, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia,
515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
192. Angela Harris has pointed out that class is frequently discussed in relation to race in two
unhelpful ways in America: first, as a critique that blames identity politics for disunity and the loss of a
rhetorical appeal to class mobilization, and second, as an unhelpful competition over the comparative
suffering of the working class and of minorities. See Harris, supra note 2, at 1187-88.
193. This analogy, commonly made after the confirmation hearings for Clarence Thomas,
implicitly poses white women against African-American men as competing beneficiary groups for
affirmative action programs. See Fran Ansley, Classifing Race, Racializing Class, 68 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1001, 1028-31 & n.76 (1997) (criticizing this comparison and citing examples of this rhetoric
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programs, this second paradigm creates a false sense of scarcity and
opposition. Both candidates should have their applications weighed against
wealthier white candidates rather than against each other.' 9 4 The third
moral argument recognizes that society places unfair obstacles in the path
of many individuals, and that it is appropriate to recognize and adjust for
these obstacles. 95 However, these arguments treat race-based recognition
and adjustment as inherently unfair to those whose obstacles were not
racial.
These moral arguments resolutely center on individuals rather than
groups, and they focus on status rather than class. These arguments are
concerned with selective elevation of individuals based on their status
rather than with class in any relational sense. As Deborah Malamud
warned:
The ideological and practical constraints of the legal system will tend to

lead the system to view economic inequality through a purely
individualistic and synchronic lens and to measure inequality by a
relatively simple quantitative metric. These choices will impoverish the
legal system's understanding of economic inequality by causing it to
associated with the confirmation of Justice Thomas); Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrmn
adt the Pursuit of Individualism in the Making o1 Social PolicY, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1432 (1995)
("To make their case, class advocates frequently call attention to the deprived socioeconomic status of a
hypothetical white Appalachian, whose plight is allegedly unaddressed by existing race-conscious
policies that unfairly benefit racial minorities."). Justice Scalia made this argument together with his
argument that race-based preferences are inherently immoral in Scalia, stpra note 54, at 153-54.
Frequently, this framing of opposed candidates for individual assistance implies that the working class
person is presumptively white. Cf ROEDIGER, supra note 36, at 26. Deborah Malanud addresses this
argument directly by comparing the black middle class and white middle class, arguing that the
structural disadvantages of the black middle class provide sufficient justification for affirmative action.
See Deborah C. Malanud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L.
REV. 939, 967-88 (1997).
194.
Derrick Bell has argued that whites gained from civil-rights related training prograrns such as
the one in Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). He writes:
IT he company, facing employment discrimination litigation, established an apprenticeship
program that they had long refused to do in collective bargaining negotiations. One-half of the
openings went to blacks based on their seniority, and evidently to forestall charges of racial
unfairness, one-half went to whites based on their seniority.., even in a situation where white
workers would become the gratuitous beneficiaries of civil rights efforts, Mr. Weber and his
supporters saw the issue as solely one of racial competition.
Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique, supra note 50, at 1610.
195.
Cf Fallon, supra note 2, at 1914-15 (characterizing support for economic disadvantage
programs as falling into two general areas: reaction to race-based proposals, and a "fresher" support
because it permits responding to obstacles that have been placed in individual's paths). Fallon cites
Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia as examples of the "fresher" approach that is not a reaction to
race; in contrast, I find the "reaction to race" and "removal of obstacles" arguments intertwined. See id.
at 1914 n.3. See also Russell, supra note 193, at 1432-33 (reviewing arguntts for "class"-based
programs).
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reject the representation of class as a structured phenomenon
that
196
transcends the transitory economic rank-ordering of individuals.

The proposals address individual rather than group advancement, and in
that sense they are committed to a status vision. Based on a norm of
middle-class status, they offer a hand up to those unfortunate enough not to
have a "full" measure of opportunity-really, privilege-distributed to

them at birth. "Class" continues to mean "Other" and is equated with
"poverty"-in reality, a status concept. Lower classes are lifted up toward
97
the norm, usually perceived as classless.1
Race-neutral programs assisting low-income individuals therefore do
not address issues of class advancement in the way that race-conscious

affirmative action addresses the complex questions of increasing access for
racially subordinated communities. Instead, because of the explicit goal of
assisting people with no particular race toward the status of the middle
class, solidaristic working class interest disappears entirely. The idea that
morally virtuous assistance is the sort offered to individuals rather than
communities is a concept based on status rather than class. It is also a
positioned notion that reflects the concepts of self, individuality, merit and
access consistent with dominant white norms.
In essence, it is a
conservative approach to change. 198 That is why a conservative politician
can publicly support affirmative action for people from "poor" areasbased on the argument that affirmative action programs must change from
199
group to individual orientations.

Individual assistance avoids challenging prevailing distributions of
power as well as white dominance. It reflects the positioned perception of
196. Malamud, Lessons and Caveats, supra note 2, at 1850.
197. Working class people are harmed by selection criteria that effectively favor the wealthy. See
Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84
Cal. L. Rev. 953, 957-58, 987 (1996) (criticizing selections framework and identifying "wealth
preference" in SAT). Sturm and Guinier emphasize that existing selection criteria have exclusionary
effects that include race, gender, and class; do not reflect functional merit; and do a poor job of
predicting success. Their approach is transformational and avoids the class-versus-race paradigm that I
criticize here.
198. Although Richard Fallon noted that "[tio date, virtually no one has argued that preferences
based on economic disadvantage are inherently morally unjust," Fallon, supra note 2, at 1923, Abigail
Thernstrom has criticized "class" based proposals as unworkable and motivated by a desire among
Congressional Republicans not to be seen as "mean." Abigail Thernstrom, A Class Backwards Idea;
Why Affirmative Action For the Needy Won't Work, WASH. POST, June I1, 1995, at Cl.
199. "'I'd rather talk about how do we replace group affirmative action with effective help for
individuals, rather than just talk about wiping out affirmative action by itself."' Newt Gingrich, quoted
in Richard Kahlenberg, Equal OpportunitY Critics, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 17, 1995 at 20, 20.
Gingrich went on to advocate affirmative action for people .'who come out of poor neighborhoods,
who come out of poor backgrounds. who go to schools in poor counties."' Id.
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the "middle class"-that is, it reflects concepts of self, identity, merit and
access that do not depend on collective or solidaristic action and interest.
Indeed, one reason whiteness may so easily be equated with "middle class"
status in America is because the positioned dominant identities of
whiteness and "middle class" status are so congruent. The insistently
individualistic self-image and the lack of awareness of being part of a
social group that are part of dominant white mentality fit neatly with
unexamined "middle class" identity and with treating the status category
"middle class" as presumptively white.
The second major strand of argument for "class"-based affirmative
action claims a concern with class unity or coalition and treats demands for
racial inclusion as a point of division.200 Richard Kahlenberg argues that
race-based affirmative action programs divided the labor movement from
the civil rights movement and justifies his arguments against raceconscious programs by arguing that the important contemporary project of
building coalitions between the labor movement and minority communities
requires the substitution of "class" for race as a criterion in affirmative
action programs. 20 But Kahlenberg has also framed his proposal in terms
of status rather than class. As Malamud has explained, it is difficult to
choose a "class" paradigm for affirmative action from among many
contested concepts of class.20 2 Rather than choose, Kahlenberg articulated
three sets of criteria for defining what he called "class" that could form the
basis for affirmative action programs.20 3 His categories reflect differing
levels of sensitivity to a variety of socioeconomic factors, but all involve
changing status for individual applicants, rather than transforming relations
of power among social groups. Much of the public debate has focused on
education, especially on admission of students, and education is the context
to which many academics turn reflexively-it is the work we know best.
Kahlenberg's criteria merged questions of education and of work which
may be different in terms of class interest. Proposals for "class"-based
affirmative action may include hiring, promotions, and the awarding of
municipal contracts.
200.
According to the Edsalls, Nixon was pleased that affirmative action created a political
dilemma for labor union leaders and civil rights groups, but the programs proved more effective at
dividing Democrats than he had anticipated. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 164, at 86-87. In
1972, Nixon criticized the Philadelphia plan, which he had endorsed in 1969, to gain political rewards
from resentment among the white working class. See id. at 97.
201.
See KAHLENIBERG, supra note 2, at 190-293 (using the term "black and blue" coalition,
referring to blue collar workers and African Americans).
202.
See Malamud. Lessotts attd Caveats, supra note 2, at 1861-94.
203.
See KAHLENBERG, supra note 2, at 128-39.
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In these proposals, the concept of class is disconnected from any
concept of power except the consumer power that additional dollars
inevitably provide to anyone who is lifted up to higher socioeconomic
status. These are vulgar status proposals either explicitly (they help anyone
with any form of disadvantage, all of which are equally contingent) or
implicitly (they only analyze socioeconomic status and are not conceived
as group phenomena).
Programs that help individuals of lower
socioeconomic status address different forms of exclusion than do raceconscious programs. Racial transformation programs create access for
formerly excluded communities, affecting the reproduction of power in the
present and in the future. Even when they disproportionately help the black
middle-class, 20 4 they increase the resources within oppressed communities
and create the possibility of increasing access over time through networks
of friendship and kinship. Therefore, the "coalitional" justification is really
concerned with removing race-conscious programs on the theory that they
harm coalition, rather than with building conditions for shared struggles for
change.
The third strand of argument for "class"-based affirmative action is a
pragmatic adjustment to the legal trends of our time: when law no longer
permits race to be considered in educational institutions, some institutions
will seek to maintain a diverse student body and avoid precipitous falls in
20 5
minority enrollment through consideration of socioeconomic factors.
Although scholars who believe such approaches are effective may become
advocates, they do not argue for the exclusion of race from affirmative
action programs. 20 6 Once again, these are programs of individual rather
than group advancement. The most sophisticated approach, undertaken by
the UCLA faculty and described by Richard Sander, considered the
concentration of poverty and levels of education in the applicants' home
communities. 20 7
This program considers social factors, not merely
individual ones. Nevertheless, the UCLA program remains fundamentally
an adjustment for competitive disadvantage rather than a program to
change power in subordinated communities.
As a matter of social justice, status-based affirmative action programs
have both practical and theoretical flaws. Most important, in terms of the
204.
See Malamud, Black Middle Class, supra note 193, at948.
205.
See, e.g., Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 245, 252-62 (1999). See generallyv Sander, supra note 2 (discussing UCLA Law School

plan).
206.
207.

See Banks, supra note 2, at 1066; Fallon, supra note 2, at 1947-50.
See Sander, supra note 2, at 485.
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reproduction of racial power and access, programs based on wealth or
socioeconomic status cannot adequately replace affirmative action
programs based on race. 20 8 If we were really to think in terms of class
rather than status, there are significant differences between education and
work, and also differences between the contexts of work in which programs
of affirmative action have been undertaken and challenged.
The relational framework required for affirmative action to be truly
class-based would analyze power in context and consider how individual
decisions could help to empower social groups in opposition to
subordination. This was the thinking that went into the early affirmative
action programs, which aimed at remedying the impact of societal
discrimination on individuals and strengthening minority communities, but
which were limited to narrower grounds by the Supreme Court.2 °9
Affirmative action programs developed from America's history of racial
oppression, which was structural, based on group relations of power, and
involved both subordination and exploitation. Ironically, individualism is
the only framework that courts have accepted. Therefore, in states such as
California that ban race-conscious criteria in employment or education,
group relations of power cannot be addressed directly when they involve
race.
These ironies point to two crucial problems with current debates over
"class"-based affirmative action. The first problem lies in what these
programs omit as the law fails to grapple with power. Status concepts
leave relations of power unaddressed, even when they adopt sophisticated
socioeconomic criteria that take account of neighborhood development and
the circumstances of subordinated communities. 2 10
Therefore, they
effectively protect the current distribution of class power.
208. See generally Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to DiversitY in Legal Education: An Empirical
Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions,72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4-29 (1997) (reviewing studies).
209. The Court disapproved the use of race to bring professional services to minority communities
in Regents of Universitv of Calif v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305-06 (1978) (explaining that brief for
petitioner defends program on four grounds: 1) reducing deficit of minority doctors, 2) countering
societal discrimination, 3) increasing number of physicians who will practice in underserved
communities, and 4) obtaining the educational benefits of a diverse student body; court holds all
grounds except for diversity to be insufficient justifications for the use of race).
210. See Sander, stupra note 2, at 485 (noting UCLA program considered education of both
parents, parental income and net worth, and three aspects of disadvantaged communities: single-parent
households in neighborhood; families in neighborhood on welfare; and young adults in neighborhood
who are high school dropouts). See also Lawrence, supra note 133, at 970-71 (suggesting that factors
in an affirmative action program might include incarceration rates in neighborhoods).
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The second problem lies in the interaction between arguments about
interest and the formation of classes and social groups. 2 1 1 Law is part of
the claims, rhetoric, and social mobilization involved in the construction of
social groups. It is one of the important places in which American society
argues about interest, and it is part of the cultural and political construction
of class and interest. Arguments about "class"-based affirmative action
affect social understandings about shared interests through their role in two
areas of ideology: defining race in America, and defining the nature of
class.
When Republican Congressman Newt Gingrich proposed an
individual version of class-based affirmative action, 2 12 he made both a
race-claim and a class-claim. The class-claim was that he spoke on behalf
of "poor" people. The implicit race-claim was that white workers were
disadvantaged by race-based affirmative action.
Such comments on
affirmative action promote group consciousness but not class
consciousness in any left sense of that term. White working people have
their own disadvantage recognized and are simultaneously told that the
source of their problems lies in unfair preference for people of color and
that anti-union voices are their spokesmen. The vulgar status approach to
affirmative action reinforces for white workers the sense that their "class"
interest is opposed to empowerment for people of color. While some
scholars believe this approach will stop racial division, it fails to address
the profound division that did not begin with affirmative action but with
racial subordination, and it also fails to strengthen the oppositional
mobilization of class.
IV. BUSINESSMEN ARE [NOT] LIKE LABORERS: HIDDEN
QUESTIONS OF CLASS IN THE LAW
The doctrinal evolution of the anti-transformation cases-the pattern
of analogies and deductions called "legal reasoning"-depends on both the
transparency of whiteness and the legal invisibility of class. The Supreme
Court has examined issues of affirmative action almost entirely in the
context of public employment. There are no capitalists evident in the
cases. Early complaints concerned workers who were not economically
privileged; as years passed and the doctrine evolved, the plaintiffs held
more privileged positions, but the Court's reasoning about power failed to
211.

"IT]here is every reason to believe that the law will help to create, rather than merely reflect,

the dominant discourse on class and inequality in this country-just as the law has done in the case of
race." Malamud, Lessons and Caveats, supra note 2, at 1849 (emphasis added).
212. See Kahlenberg, supra note 199, at 20.
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recognize the changes.21 3 Hidden assumptions about class and status
helped the Court develop the rule that "race classification demands strict
scrutiny" rather than "equal protection demands an exploration of power,
harm, and interest." This Part of the Article explains the ways class could
have been, and should have been, considered in the cases on work and
racial transformation.
A. THE NATURALIZATION OF SCARCITY: PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND THE
"ZERO-SUM" 2

14

GAME

The sudden appearance of the innocent victim upon the constitutional
stage has been amazing to behold. Shuffling out from the wings,
blinking in the glare of the stage lights, this guy, it turns out, has rights
he never even dreamed of, like a right to his job! Well, sometimes. At
least if the immediate threat to that job is a black and/or a woman.
Where did this figure come from? Why the starring role? What exactly
is his (or occasionally her) role? Why is he being treated this way? And
how did he get here, assigned top billing as the principal reason why
society can no longer justify or tolerate
race remediation in many of the
215
areas where it might matter most?

Public employment has provided the framework for many cases on
antidiscrimination and affirmative action. In general, it is easier for public
than private employees to sue over discrimination. 2 f6 Public sector
213. For example, in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), the workers were
teamsters; in United Steelworkers of America v.Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), production workers in a
shipyard sought training for craft jobs. In conrast, white businessmen competed for contracts with a
county in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and for federal highway
construction contracts in Adarand Constructors, hic. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
214. Justice Blackmun applied this term to the firefighters in Firefighters L..ocal Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 621 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (describing what "admittedly was a zerosum situation"). See also H. EDWARD RANSFORD, RACE AND CLASS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 198 (2d
ed. 1994) (discussing "zero sum problem" creating white working class hostility to some equality
demands by blacks).
215. Ansley, supra note 9, at 1005. Ansley has noted the irony of the first Supreme Court
appearance of the "perfectly innocent" white employee in Franks v.Bowtan Transportation Co.,
"when, (at least according to the employer), it was the refusal of white drivers to share cabs or showers
with black drivers that 'necessitated' the discrimination in the first place." Id. at 1018 & n. 88 (citing
Francis Lee Ansley, Note, Cost Allocation in Title VII Remnedies: Who Pays for Past EInployment
Discrimination?, 44 TENN. L. REV. 347, 366 n.89 (1977)) lhereinafter Cost Allocation].
216. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) is the only private sector challenge to
affirmative action outside the remedial context to reach the Supreme Court. The training program in
Weber had been adopted to comply with an executive order that covered employers working on
contracts for the federal government.
See id. at 222-23 & n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Redistribution from employer to employees was not an explicit factor in the court's opinion. See id. at
197-209.
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employees are far more likely to be unionized. 2 7 They are also more likely
to have rights against arbitrary dismissal 2 8 than workers in the private
sector, which may increase the possibility of litigating employment claims.
Aspects unique to public sector employment have had a subtle effect on
doctrine and ideology in affirmative action cases.
Firefighters unions in much of the United States had been almost
entirely white and resisted minority suits to desegregate their
departments. 2 19 Unions intervened in antidiscrimination suits brought by
black firefighters 220 and attacked settlements and judicial decisions as
unfair to white male firefighters. Two main factors made class interests
difficult to perceive in these cases. The first is social status, which is
higher for protective services workers than for many other comparably paid
workers. Within the range of manual labor and skilled work, firefighters
217. Labor organization in the private sector has become heroically difficult. See generally
GEOGHEGAN, supra note 172 (discussing difficulty of labor organizing). Few workers can afford to
litigate rights against discharge while organizing, but public sector workers often have more procedural
protection against arbitrariness. Also, public employers cannot flee to avoid unionization.
218. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-48 (1985).
219. See, e.g., Youngblood v. Dalzell, 925 F.2d 954, 955 (6th Cir. 1991) (reporting that "[i]n
1973, the Cincinnati fire fighter force was only 0.5% black, far short of the percentage of blacks in the
local population"); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 356 (9th Cir. 1987) (reflecting a
disproportionately small percentage of black firefighters); In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination
Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1495 n.7 (IIth Cir. 1987) (showing that while the labor force was
approximately fifty percent black in 1981, only forty-two of 453 Birmingham firefighters and none of
the 140 higher officers in the department were black); NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965, 968 (1st Cir.
1982) (showing that blacks and Hispanics represented only 0.9% of the Boston Fire Department's
personnel); Ass'n Against Discrimination in Employment v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 260-61
(2d Cir. 1981) (reporting that only two minority firefighters were employed between 1936 and 1972,
although minorities comprised forty-one percent of Bridgeport's population; 428 member fire
department had only one minority member in 1975); Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 1981)
(showing that in 1973, Toledo's fire department was 98.16% white and 1.83% black); Van Aken v.
Young, 541 F. Supp. 448, 450 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (describing the Detroit Fire Department as "the
private preserve of white males"); United States v. City of Buffalo, 609 F. Supp. 1252, 1254 (W.D.N.Y.
1985) (holding that the city's past selection procedures for firefighters were discriminatory); Dawson v.
Pastrick, 441 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Ind. 1977) (finding past discrimination in hiring minority firefighters
in East Chicago). For an example of on-the-job harassment of minorities, see United States v. City and
County of San Francisco, 696 F. Supp. 1287 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
220. See, e.g., Youngblood v. Dalzell, 804 F.2d 360, 364 (6th Cir. 1986) (showing that
firefighter's union unsuccessfully challenges legality of consent decree entered in antidiscrimination
suit); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (challenging successfully
district court injunction that required changes in seniority system to benefit newly hired minority
firefighters as violation of Title VII); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 758 (1989) (intervening white
firefighters in settlement of discrimination litigation); Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 75 (7th Cir.
1979) (allowing union to intervene as defendant in class action alleging racially discriminatory hiring
practices); City and County of San Francisco, 696 F. Supp. 1287 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (intervening as
defendant in class action alleging racial and sexual discrimination in fire department hiring and
promotion).
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are a relatively privileged sector. Also, their incomes are sometimes higher
than the official range of wages would indicate because of overtime
opportunities and work hours that often permit holding a second job outside
the public sector.22 '
The second factor is the public sector nature of the cases, which helps
disguise class and class interest. 222

The Supreme Court developed an

image of union members that was peculiar to public employment but
allowed it to stand for all employment. In this image, unions exist without
classes locked in struggle over production and without wealth subject to
redistribution. In contemporary ideology and politics, government is
considered an unproductive sector of society. 223 Economic exploitation of
the working class does not seem to be part of the picture in these cases,
because there appears to be no production of wealth. All public sector
"wealth" whether held by employer or employees seems to be produced at
the expense of the rest of society.
Cases involving government employees therefore do not imply the
existence of profits that can be subjected to redivision between classes, in
contrast to the ways class interest might appear in private sector litigation.
Taxpayers identify with the role of investors or capitalists in the private
sector-the bankroll for the enterprise of government. They generally do
not identify with the public sector employer or manager. 224 Increasing the
share of wealth held by public employees appears counter to the shared
economic interests of other citizens. No exploitation seems evident. In
221.
See, e.g., Walsh v. Ward, 991 F.2d 1344, 1345 (7th Cir. 1993) (involving firefighter who
claimed that when forced to give Lipoutside work he lost more than he received in additional salary as
firefighter; suffered new assignment retribution for critical speech). "This court has previously
recognized that certain municipal employees such as firefighters and police officers frequently work
shifts which provide them with long periods when they are off-duty. and that these schedules are
considered a highly desirable benefit.. ." 1i(. at 1349 (Pell, J.,
dissenting) (citing FOP. Lodge No. 121
v. City of Hobart, 864 F.2d 551, 553-56 (7th Cir. 1988)).
222.
Public sector workers may or may not actually have different class consciousness than
private sector workers, but the context of public employment is structurally different in terms of the
appearante of class interest. In Marxist concepts of class consciousness, it would not be surprising if
the shared consciousness of public employees was concerned more with general labor issues rather than
the basic organization of capitalism. C: JERRY LEMBCKE, CAPITALIST DEVEILOPMI-ENT AND CLASS
CAPACITIES: MARXIST THEORY AND UNION ORGANIZATION 160-76 (1988) (recounting debates over
whether public sector work force has proletarian consciousness and concluding that it does).
223.
I do not mean to accept the notion that government neither produces wealth nor is ati
important part of class-based redistribution. The fact that we do not see the public sector as producing
social wealth reflects the ways in which the production of service and knowledge are undervalued.
These are often aspects of traditional women's work, like caregiving and teaching. See, e.g., MARILYN
WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTitD: A NEW FEMINIST ECONOMICS 30-31 (1988).
224.
Taxpayers do not have direct power over public employment decisions and do not feel
responsible for implementation of policies in public workplaces.
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public employment, no group appears to produce profits that are captured
by another group, therefore no argument arises over who (as between labor
or capital) deserves profits. The pool of jobs cannot be expanded except
through funds paid by taxpayers, a social group that merges the working
class and the wealthy.
The only identifiable division in these cases is between those groups
who wish to gain access (blacks and other people of color) and those who
argue that reallocating access will hurt them unfairly (nonwealthy whites
who need these jobs). Both groups lack elite status, and therefore there is
no counterpoint-no elite, no powerful third party-toward which to turn
the focus of transformative inquiry. 225 The public is represented as made
up of citizens or taxpayers, status categories that include all residents
regardless of class. Any additional wealth subject to redivision must come
out of that (classless) public pocket. Therefore, the public employment
context of litigation such as the Firefighters cases legitimates the concept of
a "zero-sum" game.
In these cases, scarcity (competition between workers) rather than
struggle (collaboration between workers in competition with other classes)
appears to be a natural condition of human society. 226 The affirmative
action cases contribute to the naturalization of scarcity by assuming a
competitive framework in which anything given to black workers must be
taken from whites. Whiteness is the invisible background norm in this
vision. The current distribution of wealth, which favors whites 227 appears
to be natural, rather than part of a regime structured through law; thus, any
In general, discrimination in public employment cases was done by the government actors in
225.
charge of hiring (the second party bad actor) although in many firefighter cases, racial harassment of
African Americans who desegregated the workplace was extreme and white firefighters were active
participants in the process of racial exclusion. The distance between the public (citizens/taxpayers) and
the government as employer eliminates any sense of shared responsibility for these governmental
actions among citizens of the community. White Birmingham firefighters, for example, were not
treated as responsible for the extent to which they were part of the polity that supported overtly racist
and discriminatory administrations for many years. It is ironic, therefore, that gains in electoral
positions for African Americans are treated by the Court as showing the danger of action against whites
or the lack of continued oppression of blacks.
226. This is consistent with the logic of cases that refuse to limit the mobility of capital in the
interest of workers-fundamental class conflicts are placed outside the realm of legal challenge as part
of the protection of a market economy. I am not arguing here that scarcity is never a problem, but that,
in this contemporary age of rapid transition in the international organization of work and capital, local
narratives of scarcity for workers in the United States are often a result of the way the problem has been
constructed.
227. Dalton Conley, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN
AMERICA I (1999) (noting that in 1994 "[t]he median white family held assets worth more than seven
times those of the median nonwhite family"). Conley further emphasizes the lack of progress for
African Americans since Reconstruction in percentage of national wealth. Id. at 25.
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legal interference requires justification. The ideological framework of
these cases also accepts as natural the size of the total social "pie" from
which wedges of racially-allocated goods will be sliced; by definition,
more for one party means less for another.
But the size of the pie is neither natural nor unchangeable. Some
proposals in race remedy cases have sought to make employers pay for
discrimination by giving front-pay to displaced workers, or by keeping
more workers on the payroll.2 28 As these cases developed, Fallon and
Weiler suggested job sharing to resolve layoffs and pointed to the fact that
unemployment insurance might alleviate some of the worst impact of
layoffs.22 9 Most proposed solutions, however, concerned revisions of the
existing shares of wealth between black and white workers, rather than
social redistribution toward workers overall.
Fear of job loss and hope of access to other jobs (and hope regarding
the quality of future jobs) are deeply interrelated. In periods of full
employment, job loss is less profoundly threatening than in times of
downturn. If subsistence, health, and old age were sufficiently protected
through social insurance, loss of work would be less threatening than when
each of these protections is tied firmly to retention of a particular job. Only
continuous employment involves continued access to health insurance and
pensions.
Scarcity therefore cannot be understood without looking to the state
and cannot be addressed without state involvement. Legal rules and
governmental policies can create scarcity or diminish it. For instance, legal
rules protect the mobility of capital. 230 Legal rules affect work conditions
that result in greater or lesser scarcity for the worker. Safety regulation and
workers compensation affect how frequently and for how long injuries will
remove workers from the work force, and how dire they will find the
impoverishment accompanying movement in and out of the labor force. A
minimum wage sets a floor under income, though the lack of rights to a job
and the possibility of less-than-full-time employment place the true floor
closer to unemployment insurance benefits.
228.
See generally Ansley, Cost Allocation, supra note 215 (advocating compensation); J. Hoult
Verkerke, Note, Compensating Victims of Preferential Employinent Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 1479
(1989) (advocating a theory of systematic compensation under Title VII). See also Iris A. Burke &
Oscar G. Chase, Resolving the Seniorit'/Miinorit* Ivtoffs Conflict: An EmploYer Targeted Approach,
13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 81, 83 (1978) (advocating "full payroll" remedy to shift impact of
unpreferred workers onto employer wrongdoer).
229.
See Richard Fallon & Paul Weiler. Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of Racial

Justice, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 1,62-64.
230. See Ansley, Standing Rusto. supra note 171, at 1757.
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23 1
Legal rules govern collective organization, bargaining, and action.
Law also affects the ways in which the scarcity of jobs in society-itself
affected by state policy-will affect the life of any individual worker
through unemployment insurance and funding for retraining and education.
Scarcity and competition are not a state of nature, but recognizing their role
in reproducing power requires exposing the background rules of law. In
the context of antidiscrimination litigation, the public employment cases
make private capital disappear and fail to raise important questions about
the way the state fails to protect working people in general.

B. CLASS AND STATUS IN THE WORK CASES: REASONING FROM STOTTS TO
ADARAND

[Any] theory [of the social universe] must take as an incontrovertible
truth that the truth of the social world is the stake of a struggle....

[D]epending on ... the distributions of the various species of [economic,
cultural, social, and symbolic] capital, the agents involved in this
struggle are very unequally armed in the fight
to impose their truth, and
232
have very different, and even opposed aims.
The cases on whiteness and work depend ideologically and doctrinally
both on equating class with status and on the invisibility of white norms.
Ideologically-as they describe the world while reasoning about it-these
cases incorporate positioned white perceptions and manifest a concept of
interest in working people that is defined by reference to status,
distribution, and the market. Doctrinally, the cases explicitly limit
transformative possibilities for people of color based on harm to whites,
freezing white privilege while at the same time denying how powerfully it
structures the reproduction of access to work and power. Class is
mentioned only indirectly, as concern for otherwise disempowered white
workers enhances the harm of race-based redistribution. Different concepts
of class and of the interaction of class with white privilege would have
altered the results of these cases.
In Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 233 the dispute

concerned layoffs among Memphis firefighters. The city had settled an
antidiscrimination lawsuit by agreeing to remedial hiring and promotion
policies without mentioning layoffs. When layoffs became necessary,
231.

See generally WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING 01- THE AMERICAN LABOR

MOVEMENT (1991) (emphasizing the ways in which American labor law distributes power rather than
the ways in which it maintains conservative ideology); Rogers, supra note 108 (same).
232.
Bourdieu, supra note 66, atll (emphasis added).
233.
467 U.S. 561 (1984)
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black firefighters, still relatively low on the seniority roster, sued to enjoin
the city from applying the seniority system to effectively reduce the
percentage of black employees. Layoffs were adjusted in order to maintain
the percentage of blacks in the department; ultimately, three white workers
were laid off who would have kept their jobs if the seniority system had
been enforced.23 4 These workers actually had been hired the same day as
the black workers, but the black workers were listed below them
alphabetically in the seniority roster.235 The Court held that reordering
seniority plans to protect black workers against the layoffs was
impermissible under Title VII.
Racial seniority adjustments were
impermissible even though the layoffs had not affected workers with any
real difference in their length of employment, and even though the layoffs
were part of a consent decree settling an antidiscrimination suit brought by
black plaintiffs.
To reach this decision, the Court treated firefighters as comparable to
laborers holding industrial working class jobs and emphasized their need
for protection. A class-based analysis would have looked more carefully at
how these workers were like and unlike other workers, so that the context
of public employment did not conceal working class interest in
redistribution. The Stotts opinion could also have considered the lack of
resources for the unemployed that makes layoffs harsh. If the costs of
layoffs could not be forced onto minorities, more attention might have been
paid to the costs to all displaced workers, such as the need for development
of legislative experiments in better methods for protecting workers in
need. 6 If class interest had been a factor in Stotts, a less formalistic
reading of the conflict would have considered the substantive investment of
workers in the jobs, rather than the formality of their placement on a
seniority list. Also, the class consciousness brought to the workplace by
234. See id. at 567 n.2. The district court found that the seniority system was not "bona tide"not protected under Title VII law-and that the layoffs would have a discriminatory effect. The court
therefore granted the injunction. The appellate court reversed on the question of the validity of the
seniority system but affirmed granting the injunction. Id. at 567.
235. See Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the
Rights of Vested htcumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CORNEilL L. REV. 189, 225 (1992)
(citing Fallon & Weiler, supra note 229, at 5). An identical hiring date seems in layoffs seems likely to
be uncommon, but it is not unique. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996)
(involving employees hired the same day).
236. These opinions reflect a greater willingness to see the burden of layoffs on whites than the
burden that fell on laid-off blacks. Layoffs are reported routinely when occasioned by the drive to
increase corporate profits; if during the course of that downturn a white worker is laid off because of the
reallocation of racial privilege within the workplace, then layoff is shocking.
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black firefighters could be seen as adding to the resources of white
firefighters.

237

Reckoning with class and with whiteness more directly in Stotts would
in turn have affected the holding in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education.238 The schoolteachers' union and the school board in Jackson,
Michigan, negotiated an agreement adjusting layoffs to maintain the
percentage of minority teachers employed by the city. In contrast to Stotts,
which came to the Court as a Title VII case, Wygant addressed the issue of
layoffs under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Powell's plurality opinion took judicial notice of the needs of
workers in other cases and made these workers the paradigm through which
to understand the schoolteachers' needs: "Many of our cases involve union
seniority plans with employees who are typically heavily dependent on
wages for their day-to-day living. Even a temporary layoff may have
adverse financial as well as psychological effects. 23 9 Powell described the
job security needs of workers with those limited resources:
A worker may invest many productive years in one job and one city with
the expectation of earning the stability and security of seniority. "At that
point, the rights and expectations surrounding seniority make up what is
probably the most valuable capital asset that the
worker 'owns,' worth
240
even more than the current equity in his home."
Had class, as well as race, been part of this analysis, schoolteachers
would not have looked to the Court so much like firefighters, and therefore
they would have looked less like teamsters, mechanics, or other industrial
workers. 24 1 Teachers have higher educational levels than the workers
invoked by Justice Powell. Attention to class would not have made the
questions in Wygant simple. 242 It would, however, have contextualized the
237.
Whites who remained after layoffs suffer the loss of that alliance--even if it were a loss they
presently undervalued as the white pulpwood cutters in Mississippi had not understood the value of
overcoming racism before they engaged in shared struggles. See supra text accompanying 147-48
(discussing the GROW project).
238.
476 U.S. 267 (1986). Justice Powell's plurality opinion noted that in Stotts
the Court had
"expressed concern over the burden that a preferential-layoffs scheme imposes on innocent parties" and
held the layoff plan not sufficiently narrowly tailored to accomplish a purpose that "otherwise may be
legitimate." See id. at 282-83.

239.

Id.
at 283.

240.
Id. (quoting Fallon & Weiler, supra note 229, at 58).
241.
Powell's easy analogy reflects the same confusion about class and status that marked the
decision in NLRB v.Health Core & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571 (1994) (treating practical nurses as
managers because they directed orderlies in their work). See supra text accompanying notes 182-89.
242.
It would not be simple because layoffs are in fact the most difficult context for analyzing
questions of racial transformation and redistribution. See infratext and accompanying notes 266-80.
Also, class analysis has had great difficulty grappling with questions of the middle class. "The question
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actual needs of teachers and strengthened the arguments made in the
dissents. Justice Marshall pointed to the fact that this agreement had been
negotiated by a mostly-white union, which agreed to impose this structure
on itself.24 3 Schoolteachers are a well educated workforce, richer in human
capital than most groups vulnerable to such systemic cutbacks. If class had
been considered, the particular situation of the teachers could have
supported their ability to decide the allocation of race privilege among
244
themselves.
Justice Stevens' dissent treated neither race nor power as neutral or
formal matters. Implicitly, he did take a position conscious of class by
treating teachers as having power particular to their profession-authority
figures and educators of youth-rather than reflexively equating them with
less skilled and less educated workers. From this understanding of power,
Stevens argued against the reproduction of white privilege, pointing to the
importance for white people of minority role models: "It is one thing for a
white child to be taught by a white teacher that color, like beauty, is only
'skin deep'; it is far more convincing to experience that truth on a day to
day basis during the routine, ongoing learning process." 245 Stevens argued
that the school board and the union could therefore have sought, as
described in the collective bargaining agreement, "recognition of the
desirability of multi-ethnic representation on the teaching faculty. '246 The
plurality's analysis reflected a dominant white norm in addressing minority
role models only as a need of minority children. In contrast, Justice
Stevens treated the social construction of race as something affecting
whites as well as people of color.
A different approach to class and whiteness in Stotts and Wygant
would have permitted both whiteness and class to be cognizable in City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.247 the case that did most to formalize
of the so called 'middle classes' in advanced societies-their theoretical status, social composition, and
structural position-has been variously referred to as 'one of the most intractable issues in
contemporary sociology' and a major 'embarrassment' forMarxist class analysis." Wacquant, supra
note 68, at 39. "[Flew problems in social science have proved more persistent and more strongly
colored by both ideological commitments and political context." Id.
243. See Wygant,476 U.S. at 310-I1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
244. A crucial fact hidden in the background of Wygant was the state of the economy in Michigan.
If the need forjobs was the focus of concern, Wygant would have appeared as part of the era of decline
that produced Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit. 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (finding economic
development necessary to relieve unemployment and severe economic conditions in the city and the
state).
245. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 315 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
246. Id. (quoting statement of purpose in Jackson's collective bargaining agreement).
247. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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questions of the reproduction of power and lay the basis for the 1990s
decisions blocking racial transformation. Richmond had a proven history
of discrimination in many fields, and national studies had established
correlations between patterns of discrimination and the makeup of the
contracting industry. 24 8 Croson reviewed a set-aside program for awarding
municipal contracts. The Court rejected the idea that the standard of
review should depend on whether the program was designed to benefit
historically oppressed groups and held that strict scrutiny applied to all
249
racial classifications.
Croson is power evasive in two ways: first, in treating racial
classifications as if they have the same meaning and pose the same danger
in all contexts; second, in holding that Richmond had failed to establish a
connection between the low numbers of black contractors bidding on
public contracts and actions taken by the city in furtherance of either public
or private discrimination. Absent legally sufficient proof to the contrary,
white power would not be understood to reproduce itself, and therefore the
years of white majority city governments granting virtually all contracts to
whites did not manifest a racial use of power. Black power, on the other
hand, was presumptively dangerous: the Court expressed great concern that
the new city government that enacted the set-aside program had a bare
248. The long history of official protection of white privilege in Richmond was discussed by
Justice Marshall in dissent. Id. at 534-35, 544-45. However, the Court held that this history did not
support application of the national findings to Richmond; however, the fact that the local government
had finally developed a narrow majority of African Americans did buttress the need to scrutinize the
program. In Croson, a majority of the Court for the first time endorsed the rule that had only plurality
support in Wvgant, holding strict scrutiny applicable to all racial classifications regardless of their
purpose and context in a history of power and privilege. Croson constitutionalized a vision of "race"
divorced from questions of power. Many scholars have criticized the Croson decision. See, e.g., Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 47-53 (1991) (contrasting
formal-race and historical-race approaches to strict scrutiny), Charles R. Lawrence Ill, Race and
Affirmative Action: A Critical Race Perspective, in The Politics of Law 315 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed.
1998) (quoting historian's assessment of discrimination and arguing that "rh lad the Court considered
the historical record, it would have found abundant and uncontroverted evidence that the dearth of
minorities was a direct consequence of long-standing discrimination against African-American
contractors in Richmond").
249. The Court's refusal to assume that minorities will be interested in a field in "lockstep
proportion" to their presence in the population effectively assumes that minorities will not want the
same career opportunities that whites want. The success of the "lack of interest" argument in
discrimination cases is documented by Vicki Schultz and Stephen Petterson and reveals that courts are
willing to attribute employment structures skewed by race and gender to the interest levels of excluded
groups. See generally Vicki Schultz & Stephen Patterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An
Empirical Study of the Lick of hiterest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U.
CHi. L. REV 1073 (1992)
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majority of black members.25 ° Following Croson, Adarand Constructors v.
Peiia25 1 also denied the connection between race and the history of
exclusion, 252 holding that the federal government could not consider
minority race a category of presumptive disadvantage-even in a program
in which disadvantaged whites were eligible for affirmative action.
The Croson decision moved the reproduction of power and privilege
in the business community and its interaction with local government into
the same legal sphere as the cases involving work and workers.
Overlooking class differences is fundamental to the logic of the case. The
case simply does not deal with the same sort of "affirmative action" issues
as work cases involving steelworkers, schoolteachers, or firefighters. The
interests of white working people are not at issue, nor those of underpaid,
overworked schoolteachers. The issue is competition among businesses
(employers) over which company gets to do business with government.
Set-aside programs address the interaction in power and access between
local businessmen and the political structures that allocate spending of
public funds and thereby foster further business growth. These are
precisely the areas in which whiteness reproduces itself in private clubs and
social networks, even after previously excluded groups achieve increased
political power. To reach the Croson holding, the Court had to overlook
class, the social nature of work, the meaning of racial subordination and
privilege, and questions of the ongoing reproduction of power-as well as
distinguishing away the entire history of subordination in Richmond,
Virginia as unreachable "societal" discrimination. In Adarand, the Court
extended protection of contractors to federal as well as state programs,
holding that all state, local, and federal decisions that classified by race are
to be subject to strict scrutiny.
The contractor cases can only be explained through understanding
class as well as whiteness. Courts do not protect inchoate opportunity for
250. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96 (noting that political power in Richmond, Virginia, had
shifted to a majority black city council in striking down fixed minority set-asides for municipal
contracts). See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciosness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060,
1102-06 (1991) (criticizing Court's view of "racial politics" in Richmond). "It is a spectacular irony
that black electoral successes are used to deny black elected officials an equal opportunity to fashion
what they believe to be effective programs for ending second-class citizenship based on race." Id. at
1105-06. Butf Issacharoff, supra note 235, at 247 (accepting the Court's account of the dangers of
black capture of political power in historically white-dominated Southern cities and applying it to
firefighters in Birmingham, Alabama).
251.
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
252. The Adarand decision is also power evasive in another sense. It avoids looking at the
difference between federal and state power to correct past historical racial injustice.
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working people. 25 3 At the same moment as Wygant protected seniority
against collective bargaining, the deindustrialization cases proved that even
long work relationships and settled expectations were not protected for
workers. The Court has found opportunity insufficiently certain to create
standing when the plaintiffs are African Americans. 254 Yet opportunity for
white businessmen seemed so tangible that the Court granted standing even
in the absence of criteria on which it insists in other cases. 255 This is
indeed protection of whiteness, but it is also protection of class privilege.
C.

INTEREST IN CONTEXT

Class action antidiscrimination suits decreased by the 1990s, as did
antidiscrimination suits dealing with hiring. 256 Recent cases have dealt
with either promotions or the award of government contracts. Although the
Supreme Court applies the same logic to cases on hiring, promotions, and
layoffs as to as cases on government contracts, questions of class interest
are quite different in each context. The heavy emphasis on promotions and
layoffs as this line of cases developed allowed the Court to ignore
important questions about the direction of social development and
government priorities favoring or threatening the supply of jobs.
253.
See, e.g., Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am. v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d
1264 (6th Cir. 1980); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN L. REV. 611
(1988) (reviewing the ways reliance is protected in property law and arguing that the court could have
protected the steelworker's interests in theirjobs).
254.
See Girardeau A. Spann, Color Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1424 (1995)
arguing:
When minority plaintiffs file programmatic challenges to widespread patterns of racial
discrimination, the Court typically denies standing because the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a
sufficient likelihood of particularized gain resulting from a favorable judgment.... However,
when nonminority plaintiffs file similar programmatic challenges to affirmative action
programs, the Court typically grants standing, even though the plaintiffs are equally unable to
demonstrate a high likelihood of particularized gain.
/d. at 1424.
255.
See N.E. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 669
(1993). See generally Spann, supra note 254 (analyzing Jacksonville Contractors and the law of
standing).
256. See John J. Donohue Ill & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 984 (1991) (stating that "[a lthough the authors and
early architects of employment discrimination laws envisioned them as tools for opening employment
opportunities to blacks, women, and other minorities, this is no longer their primary use. Instead, the
antidiscrimination laws are predominantly used to protect the existing positions of incumbent
workers"); Schultz & Petterson, supra note 249, at 1096 (showing that class actions and hiring
discrimination suits dropped sharply in the late 1970s).

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76:799

1. Hiring
Does affirmative action in hiring hurt white people? In Wygant,
Justice Powell described affirmative action in hiring as a burden on whites
that was "diffused" generally among society. 257 Justice Stevens, who
defended the general importance of affirmative action in his dissenting
opinion in Martin v. Wilks, still assumed that whites were harmed if people
of color were encouraged to apply for jobs:
It is inevitable that nonminority employees or applicants will be less well
off under an affirmative-action plan than without it, no matter what form
it takes. For example, even when an employer simply agrees to recruit
minority job applicants more actively, white applicants suffer the
"nebulous" harm of facing increased competition and the diminished
likelihood of eventually being hired.25 8

Troubling assumptions underlie the idea that minority outreach in hiring is
a burden for white workers. Even the idea of a "diffuse" burden overlooks
advantages of diversity. Whiteness is transparent for whites until its
capacity to define the dominant norm becomes endangered. Any good job
without color is perceived naturally as a white job. The default position for
hiring is therefore white. Even "more energetic recruiting" decreases the
likelihood for whites of getting hired.
But energetic recruiting always increases the applicant pool and
reduces the chance that any individual will be hired, even if all applicants
are white. If the employer creates an applicant pool of the same size but
greater diversity, any white applicant faces the same amount of competition
and may retain an advantage in past work experience that was created by
discrimination by other employers in the past or other institutions such as
school systems. The assumption about harm implies that whites have a
collective interest in white people constituting the pool, or in the hiring of
other white people. The "more active" affirmative action recruiting
programs are undertaken because a mostly-white applicant pool would tend
to reproduce itself. Work is fundamentally social and embedded in a
network of community relationships. The assumption about harm in
energetic recruiting implies that having white colleagues, not merely access
257. See 476 U.S. at 282-83 (finding that "hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing
only one of several opportunities..."). See also Estlund, supra note 2, at 89:
The potential backfire effect of affirnative, pro-integration preferences is likely to be least in
the context of hiring. Hiring preferences in favor of minority applicants-as long as the
preferences are neither rigid nor too large-are relatively invisible and nonthreatening to
those white employees who are also hired, and who become coworkers with the minority
hires.
258. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755,792 n.31 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to job applications, is ultimately better for white people. Whites will gain
the benefits of working in a more diverse environment.25 9 But the potential
or actual benefits of integrating the work environment-in human relations,
militancy on employment issues, and attention to broader social issues
within the work place-are not cognizable in this framework.
The statement about the burden on whites hides both class interest and
the naturalization of scarcity. Competition is harmless unless there is an
inadequate supply of comparable jobs. Otherwise, a shift in an employer's
hiring practices to more energetically recruit among minorities would be
relatively unimportant to white well-being. The structural background of
the organization of work is also important: a shift from industrial to service
work marked by insecurity and low wages, chronically high unemployment
with inadequate social insurance to cushion its hardships, and dangerously
260
mobile capital that threatens to depart for less demanding shores.
People of color, particularly African Americans, brought gains in class
consciousness to the workplace, especially in the period after the civil
rights movement. 261 If class activism and consciousness were a cognizable
interest of white working class people, the gains for whites that come from
the inclusion of people of color would be considered as well as the
marginal changes in access that flow from ending exclusion.
The
attachment to privilege, not the integration of the workforce, endangers
class consciousness and activism.
In other words, diversifying the
workplace hurts white workers if racism divides workers. But then the
problem is racism, not diversity.
2. Promotions
Litigation about promotions also naturalizes scarcity in affirmative
action cases. By definition, there will never be as many promotions as
there are workers who aspire to them. The Supreme Court refers to
promotions as an intermediate category in terms of their "burden" on white
259.
See Estlund, supra note 2, at 20-29 (discussing benefits of interaction between groups within
the workplace and society).
260. As Fran Ansley points out, the danger that jobs will leave the country entirely has the effect
of linking the interests of employed workers more firmly to the profits of their employers, which also
tends to undermine an adversarial sense of class interest in workers. Telephone Interview with Fran
Ansley (Mar. 6, 1997).
261.
See, e.g., supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (accounts of organizing drive at
Kmart). Michael Honey underlines this point, noting that "African-Americans are now the most
unionized and the strongest union supporters of any social group." Honey, supra note 145, at 21. He
also emphasizes the importance of women, immigrants, and people of color, who are increasingly
responsible for success for the labor movement. Id.
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workers-neither as diffuse a burden as hiring nor as harsh as layoffs. Yet
having to "share" promotions with blacks still triggers treatment of whites
2 62
as "innocent victims" of the burdens of past discrimination.
Promotions are a middle-class concept of the interest of working
people.
Promotion is the individual path of upward mobility, an
improvement in status for the person promoted. In contrast, concepts of
class that are about group relationships of power would emphasize the
collective interdependence of workers seeking advancement. There will
never be as many promotions as there are workers. For most working class
people, therefore, improvement in their work life depends on changed
conditions that are not won individually, and on the ability to work together
to gain more from their work and to transform the system to better meet
their needs.
In a class-based analysis, promotions are important in direct relation to
the lack of other rights in employment and in society. The smaller the total
package of wages, benefits, rights, and comforts secured to people
throughout society, the more important promotion becomes in the life of
any individual worker. The relative importance of promotions is derived
from the lack of other avenues of class advancement and the relative
dignity and comfort of work conditions-the structure of class relations
that law tends to render invisible. As the doctrine evolved in the promotion
cases, the emphasis on opportunity and competition caused the need for
collective advancement among workers to disappear from view.
Integration of systems of authority is an important aspect of justice for
historically excluded groups, because the system of labor control and
appropriation26 3 becomes less tightly connected with racial domination.
Racial diversity in authority may also help workers notice class privilege
and subordination rather than associating privilege so closely with skin
color. To the extent that white workers supported the ability of white
supervisors to reward arbitrarily based on skin privilege, they opened
themselves to arbitrary treatment as individuals. 264 A crucial component of
262.
See In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 20 F.3d 1525, 1549 (11 th
Cir. 1994). The Birmingham firefighters cases reveal the interplay of hiring and promotion policies.
Because of the city's failures in minority hiring, it later had difficulty finding sufficient numbers of
minority candidates for promotions. To meet remedial goals in equalizing higher positions in the
department, it turned to restrictions on promoting white firefighters; those restrictions were later held
insufficiently narrowly tailored to withstand scrutiny.
263.
See generally Brenner, supra note 187 (describing managerial control).
264.
Unless all whites are equally favored, some will also be harmed by arbitrary power. For

example, union membership in one textile factory had fallen below fifty percent, and white workers
were not union members. Fearing decertification, the union began a campaign against favoritism in the
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the transformative project must be to help whites see how they need people
of color on the basis of equality. 265 Rather than defending a property right
in advantageous access to scarce resources, the project becomes (like the
work done with white workers in Mississippi years ago) helping white
workers see the limits of the privileges secured by whiteness and the class

interest in constructing struggle on an antiracist basis to protect the interests
of all.
3. Layoffs

The most troubling claims of harm to white workers arise in the cases
dealing with seniority 266 during layoffs. Most "competitive" benefits
conferred by seniority concern job tenure. 267 The fact that private sector

employees have no independent right to jobs is an important aspect of this
problem. So is the inadequacy of available unemployment insurance and
The scarcity of resources described as
social security systems. 268
shop. Of course, white supervisors tended to prefer white workers-but in reality they only favored a
handful of whites; favoritism in fact disfavored the majority of whites as well as almost all blacks.
Bringing all jobs within the bidding process opened some of them to African Americans, but it also
protected whites who did not curry favor with supervisors. Union membership rose in response, and the
next contract renewal brought the highest raise in the history of that shop. See Mahoney, supra note 38,
at 766-67.
Elizabeth Iglesias argues that law often enforced solidarity based on the ability of a white
265.
majority to subordinate the needs of the Other, resulting in intersecting structures that perpetuate the
subordination of women of color. See Iglesias, supra note 149, at 423-30.
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., the Court noted that seniority was of "vast and
266.
increasing importance in the economic employment system," and that seniority was increasingly used to
allocate entitlement among competing employees and compute "noncompetitive" benefits under
employment contracts. 424 U.S. 747, 766 (1976) (citations omitted). Although this argument implies
that "noncompetitive" benefits are not scarce resources, in fact their value depends in part on the lack of
social benefits available outside the employment context.
The Court quoted an article by Donald Stacy:
267.
[A]ffected by competitive status seniority, are not only promotion and layoff, but also
transfer, demotion, rest days, shift assignments, prerogative in scheduling vacation, order of
layoff, possibilities of lateral transfer to avoid layoff, "bumping" possibilities in the face of
layoff, order of recall, training opportunities, working conditions, length of layoff endured
without reducing seniority, length of layoff recall rights will withstand, overtime
opportunities, parking privileges, and, in one plant, a preferred place in the punch-out line.
Donald R. Stacy, Title VII Seniorits, Remedies in a Time of Economic Downturn, 28 VAND. L. REV.
487, 490 (1975) (citations omitted) (cited in Franks, 424 U.S. at 762). Although the list is long, nine of
the items relate to the retention of work, mostly to layoff or recall. Training opportunities and
promotion, since they may indirectly affect the likelihood of being subject to layoff or the skills which
would affect recall, could also be added to the list. In other words, seniority is as important as the Court
said it was. See Issacharoff, supra note 235, at 220-22 (arguing for the importance of protecting
property rights in seniority for workers).
Fallon and Weiler discussed the possibility that the costs of work downturns be absorbed
268.
through the unemployment system, by encouraging job sharing among workers. Unemployment
systems in Europe and Canada have been revised to provide benefits when all employees lose some
hours of work, not only when some lose their jobs entirely. Fallon & Weiler, supra note 229, at 63.
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"competitive" and "noncompetitive" benefits in the workplace and in
society is important to understanding the cases on seniority and layoffs. A
more adequate system of social insurance would change much of the
pressure currently placed on seniority systems and allow us to discuss
affirmative action on a different, less desperate ground. Seniority is only
partial protection in a system in which capital is mobile and the safety net
is thin at best.269 "Noncompetitive" benefits such as vacation time,
insurance, 270 and retirement plans are similarly negotiated against the
27
backdrop of what society does not provide. '
Even if class interest were better articulated and the needs of workers
better met in American law and society, layoffs would remain difficult and
hurtful because the social aspect of work in human life-the "personhood"
value of work-is important as well. Self-esteem and friendship are
important components of work life. Displacement from work can make
otherwise energetic and engaged people feel, at least temporarily,
powerless. Proposals to make employers pay-including by retaining
additional workers-have occasionally been raised in cases or
But unemployment insurance in this country provides benefits that are meager and that are also
unhelpful to many low-wage contingent workers.
269.
Fallon and Weiler first emphasized the importance of seniority. "At a certain point, the
worker achieves the equivalent of tenure, because he knows that he is sufficiently high on the seniority
list to be protected against nearly any risk of permanent job loss." Id. at 58. In a footnote, however,
they acknowledged that seniority rights may be effectively limited: "Seniority protection may not be as
strong against short-term layoffs ....
Nor is it an absolute guarantee against economic disaster,
involving an employer's bankruptcy, the closing of a plant, or the relocation of operations." /d. at 58,
n.219. They concluded optimistically, without foreseeing the subsequent growth of the contingent
workforce: "Nevertheless, by committing a certain part of his working life to one firm, the employee
can insure himself against most of the vicissitudes that might affect his job security." Id.
270.
The defeat of national health care plans forced unions to spend substantial negotiating energy
arranging health care coverage for their members. See, e.g., NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE STATE OF
THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 251-52 (2002):
1
By the early 990s ... health care costs had risen at twice the level of inflation . . . . For the
unions, this ... meant that the effort to build a private welfare state for their own members,
which had once seemed so promising, now generated a nightmare at the bargaining table and on
the picket line.
During the 1980s management efforts to trim health-insurance costs
precipitated more than 80 percent of all strikes that took place in the United States.
271.
"IT he expected value to the worker of seniority may exceed the actual value of such tangible
assets as his home or accumulated pension benefits." Fallon & Weiler, supra note 229, at 58. Since no
one would suggest taking a white teacher's home or benefits to promote racial equality, Fallon and
Weiler argued, seniority should be protected. Id. But the meaning of such a suggestion would surely
depend on the rights to and availability of shelter and income available for all members of a society.
Given a different constellation of rights, the need to "take" seniority rights could be obviated by the
adequacy of general social protection, or it might be a proposal for relatively painless maneuvers to
adjust social roles in the interest of justice, with minimal attendant costs. If compensation supplied a
house that was comparable or better, not a bed in a homeless shelter or a space under a bridge, the
question of displacement would change significantly-even though emotional attachment to the house
one now has would likely still be great.
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scholarship. 27 2 The aspect of work that involves meeting material needs
could be met by opportunities for other work or better social insurance.

But work is also an important part of our construction of ourselves in the

273
world, and our part in the creation and reproduction of our society.
Improving other aspects of work life and social insurance would not make
jobs truly fungible, though it would radically alter the burdens of layoffs.

Recognizing the social nature of work and the importance of class
reveals an important component of racial oppression that is currently
invisible in these cases. The construction of race in America includes the
presumption of employability that attaches to whiteness and the

presumption of unemployability that often attaches to black communities
and individuals. As a result, black workers encounter more difficulty
securing jobs if they have home addresses in black neighborhoods than in
whiter, more middle-income areas. 274 The employment history of white

and non-white workers-and the capacity to obtain future work-are
therefore part of the social construction of race. Legal opinions do not
address how the meaning of layoffs is shaped by the social construction of
race in America. The impact of racial constructions is not simple. Having
held a job helps establish one's identity as an employable person (for
whites and for people of color), so arguably blacks are proportionately
much better off to have worked at all. This position could support the
current judicial approach that treats hiring as a much more available
remedial measure than protection against layoffs. Blacks experience higher
unemployment than whites 275 and can also expect longer periods of
unemployment when laid off than whites. 276
Because the social
272. See, e.g., Ansley, Cost Allocation, supra note 215, at 374-76; Verkerke, supra note 228, at
1490.
273. For eloquent descriptions of the role of work in social life, see generally Kenneth L. Karst,
The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 523 (1997); Vicki
Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000).
274. The social construction of race in America has shaped racially coded concepts of
employability in which whiteness is culturally linked with employability and minorities with unstable or
lesser employment. See, e.g., Kirschenman & Neckerman, supra note 96, at 203-04 (employers bluntly
expressed overtly racial notions concerning the worthiness of prospective employees and preferred
suburban to inner-city applicants).
275. See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL
103 (1992) (noting that in 1990, average black unemployment was 2.76 times as great as white-the
highest differential since 1960).
276. See, e.g., id. at 102 ("Stated very simply, if you are black in America, you will find it twice
as hard to find or keep a job."); id. at 105 (noting that of "discouraged workers" who have ceased
looking for work because they are convinced they will not find it and are no longer counted among the
statistics of the unemployed, close to thirty percent are black, a much higher proportion than on the
official list of unemployed looking for work); Lori G. Keitzer, Job Displacement 1977-1986, How
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construction of blackness includes stereotypes concerning unemployment
and unernployability, the costs of layoffs are likely to be higher for blacks
than for whites. These stereotypes reveal that current understanding of the
harm of layoffs presumes a white norm. It may be more important to
blacks than to whites to change hiring patterns and simultaneously more
destructive to blacks than whites to be laid off.
Protecting rights for all workers is a collective class interest. In the
context of layoffs, this means lowering the cost of lost jobs and perhaps
adjusting those costs further for workers displaced because of the history of
racial exclusion. 277 Providing retraining and long-term higher-level income
support would avoid simultaneously protecting the entire structure of
privilege and inflicting the costs of transition on the displaced worker. In
other words, the zero-sum game disappears if class interest, not merely
white interest, is taken seriously. 278 Balancing the equities would retain
minority employees when there was little or no difference in seniority
level, but protect seniority for workers who have long-term investment in
that workplace. 27 9 One reason it is difficult to reach this result in the
current system is that worker investment in the job is protected only in the
seniority system-not against plant closure or restructuring, 280 nor against
changes in unemployment benefits relative to wages.
4. Contracting
The reasons to redistribute access to contracting involve the nature of
minority business development under conditions of widespread, continuing
racial discrimination. 28 1 The creation of increased access for minority
enterprises has the effect of strengthening the economy in minority
Blacks Fared Relative to Whites, 1991 MONTHLY LAB. REv 17 (1991) (noting that blacks experienced
longer periods ofjoblessness than whites).
277.

Judge Sarokin had ordered that the federal government must pay long-term compensation in

the New Jersey Firefighters case, but the opinion was withdrawn in light of Stotts. Vulcan Pioneers, Inc.
v. N.J. Dep't of Civil Serv., 588 F. Supp. 716, vacated, 588 F. Supp. 732 (D.N.J. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d
1077 (3d Cir. 1985). See EZORSKY, supra note 55, at 45.
278. In a world historically and currently structured by racial subordination and privilege, many
layoffs will be experienced differentially because of a history of past exclusion. Therefore, class
interest among workers lies in social remedies rather than zero-sum games.

279.

When employees have been hired on the same day, the seniority system is not protecting

greater investment in the job but at best investment in the rules of the system. See stipra note 235 and

accompanying text.
280. In the absence of a union contract, seniority may not be protected at all. And since less than
ten percent of private sector workers are now organized into unions, a majority of workers may not
have enforceable security rights.
281.
See, e.g.. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 465 (1980) (noting Congressional
subcommittee report recognizing that past discriminatory practices affect present economic system).
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communities, promoting economic development more evenly between
These are middle-class access
white and minority communities.
arguments: take a historically weak minority business elite and strengthen
it by ensuring greater opportunities for access and participation. Minority
set-asides do not harm white workers directly; at most, more minorityowned businesses bring some282more minority workers into the pool of
employees on urban contracts.
In the contracting cases, the Court applies precedent originally built on
the rationale of protecting white workers but no longer invokes workers as
a rationale. The Court identifies harm in the decreased opportunity for
white contractors to compete for contracts. In Adarand, the state could
seek to protect disadvantaged businesses, but the Court perceived harm in
the decreased chance of getting the contract for a white business which had
not sought certification as a disadvantagedbusiness. The harm arose from
the fact that non-white racial identity was rebuttably presumed to make a
business eligible for certification as disadvantaged.283
Let us read workers back in. The category of "disadvantaged"
businesses does not harm white workers, who often dream of becoming
businessmen and fail because of undercapitalization, inexperience, and the
other problems that plague small businesses. As Derrick Bell pointed out
about the training program in Weber, working class whites gain from the
establishment of programs put in place to adjust for the history of racial
subordination, since those programs rarely exclude whites. 284 For working
class whites who seek individual mobility between classes rather than class
advancement for all, programs to aid "disadvantaged" businesses are likely
to be valuable. But class mobility for individuals should not be confused
with class-based advancement in general.
282.

Of course, since work is social and discrimination still exists, increasing minority business

with government will likely bring more minority workers in general into urban employment. This is
therefore something like the "increased competition" question mentioned in Justice Steven's dissent in
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 792 n.31 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
283.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the court did not confront the difficulties of this argument
directly, merely citing Jacksonville Contractors on the standing issue rather than confronting the

difference between a race-targeted set-aside program and the Disadvantaged Business Entity ("DBE")
program under federal government guidelines. DBE guidelines compensated prime contractors for the
higher costs involved in hiring disadvantaged businesses which were not the lowest bidders. See
discussion in Casebeer, The Empty State, supra note 105. The Jacksonville Contractors case-which

established standing for white contractors seeking to challenge minority set-aside programs-has been
described as "universal white person's standing" by Pamela Karlan, in The Supreme Court, Racial
Politics, and the Right to Vote: Shaw v. Reno and the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 45 AM. U. L.

REv. 1, 45 (1996), and criticized as "color-coded standing" by Spann, supra note 254, at 1496
(concluding that "the Court is stingier on standing for racial minorities than for the white majority").
284.

See Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Mystique, supra note 50, at 1610.
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So what is the working class interest in which business secures a

government contract? 285 Working people would gain if the award of
contracts was made on the basis of furthering equality. I can imagine a
system which awarded points for the smallest gap between the pay of
workers and management, for excellent records on employee safety, or for
other class-based concerns. 28 6 The Court has not addressed working class

interest in these cases because it did not seriously explore that question in
287
any of the affirmative action cases.
V. ANTI-TRANSFORMATION: THE MOVE FROM WORK TO
POLITICS
Any theory of the social universe must include the representation that
agents have of the social world and ... the contribution they make to the
construction of the vision of that world, and consequently, to the very
construction of that world. It must take into account the symbolic work
of... group-making. It is through this endless work of representation
(in every sense of the term) that social agents try to impose their vision
288
of the world ... and to define their social identity.
A. CLASS QUESTIONS AND POLITICS
There is an interactive relationship between low rates of union

organization and the politics of class in America.

Legal rules make

organization difficult, which in turn diminishes the capacity of workers to
identify and pursue shared interests. The work of bringing labor together
with community activism, always time-consuming, is impeded by labor's
current general weakness. 289 Lack of organization makes workers more
285. As long as the ranks of capital are not well integrated, there is a general social justice interest
in transformative work for racial justice, which is shared by working class people.
286. A worker-friendly contracting criterion was struck down when the National Labor Relations
Act was held to pre-empt a state's effort to ban from state contracts companies which had been found to
have committed repeated unfair labor practices under the NLRA. See Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor, and
Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 291 (1986).
287. On remand in Adarand, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on questions like lending
capital to minority businesses as well as white businesses-issues that show the continuing need at the
corporate level for aflirmative action programs. The history of the case is discussed in Adarand
Constructors, hic. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1155-57 (10th Cir. 2000), cert dismissed, 534 U.S. 103
(2001) (applying strict scrutiny and finding constitutional a program for disadvantaged businesses), and
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) (dismissing writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted because of Adarand's lack of standing to challenge particular regulations).
288. See Bourdieu, suopra note 66, at 10-1I1.
289.

See generally KiM MOODY, AN INJURY TO ALl-: THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN UNIONISM

(1988) (discussing weakness of labor). See also Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Institutionalizing Economic
Jtstice: A LtCrit Perspective on The Imperatives of Linking The Reconstruction of 'Contnunity to

20031

CLASS AND STATUS IN AMERICAN LA W

dependent on protection through state regulation of conditions and terms of
employment. Other urgent interests of working people also depend on state
policy, including the mobility of capital, a floor under subsistence when
capital departs, reeducation and retraining if job skills become obsolete,
and access to health care for the uninsured.
As unorganized workers become increasingly dependent on the state,
they are represented less within the state as workers and more as the
subject of divided political allegiances. Labor participation in promoting
legislation and other government processes is correspondingly
weakened.29 ° Working people become more dependent on general political
representation which is embodied in any given elected official as an
expensive winner-take-all prize 29 1 and need not be directly responsive to
labor in many districts. A local representative must speak for many facets
of constituent interest-taxpayer, homeowner, consumer, person who may
someday need an abortion (or whose wife, daughter, or partner may need
one), immigrant, advocate of a particular position on international issues,
and many more. Systematic political participation for labor is reduced or
may disappear entirely into the notion of a "nation of consumers" whose
shared group interest is in keeping prices down rather than keeping income
up.
The organizational and political weakness of the labor movement also
has racial consequences. Low levels of labor organization lead white
workers to interact less with leaders who are invested in building
multiracial solidarity.
Pervasive residential segregation means that
working class whites often do not live near working class people of color.
Since class formation happens outside the workplace as well as within it,
antiracist class-based activism is a practical as well as a theoretical
challenge. Political leaders of mostly-white districts may not believe they
need interracial support when they build voting bases. The loss of
leadership in organized labor and the transition to less organized
participation within broader civic processes tend to diminish the amount of
The Transformation Of Legal Structures That Institutionalize The Depoliticization And Fragmentation

of Labor/Community Solidarit,, 2 U. PA. J.LAB. & EMP. L. 773, 788 (2000) ("lUinion failures to
participate reciprocally in community struggles over matters unrelated to the conditions of employment
must be analyzed against a history of judicial interpretation that has worked to isolate unions and to
narrow the instances in which unionized workers can lawfully exercise economic and political power.-)
290. Judges import their own class-based concepts of the workplace into lawmaking, with results
that demonstrate ignorance of the power relations of the workplace or disinterest in protecting workers.
ATLESON, supra note 175, at 69-77.
291.
See Lani Guinier, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 79-82 (1994) (criticizing problems of
winner-take-all voting).
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messages white workers will hear about shared interests with people of
color.

29 2

Neither major party 293 is moving to pursue labor-protective legislation
to protect these voters as workers. Their self interest is too seldom
addressed as workers, but there are occasional appeals to them as white
workers. In the infamous political advertisement during Jesse Helms'
senatorial campaign against African-American Harvey Gantt, a pair of
white hands crumpled a slip of paper while the narrator said, "You really
needed that job, but it went to a minority because of a quota.- 294 This
strategy does not acknowledge inauthentic white privilege but, in contrast,
attempts to forge consciousness as a social group around a view of whites
as the objects of race discrimination. In the contested, interrelated
construction of race and class in contemporary America, conscious efforts
to identify, mobilize, or create antiracist class consciousness have been
largely missing.295 A simplistic status approach may implicate the state's
role in distribution (or redistribution) of wealth and privilege but need not
implicate the state's role in organizing and maintaining the production of
296
wealth and power.

After 1995, the AFL-CIO under newly diverse leadership returned to
emphasizing political organizing rather than relying on political
endorsements. 297 Unions were encouraged to address issues rather than
backing candidates or parties and to mobilize voters through grass-roots
292. 1am grateful to Monte Piliawsky for sharing his thoughts on this subject.
293. On the absence of a major party to speak for labor, see Rogers, supra note 108, at 47-54.
See generally Moody, supra note 289 (discussing political weakness of labor).
294. See, e.g., Lloyd Grove, The Ballot of Harvev Gantt: He's Had Six Years to Think About a
Rematch with Jesse Helms. And He's Ready, WASH. POST, May 24, 1996, at DI. These messages told
white workers that they had a natural right of access to jobs, that they were meritorious, and that people
of color, backed by powerful others as an intervention in the natural state of affairs, caused their
problems.
295. See generally MOODY, supra note 289 (describing how the triumph of "business unionism"
after World War II shrank the sphere of union work to wages, working conditions, and particular sorts
of benefits, and noting how that triumph led to less class-conscious mobilization within unions in
general).
296. Cf Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 310 (1978) ("Liberal political theory has
always conceived of the state as being radically divorced from, or rising above, civil society, the realm
of private and group interest.").
297. The new leaders also changed their position on immigration, abandoning the previous
commitment to protectionism. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Urges Annesty fvor Illegal Imnmigrants,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2000, at A26 (describing attitudes of previous decades and new policy advocating
blanket amnesty).
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style efforts. 298 By the 2000 election, labor turnout was the highest it had

been in decades-twenty-six percent of voters were from union
households, although only about ten percent of the workforce was
unionized.299

Class and race were both crucial factors in the 2000 elections. Labor
support was mobilized by grass-roots efforts to turn out the vote. Labor
support, including from white workers, was vital to Democrats.300 Labor
was one of the decisive factors in several states carried by Al Gore, in
which Gore had lost among voters from non-union households. 30 1 The
majority of white men and women from union households voted for Gore
for president. 30 2 Black voter turnout was very high in several states.30 3
298.
See generally Geoffrey Garin & Guy Molyneux, Informing and Empowering American
Workers, Ten Rules for Union Political Action, in NOT YOUR FATHER'S UNION MOVEMENT: INSIDE

THE AFL-CIO 113, 115 (Jo-Ann Mort ed., 1998) (introducing "Ten Rules for Union Political Action;"
rule number one is "lilssues come first, candidates and parties second"). See also Steve Rosenthal,
Building to Win, Building to Last: The AFL-CIO Political Program, in NOT YOUR FATHER'S UNION

MOVEMENT 99, 111 ("Labor's goal has to be more than simply building a machine to elect
Democrats.").
299. See Susan Schmidt & John Mintz, Voter Turnout Up Onl' Slightly Despite Big Drive:
Battleground States Had Major Gains, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2000, at A35 (identifying twenty-six
percent of voters from union households). On the percent of workers in the United States who are
members of unions, see note 172.
300. Paul Frymer has described the "capture" of minorities within a two-party system: when
minority voters cannot afford to switch parties, the party with which they are affiliated can take their
votes for granted rather than working to fulfill their needs. See PAUL FRYMER, UNEASY ALLIANCES:
RACE AN)

PARTY COMPETITION IN AMERICA 87-119 (1999) (describing electoral capture); Id. at 182

(noting that white racism makes building coalitions more difficult for black leaders and tends to
reinforce electoral capture). The Democrats might similarly capture labor-to the extent that labor
votes as a bloc. A history of the relationship between labor and the Democratic Party is beyond the
scope this Article. Organized labor had previously voted strongly Democratic, but then turned out
poorly for the 1972 election and afterward. As a result, the Democrats lost significant numbers of white
voters to the Republican Party during the 1980s. See generally GORDON L. CLARK, UNIONS AND
COMMUNITIES UNDER SIEGE: AMERICAN COMMUNITIES AND THE CRISIS OF ORGANIZED LABOR, 193215 (1989); FORM, supra note 134, (describing impact of labor segmentation on politics); FRYMER.
supra. Voting for the Democratic Party seems an imperfect measure of class consciousness, but
America has no major party that speaks primarily for labor to present an affirmatively class-conscious
electoral choice. Obviously, a two-party system limits the representational choices available to all
citizens, but the consequences are less serious for corporations, which are represented by both parties,
than for labor or minorities.
301.
See Steven Greenhouse, Unions See Signs of Trouble in Bush's Choice for Labor, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2001, at A23 (noting that the "[u]nion members gave Mr. Gore the winning margin in
numerous closely contested states, including Iowa, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin").
302.

See PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, AFL-CIO ELECTION NIGHT STUDY (Nov. 7,

2000) (on file with the Southern California Law Review). See also AFL-CIO Post Election Survey
(2000), at http://www.aflcio.org/inediacenter/resources/polls.cfi.
White women from union
households voted for Gore; he lost among white women from non-union households. Gore also won
among white men from union households, but lost badly among white men from non-union households.
See also Jill Lawrence, Countryv v. City., Spelled in Red, Blue: Election Map Shows Traditional
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Ninety percent of black voters cast ballots for Gore. 30 4 Voting rights
violations in black communities-and a conservative Court that has
protected neither labor nor minorities-defeated that coalition effort.30 5
B.

DEFINING WHITE INTERESTS-COLOR AND POWER EVASION IN THE
VOTING RIGHTS CASES

The primacy of individual rather than group-based approaches to
rights in law tracks the positioned identification of white people as
individuals rather than as members of a race. 30 6 It also affects
consciousness of class. Whiteness and simplistic concepts of status make it
easy for judges to conceive of voting cases as "race" cases when they
concern minority voting rights and "political power" cases when they are
appear to mainly concern whites. Status and whiteness also help explain
why class interest has not been a point of inquiry in the voting cases any
more than class was explored in the cases on work. If class had been
cognizable in the cases on work, it could have changed both the inquiry and
the outcome in Shaw v. Reno and the cases that followed.
Color evasion and power evasion marked the reasoning of Shaw v.
Reno, 307 as the Court reviewed the creation of a legislative district in North
Carolina that spanned many miles of 1-85 through the industrial centers of
the Piedmont district. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion held that the
act of classifying by race is inherently "odious,' 30 8 regardless of whether
the classification creates privilege or subordination or inflicts harm or
deprivation on anyone. All racial classifications therefore trigger strict
scrutiny by courts. The Shaw opinion is color evasive. As many scholars
Demographic Divide Still Strong, USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 2000, at 19A (noting that white women voted
forty-nine percent for Bush and forty-eight percent for Gore).
See Samual Issacharoff, Race and Campaign Finance Reform, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1523, 1526303.
27; Jill Lawrence, Aggressive NAACP Urged African-Americans to the Polls, USA TODAY, Dec. 8,
2000, at 8A.
See Lawrence, supra note 303.
304.
305.
See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CtVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001), available at http://www.usccr.gov (reporting extensive
problems with voting rights in Florida). As Pamela Karlan has pointed out, George Bush was able to
claim a uniquely individual interpretation of equal protection in his Supreme Court arguments which
had been developed through the 1990s voting cases. See Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The
Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345,
1356-60 (2001).
See Barbara Jean Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race, Process, and Constitutional Law,82
306.
CAL. L. REV. 935, 937-38 (1994) (arguing that the process perspective on constitutional law is
identifiably white). See also FLAGG, supra note 18, at I.
307. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
308. Id. at 643.
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and advocates have pointed out, districts are not suspicious when they are
majority-white and near other majority-white districts, no matter how oddly
they are shaped; only proximity to the Other triggers suspicion. 30 9 For
Justice O'Connor, as for Ruth Frankenberg's white subjects, race is

something that good people simply do not notice.3" °

Noticing race is

"odious" because race itself is bad; race became bad because it was firmly
linked to concepts of subordination and inferiority. The plaintiffs' belief
that racial identity should not matter to the use of race under the Equal

Protection Clause is itself an attitude that reflects positioned white views on
race, and the coyness of the Supreme Court's discussion about the race of

plaintiffs in some of these cases reflects the same general reluctance to

3
discuss whiteness. '

Shaw is also power evasive. It is not the exercise of power resulting in
racial subordination, but the act of classification by race that is held to
offend the Constitution. 31 2
Justice O'Connor's use of the terms
"segregated" and "apartheid" reflects a positioned white viewpoint when
describing states made up of many predominantly white districts and a
small number which are predominantly minority (in North Carolina,
black).31 3 The term "apartheid" demonstrates that, to Justice O'Connor,
this feels like racism. 31 4 The assertion that majority-minority districts may
"pull us apart" 31 5 reflects a positioned white belief that "we" are not
309. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588 (1993) (examining racial
gerrymandering); Robert Polsby and Robert Popper, "Ugly": An hiquiry hito The Problem of Racial
Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 652 (1993) (same). Kousser points
out that, after Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996), Justice O'Connor required compactness of majorityminority districts but not of majority-white districts. See Kousser, supra note 164, at 417-18, 488.
310. See supra text accompanying note 34.
311. The Shaw plaintiffs were so color evasive that they did not identify their own race; the
district court took judicial notice that the plaintiffs were white. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 638. See also the
discussion of the published comment by one of the Shaw plaintiffs that he did not think it important that
he and the other plaintiffs were white in Karlan, supra note 305, at 1348-49 (criticizing Robinson 0.
Everett, Redistricting in North Carolina-A Personal Perspective, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1301 (2001)).

312. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting
Rights Law, Ill HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2279 (1998) (criticizing the way that standing doctrine has
evolved without any coherent theory of injury).
313. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as An American Nationalities
Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 94 (referring to North Carolina's twelfth congressional district as
"among the most integrated" in the country).
314. Cf supra text accompanying notes 43-44 (noting that to whites, making white people feel
white feels like racism, because it violates norms of not recognizing one's own race or the race of
others).
315. This reasoning has been criticized extensively. See Karlan, supra note 313, at 93-96;
KOUSSER, supra note 164, at 270-72.
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currently "apart." 31 6 It is consistent with classic Southern white privilege
for whites to believe that race relations are comfortable and undivided
3 17
while blacks perceive division and oppression.
Positioned white perceptions were written into constitutional doctrine
in the cases on the standing of plaintiffs challenging voting districts. In
United States v. Hays,31 8 the Court held that plaintiffs who lived in
majority-black districts had standing to challenge the state's redistricting
plan, but that plaintiffs in a mostly-white district did not. A line that
intentionally divides black from white must intentionally classify by race
on both sides, unless whiteness is invisible. If intentional race-conscious
districting were really the key to finding a constitutional violation,3" 9 voters
from both districts would have standing to bring challenges. 320 The
Supreme Court has been unwilling to grant standing so widely. Instead,
Justice O'Connor asserted a link between classification and political harm
by emphasizing "representational harm"-the message purportedly sent by
the act of racial classification that a political representative need only
represent the particular group that forms the majority of the district.
Representatives from white districts would be told to pay attention to
32
whites, and white plaintiffs would not have standing in those districts. 1
The decision in Bush v. Vera 322 brought the subtext of Hays into the
open and made its rationale incoherent. Although Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion did not mention the plaintiffs' race, they included at least
316. In 1993, just as Shaw was being decided, a study of attitudes of blacks and whites in North
Carolina revealed that white residents tended to believe that neither race prejudice nor discrimination
against blacks, were major problems in North Carolina. African Americans, in contrast, saw
discrimination and prejudice as widespread. Although whites indicated they preferred local ordinances
which permitted segregation, they seldom expressed overt hostility to blacks and expressed few
sentiments that were openly racist. KOUSSER, supra note 164, at 272.
317.
See, e.g., WILLIAM CHAFE, CIVIITIES ANt) cVIL RIGHTS 3-10 (1980).
318. 515U.S. 737(1995).
319. Or if the injury creating standing was the "expressive harm" inflicted on all of society via
"stereotyping" interests by drawing race-based voting districts, see Richard H. Pildes & Richard G.
Niemi, Expressive Haris, "Bizarre Districts,"

ad
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Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 514-16 (1993), voters from both districts, or
the whole state, would have standing. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 312, at 2286 ("When
the government uses race to assign some voters to District X, it tells all voters that race matters."). See
also KOUSSER, supra note 164, at 399-409.
320. Many authors have criticized these cases. See, e.g., KOUSSER, supra note 164 (criticizing
cases); Issacharoff & Karlan. supra note 312 (same).
321.
The Court never addressed the tensions within the "representational harm" theory. "All five
members of the Shaw majority appear to have abandoned the 'representational harm' justification for
the Shaw doctrine." Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1663, 1693 (2001).
322. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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one Hispanic 323 as well as some whites who lived in and challenged a
majority-Hispanic district. 324 Even though the way the district was drawn
"deliberately exclude[d] ...wealthy white neighborhoods," 325 only whites

and minorities in majority-minority districts had standing; plaintiffs from
majority-white districts did not have standing. 32 6 Together, Hays and Bush
reveal that the current Court 327 believes that minority dominance is the

crucial factor that constitutes a presumptive "racial classification" and
creates "personal injury" to a plaintiff. In the anti-transformation cases, the
Supreme Court made power evasion into a constitutional standard.
Redistricting places questions of representation and power squarely at
the center of political contest in America. Shaw is a case about politics,
and therefore about past and future struggle. But that struggle takes place
on odd terms. 328 Legislators may be aware of race while creating electoral
districts (color evasion is held not to be possible when the Voting Rights
Act requires avoiding adverse impact on minorities). However, they may

not be motivated primarily by race in structuring districts, nor may they act
deliberately to maximize political representation for minorities (power
evasion remains possible and in fact is required). If white voters are placed
in majority-white districts, the Court does not presume that those voters
323.
Hispanic is the term used by the court. Another plaintiff, Edward Chen, was AsianAmerican, see Alan Bernstein & R.G. Ratcliffe, Justices Quash Racial Districts; Ruling May Force
States to Hold New Elections, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 14, 1996, at Al (noting that Vera was
Hispanic and Chen was Asian-American). The Court did not mention the race of the plaintiffs.
324.
See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 312, at 2278 n. 15 (1998) (noting that Al Vera, one of
the plaintiffs in Vera, was himself Hispanic and was granted standing to challenge a majority-Hispanic
House District).
325.
Vera, 517 U.S. at 965 ("[District 301 sprawls throughout Dallas County, deliberately
excludes the wealthy white neighborhoods of Highland Park and University Park and extends fingers
into Collin County.") (quoting Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp 1304, 1337-38 (S.D. Tex. 1994)).
Obviously, when white neighborhoods are being placed "deliberately" into districts and excluded from
other districts, they are the subjects of "racial classification" to the same extent as the minority
neighborhoods placed in other districts.
326.
See Vera, 517 U.S. at 957 (denying standing to plaintiff residing in District 25 who "has not
alleged any specific facts showing that he personally has been subjected to any racial classification")
(following United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744-45 (1995)).
327.
But cf. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 155 (1977)
(holding race-conscious districting not subject to strict scrutiny).
328.
Overall, organized labor and racial minorities, especially African Americans, have been a
strong base of support for the Democratic Party. In political redistricting, both "partisan" and "race"based districting involve questions of race, class, and power. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986),
is a case regarding "partisan" control of the districting process; it began with a racial vote dilution case
as well as a partisan gerrymandering case, but reached the Court as a partisan case. The cases were
consolidated after the district court noted that blacks in Indiana voted overwhelmingly Democratic and
held that "the voting efficacy of the NAACP plaintiffs was impinged upon because of their politics and
not because of their race." Id. at 118 n.8. As I argue below, although Shaw was clearly a race case, it
implicitly involved significant class issues.
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have personally been subject to race-based decision-making. Placement in
majority-minority districts, however, created standing for white voters.
Race is acknowledged to be visible, but it will be up to the legislating
bodies to minimize its apparent connection with decisions about power.
Class will not be visible in this process most of the time. The next section
turns to an exploration of interest, as it is understood by the Court, and as it
could be understood.
C. REDEFINING INTEREST: HIGHWAYS, LABOR, AND POLITICAL POWER
Politics is what makes this world go 'round. It is the ruling factor in why
the poor continue to be poor and the rich continue to be rich. This
bothers me a lot. Textile workers in North Carolina are the lowest paid
and the least unionized in the South, where the labor struggle is hard and
329
getting harder every day.

[T]he principles of vision and division of the social world at work in the
construction of theoretical classes have to compete, in reality, with other
principles, ethnic, racial or national, and more concretely still, with
of occupational,
principles imposed by the ordinary experience
33
communal and local divisions and rivalries.
If you tour the locations of labor struggles in the textile mills of North
Carolina, much of your journey will follow 1-85, the interstate highway
through the Piedmont. Start near the Virginia border, where a walkout in
1927 at the Harriet Mill in Henderson began two years of intense and
violent labor struggle in the textile industry regionally, 331 and where a long
bitter strike in the 1950s 332 left the union "deeply defeated but not quite
dead. ' '333 You will pass Durham, where the General Strike of 1934 was
329. Crystal Lee Sutton, Crystal Lee Sutton, in HARD TIMES COTTON MILL GIRLS: PERSONAL
HISTORIES OF WOMANHOOD AND POVERTY IN THE SOUTH 201, 217 (Victoria Byerly ed., 1986). Ms.
Sutton's story was the basis of the movie "Norma Rae," made by Martin Ritt, and starring Sally Fields.
330. BourdieI, supra note 66, at 7-8.
JACQUELYN DowD HALL, JAMES LELOUDIs, ROBERT KORSTAD, MARY MURPHY, LUANN
331.
JONES, & CHRISTOPHER B. DALY, LIKE A FAMILY: THE MAKING OF A SOUTHERN COTTON MILL

WORLD 212 (1987).
332. See generallv Linda Frankel, "Jesus Leads Us, Cooper Needs Us, the Union Feeds Us": The
1958 Harriet-Henderson Textile Strike, in HANGING 13Y A THREAD: SOCIAL CHANGE IN SOUTHERN
TE'XTILES 101-20 (Jeffrey Leiteret al. eds., 1991) (describing strike).
333. Rhonda Zingraff, Facing Extinction, in HANGING BY A THREAD: SOCIAL CHANGE IN
SOUTHERN TEXTILES, supra note 332, at 205. Of course, not every labor struggle lay along 1-85; the
first major victory at J.P. Stevens in 1974 took place in Roanoke Rapids, east of Henderson on a
different highway (though perhaps located along an intersecting railroad line). See James A. Hodges,
J.P. Stevens attd the Uniot: Struggle for the South, in RACE, CLASS, AND COMMUNITY IN SOUTHERN
LAt3OR HISTORY 53-64 (Gary M. Fink & Merl E. Reed eds., 1994).
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"100 percent effective" 334 and a "marvel of self-organization." 335 In
Burlington, at one time the site of the largest textile company in the world,
the General Strike of 1934 brought confrontations between strikers and the
National Guard, and strikers were convicted of conspiracy to dynamite a
mill despite contradictory evidence. 336 Farther along the highway lies
Greensboro, corporate headquarters of Burlington Mills, Cone Mills, and
other textile companies, where paternalism at Cone Mills maintained years
control
of industrial peace that covered simmering resentment; paternalistic
337
Depression.
the
of
time
the
by
struggles
labor
into
broken
had
In Kannapolis, home of the giant Cannon Mills, the needle trades
union UNITE won an NLRB election in June 1999 after 25 years of
organizing. 338 In Charlotte, the financial and transportation hub of the
Carolinas, 339 a long strike in 1919 gained support from the governor and
340
won the first labor victories in textile, promoting unionism in the region.
Before the South Carolina border, 34 1 you will reach Gastonia, where Ella
a strike in
Mae Wiggins, activist and songwriter, was shot and killed during 343
Gastonia.
in
warfare"
class
on
1929;342 the strike of 1934 "verged
The railroad was there before the interstate. 344 During the 19th
century, most mills relied on water power and were located along rivers.
334. See HALL ET AL., supra note 331, at 340. Hall et a]. use the term "General Strike" or
"General Textile Strike" to describe the great labor uprising of 1934. See id. at 328-54 passim.
335. See id. at 341. Durham was home to tobacco factories as well as textiles. See generally
DOLORES E. JANIEWSKI, SISTERHOOD DENIED: RACE, GENDER, AND CLASS IN A NEW SOUTH

COMMUNITY (1985) (discussing industry in Durham and emphasizing the ways in which racism and
segregation constructed a segmented and divided working class).
336. HALL ET AL., supra note 331, at 343.
337. See generally Bryant Simon, "Choosing Between the Haii and the Union ": Paternalism in
the Cone Mills of Greensboro, 1925-1930, in HANGING BY A THREAD, supra note 332, at 81-100. See
also id. at 88 (describing simmering resentment).
338. David Firestone, Union Victory at Plant in South is Labor Milestone, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
1999, at A16.
339. HALL ET AL., supra note 33 1, at xii.
340. See id. at 233-36.
341. This pattern of production in the Piedmont crosses state lines. Textile mills spread across the
state border, along 1-85 through Greenville and Spartanville, South Carolina, and on into Georgia. The
Georgia district that was the subject of repeated voting rights litigation in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900 (995), and Abrais v. Miller, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) also includes an industrial history of textile
development.
342. See HALL ET AL., supra note 331, at 215, 227 (mentioning that Wiggins "lived in a black
neighborhood outside the mill village and, alone among local unionists, tried to persuade black workers
to sign union cards").

343. See id. at 351.
344. The current route of 1-85 follows the approximate route of the Norfolk Southern Railway
from Durham to Greensboro, and of the Southern railway, from Greensboro through Charlotte toward
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Industrial development grew after the railroads reached into coal mining
areas, providing fuel for steam power, and brought cotton and coal to the
Piedmont. 345 Along the rail lines, industry and towns grew rapidly 346 and

"[m]ill building became synonymous with town building ..."347
Highways, like railroads, tie together the industrial centers of the Piedmont.
Their placement is not arbitrary; they track the organization of production,
as materials and people must be moved from place to place.
Along those routes, working people came to the mills and businesses
developed around them. As the textile industry grew through the late
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, mill villages became close-knit white
working class communities; blacks were excluded from all but the heaviest
jobs and lived outside the mill villages. 348 Black workers moved into the
industry in large numbers only after the federal government intervened to
pressure the textile mills for desegregation. They brought militancy forged
from collective action and the civil rights movement into the struggles of
349 Black
textile workers.
support proved fundamental to union successes
3 °
after 1970. "

Racism continued to be used as an anti-union strategy in

fighting organizing drives, however, and many textile companies continued
35
to reserve supervisory positions and better jobs for whites. '
In 1992, the District Director for Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union described the newly created 12th Congressional District in
North Carolina as an unparalleled opportunity for labor in the state.
Running along Interstate 85,352 it concentrated more shops organized by his
union than any other district in the state. 353 If the goal of legislative
districting in North Carolina were to increase the political strength of
working class people, and particularly of organized labor, the Piedmont
workers could be brought together by a district through that textile and
Gastonia. Compare HALL ET AL., supra note 33 1,at xxx (map of railroads and rivers of theSoutheast),
with Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658-59 (containing map of contemporary District 12).
345.
See HALL ET AL., supra note 331, at 9-10, 24-25, 48-49.
346.
See id. at 25.
347.
See id at 24. See also id. at xxx, xxvi (showing maps of railroads and rivers as of 1930 and
density of textile spindleage by county in 1929 showing concentration in Piedmont).
348.
See Wool), supra note 15, at 42 (explaining that the threat to use black labor instead of white
was an effective obstacle to organizing by white workers).
349.
See Michael Schulman & Jeffrey Leiter, Southern Textiles: Contested Puzzles and
Continuing Paradoxes, in HANGING BY A THREAD, supra note 332, at 11.
350.
See id.
35!.
See id. at 11.
352.
District 12 stretched from about 160 miles Durham to Gastonia. See Shaw v. Barr, 808 F.
Supp. 461, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd, Shaw v. Reno. 509 U.S. 630 (1930). The district did not reach

as far north and east as Henderson.
353.

See Joe Alvarez, presentation at Law and Society Association (Philadelphia, May 1992).
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furniture belt along the interstate. But North Carolina has never sought to
maximize working class strength. A sustained period of coalition voting by
blacks and poor whites after the Civil War triggered repeated waves of
opposition. Some of the opposition was cultural, seeking to mobilize
racism in opposition to class interest through racist rhetoric. But the attack
was not only cultural: violence and terror, including whippings and killings
of both blacks and whites, were part of the repression of biracial political
alliance. When North Carolina disfranchised blacks, state leaders had
promised to avoid disfranchising poor whites; in reality, however, the
measures that disfranchised blacks drove poor white voters out of the
political process as well.354

Political economy can easily trace the logic of an electoral district
along an interstate highway. Textile mills and other factories shaped the
economies of towns linked by roads. Construction of the interstate
highway in turn affected the development of industry. 355 Both textile and
furniture production tended to attract further manufacturing in related
industries. The pattern of black communities stretched in segregated
pockets along major arteries of production and commerce is typical not
only of North Carolina but of other Southern states as well.
The working class in North Carolina has been "politically and
economically weak and, as a result of the way in which industrialization
has taken place, socially and geographically fragmented. 3 56 North
Carolina deliberately scattered its urban and industrial centers rather than
develop concentrated urban areas.3 57 Having attracted major industries as
companies fled union organization, the state's leaders energetically pursued
anti-union policies and declined to assist companies with organized
workforces.3 58 In the 1970s, the state's department of administration
354.

See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS 57-62 (1974) (discussing

effects on lower-class whites
disfranchisement; Democrats
(discussing issue of excluding
whites). See also HALL ET

generally); id. at 188-89 (observing that upper-class whites supported
ridiculed "low-born scum and quondam slaves"); id. at 191-92
lower-class whites; temporary grandfather clause as a concession to poor
AL., supra note 331, at 105. See generally Paul D. Escott, White

Republicanism and Ku Klux Klan Terror: The North Carolina Piedmont During Reconstruction, in
RACE, CLASS, AND POLITICS IN SOUTHERN HISTORY 3-34 (Jeffrey J. Crow et al. eds., 1989) (describing

violent repression).
355. See Alvarez, supra note 353 (describing the district along 1-85 as tracking industrial towns
and cities where African Americans lived and worked).
356. See WOOD, supra note 15, at 19.
357. See id. at 161-63.
358. See id. at 165-66. The governor of the state told manufacturers that the efficient highway
system and agricultural labor force allowed industry "to locate away from congestion and at the same
time to draw upon a large and industrious labor supply that is mostly rural. They are stable people who
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favored "creation of a network of smaller urban centers [as] the key in a
settlement pattern for shaping the growth and location of population within
the state." 359 The state also sought to attract militantly anti-union
employers and often proved unfriendly at the state or local level for
360
industries that were higher-wage and unionized.
"Traditional" districting practice in North Carolina would not bring
working class districts together into electoral power. The state prevented
that outcome by design. Bringing industrial districts together would
necessitate linking them across farming areas and other regions. In the
American legal system, there is no leverage that will force legislators to
maximize working class electoral strength. The "one man, one vote"
decisions brought greater democracy to urban areas in which many
working-class voters were packed; beyond that, nothing forced the South to
empower workers. Empowering workers generally in the South would run
counter both to anti-union sentiment and to racism.
Disfranchisement in North Carolina at the end of the nineteenth
century primarily sought to deprive African Americans of participation in
the political process. 36' The state succeeded in this goal but hurt low
income whites as well.362 The modern shift on civil rights that swept into
action during the Reagan administration and bore fruit in the Shaw cases
was part of an attack on gains made by people of color-in North Carolina,
particularly by African Americans-after many years of struggle. But its
rationale is part of a political battle that has a message for working class
whites as well. Elsewhere, I have described how white workers in
Greensboro gained from black community leadership in a union organizing
drive. 363 The Greensboro area has been part of the challenged electoral
district along the highway in North Carolina, but the interest of white
workers in minority leadership has not yet been part of the public
discussion or litigation in this case.
generally live on farms or in the country where they can gather some extra income and additional
independence from some kind of farming." hd. at 163.
359. See id.
360. See id. at 165-66.
361. See KOUSSER, stpra note 354, at 191-94. Some white politicians also sought to disfranchise
poor white farmers and workers; others sought to protect them. See id.
362. See, e.g., id. at 195 ("No longer did either party have to concern itself with the illiterate or
those too poor to pay the poll tax.").
363. See, e.g., Hair, supra note 150, at 670 (describing white workers who responded to the
company's legal attacks on black workers by demanding to be sued as well). See generally Mahoney,
supra note 38 (discussing actions of white workers at Greensboro K-Mart).

2003]

CLASS AND STATUS IN AMERICAN LAW

What is working class interest in the voting rights cases? First,
overcoming the shibboleth that black domination was dangerous for white
people in the South. The core logic of the recent voting rights decisions
recreates that myth by presuming harm to any white who complains of
being placed in a district with a black majority. Striking down majorityminority districts therefore is part of an entire history of Southern politics,
repeating the most reactionary messages to white workers. 364 If "class" is
understood as a process in which consciousness and action interact, then
the claim of harm from black dominance is plainly part of the attack on
working class mobilization. Working class people placed in wealthier
white suburban districts may find their elected leadership consistently
opposing their class interest. Because consciousness and organization
interact in making class, and because Americans have little social
awareness of class, placing white working class people in wealthy white
districts may increase their cultural identification with people of "middle
as well as diminishing
class" status and diminish class consciousness,
365
mobilization.
class
for
opportunities
When white workers rely on white privilege, they tie their future to
individuals and interests who do not share their class insecurity, their
potential for multiracial solidarity, or their dependency on the bottom end
of the regulatory scheme. Therefore, my second claim does not focus on
the interest of African Americans in creating majority-minority districts,
nor do I engage here the question of whether majority-minority districts
best secure democratic representation for minorities. Rather, my argument
concerns shared self-interest among working people of all races in that
North Carolina District-and therefore, the self-interest of some white
people. When a white worker wants to pursue class-conscious interests in
America today, he or she may be best represented within a majorityminority district. Leadership arising from majority-minority districts may
far better than cross-class white
serve class needs of white workers
366
representation.
majority political
364. These cases echo the calls that have always been used to bolster elite domination by
consolidating as many whites as possible against the threat of class-conscious multiracial unity in the
South. See Mahoney, supra note 38, at 755-57 (describing Henry Grady's appeal to whites in Georgia
to consolidate race power instead of class unity).
365. The voting records of politicians representing the areas of North Carolina that became
majority-black voting districts had tracked the Conservative Coalition recommendations with great
consistency (not positions of advocacy for minorities or the working class) until 1992, when the
creation of the new district brought black representatives to office. KOUSSER, supra note 164, at 275
(depicting graph, "Did White Faces Represent Black Interests in North Carolina?").
366. See discussion supra notes 150-52. In Greensboro during the 1990s, white workers
supported a union drive initiated and led by black workers with community support organized by a
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The interest of whites in black leadership is seldom explored in law.
When the Supreme Court finally found the redrawn lines of District 12
constitutional,3 67 the decision was based not on coalitional interest or
working class interest but on the plaintiffs' failure to prove racial motive in
creating the district. The Supreme Court recognized the tendency of white
registered Democrats to "cross over" and vote Republican vastly more
often than black registered Democrats.368
Indirectly, the opinion
recognized the persistence of segregation (by noting a reference to the
"Greensboro black community") and racial division (by recognizing
differences in voting behavior).
But the Court did not recognize inequality. Racial inequality played
no role in the majority opinion, which remained formalistic about racial
motive while adopting a slightly more deferential approach to proving
motive. The Court recognized only the self-interest of legislators, who
might have sought to protect their incumbency as a motive for structuring
the district. The latest North Carolina case therefore left the reasoning
about white interest in Shaw unchallenged. The ten-year fight about voting
districts in North Carolina is an example of the formation of discourse and
social groups around issues other than relations of economic power.
When racial classification, or intentional placement in a majorityminority district, is itself defined as harm to whites, exploration of the
nature of subordination disappears. The reasoning of Shaw makes it
impossible to hold the searching inquiry into the real nature of harm and
interest that is fundamental to increasing class consciousness today. Had
the Court permitted the decisions about collective interest struck down in
Wygant, or had it recognized class structure in any of these cases, it would
help avoid renewing the Old South myth of the danger of black domination
for white working people.
black minister. See id. The Shaw cases implicitly treated the interests of those workers in these areas as
white, rather than as workers or union members, when it held that the "message" sent by the creation of
the majority-minority district was inattentive to their needs. See Shaw v. Hunt, 509 U.S. 630 (1993);
Shaw v. Reno, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
367. Greensboro had moved in and out of District 12 during the 1990s. The district was
successfully challenged in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993), redrawn more compactly after
Shaw v. Hunt, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and then redrawn again, removing Greensboro and the rest of
Guilford County, after the district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs challenging the new
plan. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 545 n.I (1999). In Cromartie, the Supreme Court stated
that if the constitutionality of the district were upheld, the borders would revert to their previous status.

See id. The Court went on to uphold the district in 200 1. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (200 1).
368. See Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 245.
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I argued earlier that when either whiteness or class is ignored, white
workers are placed in an inherently more reactionary position than when
both are considered together. If we notice only whiteness, then working
class whites see only those aspects of self shared with more elite whites,
and fail to see those aspects of self shared with people of color. If we
emphasize only class, this shift does not make race disappear from
American society. Rather, because whites do not see white privilege and
white norms as a matter of course, demands for inclusion from people of
color are experienced as disruptive and destructive of a natural state of
affairs.
Formalism on race combined with the invisibility of class-the
approach in Shaw and its progeny-places white workers in the most
reactionary position. For white workers, transformative work requires
recognition of structures of power and of mutual need. This includes,
eventually, developing of an understanding of the limits that racism
structures into class advancement. It includes recognizing the potential for
labor mobilization in majority-minority districts. It includes the need to
integrate union leadership and the need to work with leaders of minority
communities as allies in labor struggles. 369 Transformative work, in other
words, will mean reconciling concepts of mutual interest and self-interest
that are not often explored in America, articulating shared interest and
working to put that vision into practice.
VI. CONCLUSION: POWER, HARM, AND INTEREST
but
Change in material life determines the conditions of [ ] struggle,...
370
the particular outcome is determined only by the struggle itself.
Class matters to legal doctrine. If class were cognizable, the cases
would have come out differently. Class also matters to justice. The cases
should have come out differently, and the exploration of class and power
provides a method that can change the ways conflicts have been framed
and turn the framework of legal thought in a better direction. Finally,
justice matters to class. Claims about morality, about interest, and even
about legality are part of the mobilization of social groups and the
construction of conditions that promote, or obstruct, solidarity.
Law has not been the only force diminishing class consciousness in
America or discouraging solidarity. Law alone cannot determine whether
369. See ERIC MANN. TAKING ON GENERAL MOTORS 161-64 (1987).
150-52 (discussing the Kmart organizing campaign in Greensboro).
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white people voluntarily work with people of color on terms of equality, or
whether they find common ground in politics.3 7 ' But law does affect the
interaction of whiteness and class. Explicitly and implicitly, it identified
harm to white people from transformative programs that included people of
color within the workplace.
Also, law shapes race-biased political
standards under a guise of race-neutrality. By pretending that the status
quo in political districting was neutral, these standards disempower people
of color. By ignoring the ways in which the status quo disempowers
working class people, the cases keep questions of class and power out of
public debate.
The Rehnquist Court has not protected working class interests, and the
cases limiting racial transformation do not address class interest directly.
Searching examination of class and interest is necessary in many contexts.
For example, rather than cooperating in the treatment of "class-based
affirmative action" as a category opposed to "race-based affirmative
action," defending affirmative action as a tool of shifting power is
important to people of color and to labor. Defending affirmative action
involves structuring programs for inclusion on the basis of both race and
class and recognizing, in both contexts, group relationships of power. The
different goals of aiding businessmen, students, and laborers should be
addressed by courts with specificity. Challenges and revisions to municipal
set-aside plans should be addressed in terms that favor an end to racial
exclusion and take class interest seriously, rather than merely protecting the
white businessmen. The capacity of labor to organize and to speak
politically needs protection. Antiracist, class conscious leadership needs
support within unions and within communities.
The challenge in law is to make class visible and to examine what it
means. The frameworks that have posed class interest for white workers
against the interests of racial minorities in structural transformation are
inadequate and misleading. The march backward on minority rights has
happened under a banner of protecting disadvantaged whites. In the
interest of working class white people, as well as people of color, that
particular flag should be torn down.
371.
Law does directly control choice at least in part by making third parties virtually impossible,
thereby ensuring that working class people vote Democrat, Republican, or, much of the time, not at all.

